as no reconciliation between the husband and the wife could be legally made; and as the end and object of the marriage was decided, he should vote for the clause standing as part of the bill.

The Lord Chancellor (Eldon) observed that the public were highly indebted to the noble and learned Lord for the very able manner in which he had laid down the law of divorce; and the sound arguments that he had raised upon it. He must confess that his opinion had been greatly affected by the new light in which his learned friend had placed it. He had formed an opinion, after much consideration, which went to the opposite of the conclusion of his learned friend; but as his learned friend had pointed out plainly and explicitly, that the end and object of marriage was in this case concluded irrecoverably; that no reconciliation could be hoped for—because any reconciliation would be illegal, from the act of adultery committed having been an act of incestuous adultery ($)—he should feel little difficulty in giving way to the greater wisdom, experience, and judgment of his learned friend; as he was now satisfied that the divorce in the present instance, from the specialties of the case, stood manifestly contradistinguished from any other application by a wife for a divorce, that was likely to be brought before the House; and that the bill might pass without operating as a dangerous precedent. At the same time, he must retain the opinion that upon an application by a wife, on the adultery of her husband, for a divorce, the application, resting on that simple and distinct ground, ought, for the sake of securing the morals of the public, to be resisted and refused (t). It was to be considered that adultery committed by a wife, and adultery committed by a husband, were widely different in their consequences. The adultery of a wife might impose a spurious issue upon the husband, which he might be called upon to dedicate a portion of his fortune to educate and provide for. Whereas no such injustice could result to the wife from the adultery of her husband; and in many cases, not only a reconciliation might be brought about, but it became the especial duty of the wife to forgive her husband from motives of tenderness and concern for the interests of her innocent children.

Lord Rosslyn begged also to confess his obligations to the noble

(5) This passage is perhaps inaccurately reported. It was not merely the incestuous character of the adultery, but the relationship of the wife to the party with whom the crime was committed that prevented reconciliation.

(') See, however, Mrs. Moffat's case, infra, where Lord Eldon expresses twice over his opinion that a wife had as good a claim as a husband to this species of relief.

and learned Lord (Thurlow). It had not occurred to his mind that a reconciliation could not legally take place. His objections to the bill were in a great measure removed. It stood upon strong special grounds, and might safely pass.

The bill afterwards passed both Houses, and received the royal assent; the custody and education of the children having been provided for by the following clause:-" And in order to secure, as far as circumstances will admit, the virtuous education of the children of the said Jane Campbell, be it declared and enacted, that it shall not be lawful for the said Edward Addison to remove his daughter from the care and custody of her mother, during her minority; and that the son and daughter of the said Edward Addison shall, during their respective minorities, be deemed and taken to be, to all intents and purposes, wards of the High Court of Chancery.”

DR. CAMPBELL'S CASE.-SESSION 1801.

Clause to prevent Mrs. Campbell from marrying during the Husband's lifetime inserted, but afterwards struck out.-Clause to prevent marriage of the Paramours inserted, and left in Bill as passed.

THIS bill passed on a repetition of the evidence which had supported the case of Mrs. Addison. On the third reading, the following clause was added, by way of rider :-" Provided that it shall not be lawful for the said Jessy Campbell to contract a second marriage in the lifetime of the said James Campbell; but that any such marriage shall be null and void." Which clause being objected to, after debate the question was put, and carried in the affirmative ("). Then another clause was proposed to be inserted, by way of rider, as follows:-" Provided also that in case the said Jessy Campbell shall at any time contract marriage with the said Edward Addison, such marriage shall be and is hereby declared to be null and void to all intents and purposes." This clause was agreed to, and forms part of the act (ˇ).

(") This clause, however, was afterwards struck out, most probably by the Commons. It does not appear in the Act as ultimately passed.

() It may be doubted whether this amendment was not somewhat super

fluous; as, by the law of the land, Mrs. Campbell was sufficiently prohibited from marrying a man who had been the husband of her own sister. Vide, however, a similar clause in Mrs. Turton's case, infra.

MR. CREWE'S CASE.-SESSION 1801-2.

Marriage celebrated in Jamaica without Banns or Licence.-Preliminary inquiry as to its validity.-Evidence against Wife complete,-but owing to neglect and irregularity on Husband's part-Bill rejected.

THE marriage in this case was had in Jamaica without banns or licence, in 1780; and Mr. Sewell, late Attorney-General of the colony, was examined touching its validity, according to the law of Jamaica; and gave his opinion, that the law of Jamaica, with respect to marriage, stood then as it did in this kingdom before the passing of the Marriage Act of the 26th of George II.; adding, that there was an Act of the Legislature making it penal in a minister to solemnise a marriage without banns or licence; but that act he considered to affect not the marriage, but the person solemnising it.

A verdict had been recovered by Mr. Crewe for 3000l. damages, against Sir Henry Eaglefield, Bart. But the evidence, though completely establishing the wife's adultery, was, in many respects, not favourable to the husband. The visits of Sir Henry commenced in 1794, and were continued till the separation of Mr. Crewe from his wife; which event took place in 1799. These visits were paid under circumstances which make it not easy to believe that the husband was ignorant of the object which led to them; or of the frequency of their repetition. During the five years prior to the separation, which afterwards took place, the parties had lived chiefly in London. It appeared that Mr. Crewe was accustomed to go very much abroad in the evenings, staying out till late hours, and leaving his wife at home without society. He also, from time to time, absented himself for several days together, on excursions of amusement. During these periods of neglect and of solitude, the visits of Sir Henry were received by Mrs. Crewe; but it did not appear that there was any proof of adultery till after the separation. The action against Sir Henry, too, was undefended. The circumstances of the case (which underwent a very minute scrutiny) did not appear to warrant the relief prayed for; and the bill, accordingly, was rejected.

CAPTAIN BONHAM'S CASE.-SESSION 1802.

Statement in Preamble that there was no issue of the Marriage save a particular Child mentioned ;-but no Clause in Act bastardising the others.

THE petitioner was an officer in the naval service of the East India Company. In 1797, being appointed to duty on the Manilla Coast, it was deemed advisable by the friends and relatives of his wife, that she should return to this country; and, accordingly, in the month of June, 1797, she embarked for London. On the 29th of October, 1798, the petitioner himself arrived in England, after a separation of sixteen months from his wife; and being informed that she was living in adultery, he abstained from all intercourse or communication with her; brought an action against her paramour, and recovered a verdict for 30007. damages.

It appeared in evidence, that Mrs. Bonham, on her voyage home, was delivered of a child, which the petitioner admitted to be his; but she afterwards, on the 8th day of April, 1799, being one hundred and sixty-one days after her husband's arrival in England, was delivered of another full-grown child, of which the petitioner could not possibly have been the father.

The bill passed, and the preamble of the Act states, that "there was no other legitimate issue of the said marriage, save the first mentioned child;" but no clause is introduced to bastardise the other child; nor is it made the subject of any declaration or

enactment.

MR. WOODCOCK'S CASE.-SESSION 1802.

Where a voluntary Separation had taken place for a cause palpably inadequate, Bill of Divorce for subsequent Adultery rejected.

4 March. THE order of the day being read for the second reading, it was moved that the said order be discharged; which being objected to, after debate thereon, the question was put, and it was resolved in the negative. Counsel were then called in, and Mr. Adam was heard in support of the bill; and having stated the contents of a deed of separation mentioned in the bill, where it was stated, that "by reason of certain unhappy differences which had arisen between the petitioner and his wife, they had resolved to live apart and

separate from each other;" it was moved that the counsel be asked if he had any evidence as to the nature of the differences? Counsel answered, "I had no instructions originally respecting any evidence of that sort; but I have since inquired whether there is any such evidence; and I am now instructed to state, that I can call a person who will prove that she knew Mr. and Mrs. Woodcock, and that their course of living was perfectly different, and their society different; and that the society with which Mrs. Woodcock associated was of a sort that led her into the greatest extravagance." The bill was rejected.

MR. HOARE'S CASE.-SESSION 1802.

Two verdicts at law against Husband.-Both approved of by Judge who presided at the Trials.-Petition of Husband for Bill of Divorce rejected, no grounds in support of it being stated.

MR. DALLAS, the counsel for the bill, being asked if there had been any proceedings in the Courts of Common Law, stated, that an action had been brought by the petitioner against Alexander Allan, Esq., mentioned in the bill, for criminal conversation with Mrs. Hoare; which action was tried before Lord Kenyon and a Special Jury, in the Court of King's Bench; when a verdict was given against the plaintiff, upon the evidence produced on his part; that in course of the trial certain evidence was offered on the part of the plaintiff, which the learned Judge thought inadmissible; that afterwards, on application to the Court of King's Bench, for a new trial, upon the ground that the evidence which had been rejected ought to have been received, the Court granted a new trial, which was had accordingly; and in the course of which, the evidence offered at the first trial was admitted, and went to the Jury; who, however, found for the defendant; and Mr. Dallas also thought it his duty to state to the House, that both verdicts were approved of by Lord Kenyon. Counsel were then asked what grounds they had to offer in favour of the relief sought, after the facts he had stated relative to the issue of the trials at law; and being heard thereupon, it was ordered that the further consideration of the case be adjourned. On the 19th February, a petition to withdraw the petition and bill, and to exhibit another petition and bill in lieu thereof, was presented. An order for leave was granted, and a new petition,