poses. Much progress has already been made, and nothing has done so much to clear the political atmosphere of Europe as the recent publication of the treaty, concluded some years ago, between Germany and Austria. Though it may have been known before to those whom it most concerns, its simple avowal has opened the eyes of both the Russian and the French people, and has shown them what are the risks which they have to face if they mean once more to disturb the peace of Europe. The treaty of amity between Germany and Italy has not yet been divulged, but politicians must be very dull if they cannot guess its spirit. That Spain and Sweden are animated by the same love of peace as Germany, and that they anticipate danger from the same quarters which threaten Germany on the East and on the West, has likewise been shown by signs that cannot be misunderstood. What remains to be done in order to complete the European League of Peace? Nothing but a clear understanding between Germany and England. This is the work which Providence seems to have carved out for the present Emperor of Germany. There is no time to be lost, and he should try to achieve it with all his might.

It is not an easy work; if it were, it would not have been delayed so long. But never was there a time more favourable than now. England and America are forgetting their petty rivalries, and there is a strong feeling on both sides of the Atlantic that war between two kindred nations would be an absurdity, and that all questions that might lead to war should be decided by arbitration. The recognition of such a principle by two of the most powerful nations in the world must react in time on the minds of European statesmen. England and Germany too are kindred nations, and though divided by the "silver streak," they feel more and more, as dynastic policy is giving way before the supremacy of the national will, that blood is thicker than water. The little squabbles arising from the new colonial enterprises of Germany are unworthy of two great nations. There is room in the world for both of them, and even side by side no colonists can work so heartily together as Germans and Englishmen.

But what makes the present moment particularly favourable for diplomatic action is the existence of a strong Government in England, a Government above party, or representing the best elements of both parties. Even those who form the Opposition seem, with few exceptions, to be inspired by the same sentiments with regard to foreign policy as those which Lord Salisbury has very openly expressed. There is, of course, a strong feeling that England should not with a light heart enter on a quarrel with France, but there is no necessity whatever for that. Whenever England and Germany can come to a perfect mutual understanding, the League of Peace will become so

powerful that no gun can be fired in the whole of Europe against the combined and compact will of England, Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden, and Spain. To no countries will the formation of such a league be a greater blessing than to those against whom it may seem to be formed, France and Russia. If Russia can be taught that wars of conquest in Europe are hereafter a sheer impossibility, she may continue the conquest of Central Asia, or, better still, begin the real conquest of Russia by means of agriculture, industry, schools, universities, and political organization. If France finds herself faced once for all by the determined No of England, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain, she may again enjoy peace with honour at home, and this her toiling millions will soon learn to appreciate far better than honour without peace abroad.

No doubt such a Peace-Insurance requires premiums. Each country will have to sacrifice something, and make up its mind once for all as to its alliances in the future. England has to choose between an alliance with Russia and France, or an alliance with Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Sweden. The former means chronic war, the latter peace, at least, for some time to come. As to a mere dallying policy, it is not only unworthy of a great nation, but in the present state of Europe threatens to become suicidal. Nor should there be any secrecy about all this, but, as in the case of the treaty between Germany and Austria, there should be perfect outspokenness between nation and nation. The benefit will be immeasurable. England, Germany,

Austria, Italy, Sweden, and Spain, all want peace. Not one of them wants an inch of ground in Europe more than they have at present, and yet they are crushed and crippled by their military armaments which are necessitated solely by the unfulfilled ambition of France and Russia. The majority of the French nation is still hankering for war, and if Russia could only be persuaded to join the French Republic against the German Empire we should have another war more terrible than any which our century has witnessed.

But will not even France and Russia combined recoil before the determined and united will of Europe? The present Emperor of Germany is a true German, but he knows that above patriotism there soar the higher duties of humanity. The present Government in England is a patriotic rather than a party Government, and it has learnt this one lesson at least from the experience of Free Trade, that the welfare of every country is intimately connected with the welfare of its neighbours. The present Government may dare to do what no mere party Government would have power to do. It can speak in the name of the whole nation, and pledge the good faith, not of one party only, but of the English people at large, in support of a foreign policy which would change, as if by magic, the whole face of the world, and relieve millions of toiling and almost starving

people from the crushing weight of what is called the armed peace of Europe.

There is here a glorious battle to win, more glorious even than Königgrätz and Sedan, and whatever the future may have in store for the new Emperor, this work is distinctly pointed out for him to do. He has often, brave soldier that he is, expressed his horror of war, and has never hesitated to show his love and admiration for England, sometimes perhaps more than his own countrymen have liked. What the feelings of the English people are for him and his consort has been clearly shown during the last weeks. England has been truly mourning, and not even in their own country could more fervent prayers have been offered for the Emperor and the Empress, or more hearty sympathy have been expressed for them in their sore trials. Whatever the terms may be on which England can join the League of Peace, the Emperor may be trusted as an honest friend and mediator. His task will be no easy one, for his loyalty will never allow him to forget what is due to Russia as a powerful neighbour, and on many occasions a faithful ally. And if any one is strong enough in Germany to dare to satisfy some of the national desires of France, it is again he alone who as Crown Prince was ready to sacrifice his life for the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine. His impulses are generous, sometimes too generous, and will have to be moderated by that wise counsellor to whom the new Emperor looks up with the same trust and loyalty as his father before him. But if the new Emperor craves for work, real work that is worth living for, the work is there ready for him. As long as there is life there is hope, and as long as there is hope there ought to be life and work and devotion to Royal duty. The greatest of the Hohenzollerns have always been distinguished by their indefatigable industry, their self-denial, and their exalted sense of duty. The world will wait and watch with the deepest interest whether even the shadow of death, under which, after all, all human endeavour has to be carried on, will be able to darken, or will not rather bring out in fuller relief the noble qualities inherited by the present Emperor, and which from his earliest youth have made him the hope and the darling of his people.

F. MAX MÜLler.

NEW JACOBINISM AND OLD MORALITY.

"Quid civitates sine justitia nisi magna latrocinia?"

AUGUSTINE.

SUPP

(UPPORTERS of national unity have made one grave mistake: they have relied far too much on appeals to reason and to common sense; they have not addressed themselves with anything like due vigour to the moral convictions of the people. The error was explainable; the Unionist position is so strong on the side of policy and experience that its defenders have naturally trusted to argument, and have neglected appeals to feeling or passion. But the mistake, though a natural, was a serious error, and has worked untold damage to the Unionist cause. Gladstonians have obtained the monopoly of all the taking phrases which have, with the majority of mankind, tenfold the force of cogent reasoning. "Justice to Ireland," "repentance for past wrongs," " pity for suffering," " the superiority ""the of the rule of love to the rule of law"-these and the like catchwords have become the property of rhetoricians who, bankrupt in argument, are rich in sentimentality; in public as in private life the man of sentiment is assured of popular favour. Joseph Surface is admired by persons far worthier than himself, till experience proves that a man of sentiment need not be a man of sound morality. Large bodies, again, of Englishmen have come to believe that a party which did not dwell upon the moral strength of its policy was conscious of some moral weakness in its cause. The damage done by this suspicion has been, in the strictest sense, incalculable. The English people are far more accessible to ethical convictions than to intellectual ideas. Slavery was abolished, not because the maintenance of slavery was impolitic, but because English men and English women became convinced that slavery was wrong; the fall of Lord Beaconsfield was certain from the moment when the

electorate believed that the maintenance of a Tory Government in England involved the continuance of tyranny and torture in the East; the cause of Italy was won at the bar of English opinion when the defence of Rome made patent to every man and woman throughout the land the immorality of intervention by Republican France on behalf of Papal despotism. This influence of conscience on English opinion is no recent phenomenon, but a permanent national characteristic. Outraged moral feeling engaged the English people, heart and soul, in the war with France. Burke as an advocate of conciliation with America could not obtain a hearing: Burke as the denouncer of the Regicide Peace roused the whole nation to arms. The cause of the difference is obvious. During the contest with America Englishmen believed that they were fighting in a just cause, and they paid no heed to the statesman who bade them forego their rights. When Burke denounced all compromise with the French Republic he was aided by the teaching of events. Every mail from Paris told of violence, bloodshed, treachery, and Burke easily convinced Englishmen that Jacobinism meant wickedness. From the moment when that lesson was learnt the policy of England was fixed past recall. There is no need to argue that Burke's view of French affairs was equitable or complete, though recent investigations into the dark places of revolutionary history demonstrate that Burke's insight, coloured though it was by passion, penetrated far more deeply into the true nature of the Revolution than did the rhetorical benevolence and the ignorant enthusiasm of Fox. What at the present time must be pressed home upon the attention of thoughtful men is that at the close of the last century, as at every crisis of our fortunes, the moral convictions of England determined the action of the nation. Englishmen, in common with all races gifted with political instincts, have always exhibited deeper confidence in the elementary rules of conduct than in the maxims of statecraft; and in this the English people have shown wisdom, for the elementary precepts of ethics are nothing else than the best established laws of political science. Let the idea prevail that the Unionist position is morally unsound and the Unionist cause is lost. The suspicion, however, is groundless. My aim is to show that the cause of Unionism is founded on the plainest rules of morality, and that the supporters of the Union are not only the wise, but the moral party. To establish this, let me add, is to do more than merely strengthen the hands of statesmen contending for the unity of the nation. The proof of my position puts us all in a better situation for understanding the contest in which we are engaged, for it shows that the differences between Unionists and Gladstonians are caused not so much by the faults or mistakes of individual politicians, as by profound differences of principle which, even were our Irish difficulties removed, would still divide the nation into hostile camps.