The court will direct an account of past partnership transactions, though the
bill does not pray a dissolution; but it will make no order for carrying on
partnership concerns, unless with a view to a dissolution. Richards v. Da-
vies, 68.
1, A testator devised his freehold and copyhold estates, charged with annuities
for his sons and daughter, upon trust, to invest and accumulate the surplus
produce thereof for the benefit of his grandchildren then born or thereafter
to be born, until the youngest should attain twenty-one, when the accumu-
lations were to be equally divided among such of his said grandchildren as
should then be living; and he directed that, in case any of his said sons and
daughters should be living after the youngest of his grandchildren should
have attained twenty-one, the residue of the said rents and profits should be
further accumulated, and that such last-mentioned accumulation should be
equally divided among all his grandchildren who should be living at the
death of the survivor of his said sons and daughter; and, charged as afore-
said, he directed that, immediately after the decease of such survivor, the
whole of his said estates should stand charged for twenty years with the
payment of two third parts of the clear produce of his said estates, in equal
shares and proportions of so much money as would, in fifteen years, make
in the whole 30,000l., which sum, with the interest and produce thereof, he
directed should be divided equally among all his grandchildren who should
live to attain the age of twenty-one, their executors or administrators. The
testator died in the year 1812, leaving ten grandchildren, of whom nine
were the children of one of the annuitants, and the tenth was the child of
a son of the testator, who died before the will was made: no grandchildren
were born afterwards, but those who survived the testator lived to attain
twenty-one, the eldest having come of age before the execution of the will,
and the youngest, in the year 1830: the last survivor of the testator's chil-
dren died in the year 1831. Shaw v. Rhodes, 324.
2, Held, that the limitation creating a charge of two-thirds of the produce of the
estates for twenty years, was a provision for accumulation within the meaning
of the 39 & 40 G. 3, c. 98; that it was necessarily to be connected with the
two prior trusts for accumulation, which determined in the year 1831; and
that it was therefore effectual for two years only, and was void for the re-
maining eighteen, being the period by which, when superadded to the
duration of the preceding trusts, it exceeded the limits within which accu-
mulation was allowed. Ibid.
3, Held also, that such limitation for the benefit of the grandchildren was not a
provision for raising portions for the children of a person taking an interest
under the devise, within the exception contained in the second section of the
act. Ibid.
1, Under an order, made at the hearing, that the cause should stand over, with
liberty to the plaintiff to amend his bill by adding parties, as he should be
advised, or showing why he was unable to bring all proper parties before
the court, the plaintiff is not entitled to add parties as co-plaintiffs and intro-
duce new statements and charges in the bill relating to such co-plaintiffs.
Milligan v. Mitchell, 455.
2, The provisions of the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 94, and the twentieth of the orders of
December 1833, made under the authority of that act, do not apply to an
order at the hearing, giving the plaintiff leave to amend, or to applications
with respect to amendments made in pursuance of such an order. Ibid.
3, The court will not prescribe the particular form and mode in which such an
order is to be carried into effect. Ibid.
4, Where amendments are introduced into a bill irregularly, and the defendant
does not come to the court to complain of the irregularity, but by his answer
to the amended bill insists upon the objection, and reserves to himself the
same benefit of it as if he had pleaded it in bar, the objection may be urged
at the hearing, and will entitle the defendant to the costs. Ibid.
5, An order, made at the hearing of a cause, and giving the plaintiffs leave to
amend, for the purpose of adding parties or showing why they were un-
able to bring all proper parties before the court, is sufficiently complied
with by an amendment, stating that the plaintiffs sue on behalf of them-
selves and all persons (other than the defendants), who fill a particular cha-
racter, and alleging that the persons filling that character are so numerous,
that if they were individually made parties, the suit could not be effectually
prosecuted. Ibid. 495.
Upon a bill for discovery in aid of the defence to an action at law, an order
having been made for the production of documents in the hands of the de-
fendant, the execution of the order was stayed, pending an appeal to the
House of Lords; upon the ground that, not only would the execution of the
order render the appeal useless, but also that the effect of suspending the
order would be to delay the demand of the defendant himself, who was the
plaintiff at law. Leave was given to the plaintiffs in equity to suggest any
precaution as being necessary to prevent irreparable loss to them from the
delay; e. g. such as might arise from death of witnesses or loss of docu-
ments. Storey v. Lord John George Lennox, 578.
1, A married woman, to whom a rent-charge for life in reversion is devised to her
separate use, without the intervention of trustees, joins with her husband in
assigning it for a valuable consideration: she is bound by that assignment
after the death of her husband. Major v. Lansley, 73.
2, The contingent reversionary interest of the wife in the trust of a term for
years may be sold by the husband; and the wife surviving will be bound by
such sale, though the husband dies before the contingency is determined or
the reversion falls into possession. Donne v. Hart, 75.
3, A testator gave his residuary estate to trustees, upon trust to invest the pro-
ceeds, and pay the profits, dividends, or interest thereof to the separate use
of his daughter for life, exclusive of any husband she might marry, without
power of anticipation, but with a power to appoint the capital of the fund,
such appointment to take effect only from and after her decease. The daugh-
ter, who at the date of the will, and at the testator's death, was a feme sole,
afterwards married, and joined with her husband in petitioning to have the
fund transferred to him absolutely, offering, at the same time, to execute any
appointment which the court might think proper for that purpose; but the
court refused to make any order. Stiffe v. Everitt, 275.
4, Semble, a husband and wife cannot effectually dispose of the life interest of the
wife in a fund not settled to her separate use, beyond the duration of the
coverture. Ibid.
5, A married woman being entitled under a will to stock and to cash, forming
part of a residue, her husband wrote to one of the executors, requesting that
the stock should be transferred into the names of certain trustees for the
wife's separate use, and that the cash should be paid to himself. These re-
quests were complied with. The husband employed part of the cash in
increasing the amount of the stock. He afterwards became bankrupt and
died: Held, that the stock transferred by the executors was not reduced into
possession by the husband, and therefore belonged to the wife by survivor-
ship; but that the assignees under the bankruptcy were entitled to the in-
crease made by the husband. Ryland v. Smith, 281.
Biddings opened on an advance of 500l. upon 13,500/., under the circumstances.
Cochrane v. Cochrane, 228.
In a suit to recover the amount of a lost bill of exchange, the loss of the bill
being proved at the hearing, the defendant, if he disputes the sufficiency of
an indemnity which has been offered to him, and the Master finds in favour
of the indemnity, will be ordered to pay the costs subsequent to the original
hearing. Macartney v. Graham 71.
1, A judgment-debt due to a testator, which in his lifetime had been reported in
a creditor's suit, to be an incumbrance affecting the real estate of the debtor,
will not pass by his will to a charitable use, being within the statute of the
9 G. 2, c. 36. Collinson v. Pater, 68.
2, Reference to settle a scheme for the application of the revenues of an ancient
hospital, of which the original foundation and endowment were unknown,
but of which the master, after paying a certain fixed yearly stipend to a
chaplain, and also to six alms-women who had apartments in the hospital,
and defraying the repairs, applied the surplus income to his own use. Al-
torney-General v. The Archbishop of York, 126.
3, By letters patent of King James I. a charitable corporation was created by the
name of the Master and Poor of the College or Hospital of King James, in
the Suburbs of Colchester, to consist of a master and five poor persons; and
lands were granted to the corporation, with a direction that 52s. yearly should
be paid to each of the five poor persons for their support and maintenance;
and it was ordained that the income and revenues of the lands so granted
should be expended for the support of the master and poor of the hospital,
and for the maintenance and repairs of the buildings and possessions of the
hospital. Under the particular provisions of the letters patent, it was held
at the Rolls, that the five poor persons were entitled to share with the mas-
ter in the increased revenue of the charity lands; but this decision was re-
versed on appeal. Attorney-General v. Smythies, 245.
4, The master having, in virtue of an agreement with the Comptroller of the
Barrack Office, derived a profit upon the sale of the materials of certain
barracks which under a lease from the master had been erected on part of the
charity lands; It was held, that inasmuch as this agreement, so far as the
master was a party to it, grew out of and was incidental to his official situa-
tion, the profit was not personal to the master, but was received by him in
trust for the charity. Ibid.
1, Where a petition, purporting to be in the matter of a charity which is already
the subject of proceedings under the 52 G. 3, c. 101, and praying that the
petitioner's title, as alleged heir at law of the founder of the charity, may be
put in a course of inquiry, is presented by one who is no party to such pro-
ceedings, and who has not complied with the exigency of the statute with
respect to charity petitions, the petition will be ordered to be taken off the
file for irregularity, and an order made upon it will be discharged. In the
matter of Dovenby Hospital, 391.
2, Whether such a petition would be regular, even if the required formalities had
been complied with, quære? Ibid.
3, An order made upon petition may be set aside on motion, when the objection
is grounded upon the want of jurisdiction, and not upon error in the sub-
stance of the order itself. Ibid.
4, A testator, after giving a fund to his executors upon certain trusts, declared
it to be his will that in the event of the failure of those trusts, an event
which happened, his said trustees, and the survivors and survivor of them,
his executors or administrators, should pay and apply the fund to and for such
charitable or other purposes as they, his said trustees, and the survivors or
survivor of them, his executors or administrators, should think fit, without
being accountable to any person or persons whomsoever for such their dis-
position thereof: Held, that these words created a trust, but a trust of so
indefinite a nature, that it could not be carried into effect; the bequest, there-
fore, failed, and the fund fell into the residue. Ellis v. Selby, 394.
COMMISSION TO ASCERTAIN BOUNDARIES.
In order to sustain a bill for a commission to ascertain boundaries, the plaintiff
must establish, by the admission of the defendant or by evidence, a clear
legal title to some land in the possession of the defendant, and also a ground
for equitable relief; and where the quantity of the land of the plaintiff, in the
COMMISSION TO ASCERTAIN BOUNDARIES.
possession of the defendant, is doubtful upon the evidence, the court will
direct a commission or an issue, as will best answer the justice of the case.
Godfrey v. Littel, 200.
Order made (without a reference), confirming a compromise between a bank-
rupt and his assignees, by which the bankrupt agreed to abandon all farther
litigation with respect to the validity of the commission, in consideration of
a sum of money paid to him out of the estate, such compromise being ap-
proved by more than three-fourths in number and five-sixths in value of the
creditors who had proved, and also by a considerable body of creditors who
had not proved under the commission, and none of the creditors dissenting.
In the matter of Chambers, 494.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
By an act of parliament The London Dock Company were empowered to pur-
chase lands for the purposes of the act, and in certain cases the purchase-
moneys were to be reinvested in the purchase of other lands, and the expenses
of the reinvestment were to be paid by the Dock Company. In a subsequent
part of the same act the Lords of the Treasury were empowered to purchase
certain quays within a limited time; but no express directions were given as
to the reinvestment of the purchase-moneys, or as to the payment of the ex-
penses. By a subsequent act, not relating to The Dock Campany, the time
given to the Lords of the Treasury for purchasing the quays was extended,
and it was enacted, that all the powers, provisions, regulations, directions,
clauses, matters, and things in the former act should extend to the subse-
quent act: Held, on appeal (affirming the decision of the Vice-Chancellor)
that the clauses in the former act, as to the reinvesting of purchase-moneys
and the payment of the expenses of such reinvestment, were applicable,
mutatis mutandis, to the subsequent act. In the matter of the Lords of the
Treasury, 573.
1, Privilege of parliament is no protection against an attachment for any contempt
which is of a criminal and not of a civil kind. Wellesley v. The Duke of Beau-
fort, 205.
2, The clandestine removal of a ward of court from the custody of the person with
whom such ward has been residing under the authority of the court, is in its
nature a criminal contempt. Ibid.
3, A member of the House of Commons, who had carried off his infant daughter,
a ward of the court, from the house of the ladies under whose care she had
been placed by the guardians appointed by the court, and who on being per-
sonally examined by the court admitted the fact, and refused to state the
present residence of his daughter, was ordered to be committed to the Fleet,
although he was not a party to the suit. Ibid.
4, A person writing a letter to the Lord Chancellor, relative to a threatened suit,
and inclosing a bank note, was held guilty of a contempt, and ordered to
attend personally and show cause why he should not be committed; but
afterwards, on his appearing and expressing contrition, he was discharged
on payment of costs.-Martin's Case, 222.
1, Costs, as between solicitor and client, will be allowed to the plaintiff in a
creditors' suit, where there is a deficient fund. Hood v. Wilson, 230.
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