amounts to a "little contention," "such a small rebellion," "some bit of Bumbledom, which has neither independence nor novelty." Moreover, "the idea was familiar to and admitted by " Mr. Darwin, with whose "more general conception it was strictly congruous and harmoniously subordinate." Surely here is indeed a great confession; but it is not on the side of the Duke? With an imposing flourish Mr. Spencer is brought forward to curse the ranks of the Darwinians, and lo, he ends by blessing them altogether!

But even this is not all. "I have elaborated this criticism," Mr. Spencer wrote, "with the intention of emphasizing the need for studying the changes which have gone on, and are ever going on, in organic bodies, from an exclusively physical point of view."+ In other words, his "rebellion" against natural selection is undertaken for precisely the opposite object to that which the Duke has in view: Mr. Spencer has elaborated his criticism, not in order to show that Darwinism is too "materialistic," but in order to show that it is not materialistic enough. "He goes himself into the confessional," we are told; but what is it that he confesses? He confesses merely that hitherto he has himself failed, as in his opinion Mr. Darwin also failed, adequately to express in words or phrases the purely mechanical nature of all causation within the region of life and of mind. Here, then, is surely a most extraordinary spectacle. A priest finds a repentant sinner in "the confessional," and the only contrition expressed by the penitent is, that hitherto his sin has not been sufficiently sinful. Then, instead of ejecting his penitent as an impostor, the priest calls upon us all to rejoice, for that a notorious infidel has indeed made a great confession!

This, however, is by the way. Mr. Spencer has already replied on his own behalf, and shown that the "Great Confession" attributed to him amounts to nothing more than a Great Confusion on the part of his critic. What I have now to make clear is that in one of its aspects this great confusion involves a confounding of natural selection with natural causation. The author of "The Reign of Law" is not satisfied with the "cosmo-theology" of Baden-Powell,§ alias the "wider teleology" of Professor Huxley, || which would save the Argument from Design (if it is to be saved at all) by placing it upon the order of Nature as a whole. He prefers to rest in the argument as this was presented by Paley, who, ignoring the agency of physical causes, expressly took his stand upon what is either the truism or the untruth that "there cannot be contrivance without a contriver." It is needless to say that the "wider teleology" is really the more

Nineteenth Century, January, 1888. + "Factors of Organic Evolution," pp. 42, 3. Nineteenth Century, February, 1888. § "Essays and Reviews." "Life and Letters of Charles Darwin," vol. ii. p. 201.

⚫ancient, or that the narrower arose from an implied belief in the special creation of organic types. All I am now concerned with is to remark, in the language of Professor Huxley, that "the teleology which supposes that the eye, such as we see it in man, or in any of the higher Vertebrata, was made with the precise structure it exhibits, for the purpose of enabling the animal which possesses it to see, has undoubtedly received its death-blow.* The reason of this change is that the natural causation of the eye is no longer wrapped in hopeless mystery, but has begun to become intelligible through the theory of natural selection, and therefore to take its place among all other phenomena of the universe as one in kind with them. This change seems to the Duke anti-theistic; the Darwinian theory he regards as "mechanical." mechanical." And mechanical the Darwinian theory unquestionably is, though whether on this account it must also be regarded as anti-theistic is another question, and one upon which opinions are reasonably divided. But that it is mechanical there can be, as I have said, no question. And the reason why it is mechanical is because it seeks to explain biological phenomena by natural causes. Therefore the quarrel which our author has with natural selection he has with it in its capacity as a natural cause; therefore, also, he feels that nothing is really gained by Mr. Spencer's "small rebellion" against natural selection, seeing that Mr. Spencer's only object is that of supporting another cause equally natural-namely, the Lamarckian principle of Use and Disuse; and therefore, lastly, he seeks to show that natural selection is not really a cause at all, but a mere phrase," a metaphor," and so on.

This, then, I say, is the great confusion; the Duke mistakes his antagonist. Furiously he assails natural selection as a cause on account of its being mechanical: he does not perceive that any other natural cause, or combination of natural causes, must be equally so. Granted the theory of organic evolution by natural causes, and it can make no possible difference in relation to teleology by what particular natural causes the results may have been brought about. The proof of such evolution as a fact, which the Duke accepts, carries with it the whole position which he is endeavouring to defend. In short, the quarrel which he has with natural selection he has with it, not quá selection, but quá natural; and, therefore, it is not against this theory in particular, but against the theory of evolution in general that his attack must be directed, if, as I have before said, it is to be directed with any logical aim.

But the proof of evolution as a fact, in contradistinction to natural selection as a cause, is too overwhelming to admit of question even at the hands of the Duke of Argyll. In conclusion, therefore, "Life and Letters of Charles Darwin," vol. ii. p. 201.

let us ask, What is the logical relation of this fact to the theory of Design?

Clearly, in the first place, this fact reduces all the phenomena of organic nature to the same category of physical causation as those of inorganic nature. The "mechanisms" which are so much admired in living organisms must be held to have been the results of agencies themselves as "mechanical" as those which "pre-determine" the rain to fall, or "adapt" the rivers and the lakes to their several beds. and basins. But now, whether these wonderful mechanisms, so innumerable in organic nature, are to be attributed to survival of the fittest, or to other and hitherto unsuggested principles of a natural order, the question still and equally remains open whether behind such causes of a physical kind there may not be a causa causarum of a psychical kind. For it may very well be that unless they were themselves ordained by a disposing mind, these physical causes could neither have come into existence, nor afterwards have conspired to produce, by their combined activity, an orderly cosmos. All that is done by the theory of natural selection, or by any other possible theory of a scientific kind, is to suggest, with more or less probability, a modus operandi; but who, or what, it may be that is ultimately concerned in the energising of the process, is a question which natural science can never be in a position to answer. All, therefore, that is done by Science when, at each successive stage of her progress, she furnishes natural explanations of phenomena previously attributed to miraculous interventions, is to throw back the question of Design from the facts immediately observed to the causes subsequently discovered. And there the question must be left by Science, to be taken up by Philosophy.

Now, looking to the long series of historical parallels in the past, Philosophy has ceased to be surprised when a new case of this kind is referred to her decision by any of the lower courts of Natural Science. And those who are nowadays qualified to occupy her bench have so fully learnt to anticipate such appeals, that they look forward with confidence to the time when all cases where any question of teleology is concerned will require to be tried within her precincts-when all men will recognize that no question of teleology can be heard on the merits of mere phenomena, however wonderful ; but only on those of the Causes of Things in their relation to that Final Mystery of Things, which, whatever be its nature, is presumably as much concerned in the fall of a sparrow as in the destruction of a world.

GEORGE J. ROMANES.

THE INVASION OF PAUPER

FOREIGNERS.

SELECT COMMITTEE of the House of Commons has recently

A been appointed to inquire into the immigration of foreign

paupers. The subject is one fraught with difficulty, owing to the absence of any published returns of such immigration, and the following remarks are penned, partly in the hope of lightening the labours of the Committee, but chiefly by way of reply to an article by Mr. Arnold White under the above heading.

*

The gist of the article in question lies in the proposition that the time has now come for the British Government "to stem the rising tide of foreign pauper immigration.”

This appeal for State intervention involves questions of grave import: it means nothing less than complete reversal of a portion of our domestic policy; it trenches upon the dangerous borderland of international comity. And yet it will be readily conceded that the stress and strain of existence may become so acute that some restraints upon immigration-harsh and inhospitable though they must always be -will become an absolute necessity for the commonwealth. Movements of population are, without doubt, of far too great importance to be left to their own internal motives and caprices: emigration and immigration alike should be the care of the statesman, and be regulated in accordance with the exigencies of the economic situation. Has such a case, then, of absolute necessity yet arisen, and if so, what evidence does Mr. White adduce in support of this conclusion? What are his statistics? On what does he found his arguments?

As regards statistics, none are given; indeed, he does not appear to attach any particular value to them; the question, he says, is not how many immigrants there are, but what is the effect produced by *In the Nineteenth Century for March last.

those who actually settle among us. He is content to rest his case upon a statement by Mr. Burnett in his well-known report upon the sweating system, upon a remark by Dr. Herman Adler that immorality is spreading amongst immigrant Jewesses, and upon a passage in the report of the Jewish Board of Guardians, published in February 1887.

Mr. Burnett says "that the influx of pauper foreigners (chiefly, as he explains, German and Russian Jews) has flooded the labour market of the East-end of London with cheap labour to such an extent as to reduce thousands of native workers to the verge of destitution." Had the labour correspondent of the Board of Trade known how vast a superstructure of argument would be raised on the basis of this paragraph, it may well be doubted if he would have couched it in such general terms. The sting of the statement lies in the word "pauper," for Mr. White would probably hesitate to invoke legislation against foreign immigrants, apart from the question of pauperism. Now, with all the deference due to Mr. Burnett's opinion, his views on this point are open to the following criticism. They are, in the first place, contrary to his wont, uncorroborated: this may arise, either from lack of evidence, or possibly because the subject was conceived to lie somewhat outside the scope of his inquiry; in the second place, they are opposed to the experience of other competent authorities.

The popular notion regarding the immigration of aliens into London appears to be that these aliens are mostly Jews, whose habits are degraded, and who are the inventors of the sweating system. Even Mr. White states boldly that the majority of the pauper immigrants are of the Hebrew faith. Now the Jewish Board of Guardians is undoubtedly brought into contact with all Semitic arrivals of the absolutely pauper class. They become acquainted with their trades and tabulate carefully their nationality. The annual reports issued by the Board present a noble record of unceasing charitable effort to cope with surrounding distress. To those who are disposed to cavil at the conclusions arrived at in these reports, or to hint that the Board is prone to take a biassed view by reason of sympathy with co-religionists, it is sufficient to reply that in each case chapter and verse is given, and statistical evidence supplied in support of allegations. This body of gentlemen, then, have placed on record the following, amongst other opinions (see reports for last three years):1. That Jewish immigrants do not appear to arrive in any greater proportion than non-Jewish.

2. That but few of such Jewish immigrants arrive in a state of

actual destitution.

3. That during the past year there has been a marked decrease among the Jewish immigrant poor.