The Federalist PapersPenguin, 1 d’abr. 2003 - 688 pàgines A DOCUMENT THAT SHAPED A NATION An authoritative analysis of the Constitution of the United States and an enduring classic of political philosophy. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers explain the complexities of a constitutional government—its political structure and principles based on the inherent rights of man. Scholars have long regarded this work as a milestone in political science and a classic of American political theory. Based on the original McLean edition of 1788 and edited by noted historian Clinton Rossiter, this special edition includes: ● Textual notes and a select bibliography by Charles R. Kesler ● Table of contents with a brief précis of each essay ● Appendix with a copy of the Constitution cross-referenced to The Federalist Papers ● Index of Ideas that lists the major political concepts discussed ● Copies of The Declaration of Independence and Articles of Confederation |
Des de l'interior del llibre
Resultats 1 - 5 de 81.
Pàgina 17
... provision that all elections should be held within the counties where the electors live - Such a provision harm- less and offers no security - This provision com- pared with those of State constitutions - The probability that the power ...
... provision that all elections should be held within the counties where the electors live - Such a provision harm- less and offers no security - This provision com- pared with those of State constitutions - The probability that the power ...
Pàgina 18
... provision in constitution of New York which opponents admire - That it un- duly accumulates power in the Senate , and tends to the establishment of an aristocracy - That the Senate will judge too leniently officers for whose ...
... provision in constitution of New York which opponents admire - That it un- duly accumulates power in the Senate , and tends to the establishment of an aristocracy - That the Senate will judge too leniently officers for whose ...
Pàgina 20
... PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE 421 429 434 EXECUTIVE , AND THE VETO POWER 439 Without suitable provision the Executive will be at the mercy of the legislature , and the indepen- dence of the Executive should not be impaired- The veto ...
... PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE 421 429 434 EXECUTIVE , AND THE VETO POWER 439 Without suitable provision the Executive will be at the mercy of the legislature , and the indepen- dence of the Executive should not be impaired- The veto ...
Pàgina 22
... provision for the support of the judiciary necessary to their independence - Responsibility of the judiciary - Judges liable to impeachment- Cannot be made removable for inability - Rea- sons for this - Comparison with constitution of ...
... provision for the support of the judiciary necessary to their independence - Responsibility of the judiciary - Judges liable to impeachment- Cannot be made removable for inability - Rea- sons for this - Comparison with constitution of ...
Pàgina 23
... Objection that there is no provision in the pro- posed Constitution for trial by jury in civil cases considered - True meaning of maxims on which 494 this objection rests - Importance of right of trial by Contents 23.
... Objection that there is no provision in the pro- posed Constitution for trial by jury in civil cases considered - True meaning of maxims on which 494 this objection rests - Importance of right of trial by Contents 23.
Continguts
Preface | 25 |
CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE | 31 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 40 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 44 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 54 |
THE CONSEQUENCES OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN | 60 |
THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST | 66 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 71 |
THE POWERS CONFERRED BY | 260 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 268 |
RESTRICTIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF | 277 |
THE ALLEGED DANGER FROM | 285 |
THE PARTICULAR STRUCTURE OF | 297 |
THESE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD NOT BE | 305 |
PERIODICAL APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE | 314 |
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | 322 |
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT | 79 |
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT | 86 |
ADVANTAGE OF THE UNION IN RESPECT | 92 |
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT | 100 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 108 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 118 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 124 |
OTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT | 134 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 139 |
THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT | 148 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 158 |
THE IDEA OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLATIVE | 163 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 170 |
CONCERNING THE MILITIA | 178 |
CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER | 183 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 189 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 197 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 201 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 207 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 213 |
CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES OF | 220 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND | 227 |
THE CONFORMITY OF THE PLAN | 236 |
THE POWERS OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM | 243 |
GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS CONFERRED | 251 |
THE APPORTIONMENT OF MEMBERS AMONG | 333 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 343 |
THE ALLEGED TENDENCY OF THE NEW PLAN | 348 |
OBJECTION THAT THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS | 354 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 364 |
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 370 |
THE SENATE CONTINUED | 380 |
THE POWERS OF THE SENATE | 388 |
THE POWERS OF THE SENATE CONTINUED | 394 |
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FURTHER | 421 |
THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF | 429 |
THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF | 439 |
THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL | 445 |
THE APPOINTING POWER OF | 453 |
THE JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT | 463 |
THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED | 471 |
THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED AND | 480 |
THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED | 490 |
CERTAIN GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS | 509 |
ernment too remoteNo provision for debts | 520 |
The Declaration of Independence | 528 |
The Constitution of the United States | 542 |
Notes on The Federalist Papers | 569 |
Selected Bibliography | 633 |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
Frases i termes més freqüents
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