fine himself to the purchase of game from qualified persons? Would buyers of game purchase elsewhere than from the licensed salesman? Would the poacher be undersold by the honest dealer? Would game remain in the same plenty as before? It is understood that the game laws are to remain as they are; with this only difference, that the qualified man can sell to the licensed man, and the licentiate to the public.

It seems probable to us, that vast quantities of game would, after a little time, find their way into the hands of licensed poulterers. Great people are very often half eaten up by their establishments. The quantity of game killed in a large shooting party is very great; to eat it is impossible, and to dispose of it in presents very troublesome. The preservation of game is very expensive; and, when it could be bought, it would be no more a compliment to send it as a present than it would be to send geese and fowls. If game were sold very large shooting establishments might be made to pay their own expenses. The shame is made by the law; there is a disgrace in being detected and fined. If that barrier were removed, superfluous partridges would go to the poulterers as readily as superfluous venison does to the venison butcher- or as a gentleman sells the corn and mutton off his farm which he cannot consume. For these reasons, we do not doubt that the shops of licensed poulterers would be full of game in the season; and this part of the argument, we think, the arch-enemy, Sir John Shelley, himself would concede to

us.

The next question is, From whence they would procure it? A license for selling game, granted by country magistrates, would, from their jealousy upon these subjects, be granted only to persons of some respectability and property. The purchase of game from unqualified persons would, of course, be guarded against by very heavy penalties, both personal and pecuniary; and these penalties would be inflicted, because opinion would go with them. Here is a respectable tradesman,' it would be said, 'who might have bought as

6

much game as he pleased in a lawful manner, but who, in order to increase his profits by buying it a little cheaper, has encouraged a poacher to steal it.' Public opinion, therefore, would certainly be in favour of a very strong punishment; and a licensed vendor of game, who exposed himself to these risks, would expose himself to the loss of liberty, property, character, and licence. The persons interested to put a stop to such a practice, would not be the paid agents of Government, as in cases of smuggling; but all the gentlemen of the country, the customers of the tradesman for fish, poultry, or whatever else he dealt in, would have an interest in putting down the practice. In all probability, the practice would become disreputable, like the purchase of stolen poultry; and this would be a stronger barrier than the strongest laws. There would, of course, be some exceptions to this statement. A few shabby people would, for the chance of gaining sixpence, incur the risk of ruin and disgrace; but it is probable that the general practice would be otherwise.

For the same reasons, the consumers of game would rather give a little more for it to a licensed poulterer, than expose themselves to severe penalties by purchasing from poachers. The great mass of London consumers are supplied now, not from shabby people, in whom they can have no confidence - not from hawkers and porters, but from respectable tradesmen, in whose probity they have the most perfect confidence. Men will brave the law for pheasants, but not for sixpence or a shilling; and the law itself is much more. difficult to be braved, when it allows pheasants to be bought at some price, than when it endeavours to render them utterly inaccessible to wealth. All the licensed salesmen, too, would have a direct interest in stopping the contraband trade of game. They would lose no character in doing so; their informations would be reasonable and respectable.

If all this be true, the poacher would have to compete with a great mass of game fairly and honestly poured into the market. He would be selling with a rope

about his neck, to a person who bought with a rope about his neck; his description of customers would be much the same as the customers for stolen poultry, and his profits would be very materially abridged. At present, the poacher is in the same situation as the smuggler would be, if rum and brandy could not be purchased of any fair trader. The great check to the profits of the smuggler are, that, if you want his commodities, and will pay a higher price, you may have them elsewhere without the risk of disgrace. But forbid the purchase of these luxuries at any price. Shut up the shop of the brandy-merchant, and you render the trade of the smuggler of incalculable value. The object of the intended bill is, to raise up precisely the same competition to the trade of the poacher, by giving the public an opportunity of buying lawfully and honestly the tempting articles in which he now deals exclusively. Such an improvement would not, perhaps, altogether annihilate his trade; but it would, in all probability, act as a very material check upon it.

The predominant argument against all this is, that the existing prohibition against buying game, though partially violated, does deter many persons from coming into the market; that if this prohibition were removed, the demand for game would be increased, the legal supply would be insufficient, and the residue would, and must be, supplied by the poacher, whose trade would, for these reasons, be as lucrative and flourishing as before. But it is only a few years since the purchase of game has been made illegal; and the market does not appear to have been at all narrowed by the prohibition; not one head of game the less has been sold by the poulterers; and scarcely one single conviction has taken place under that law. How, then, would the removal of the prohibition, and the alteration of the law, extend the market, and increase the demand, when the enactment of the prohibition has had no effect in narrowing it? But if the demand increases, why not the legal supply also? Game is increased upon an estate by feeding them in winter, by making some

abatement to the tenants for guarding against depredations, by a large apparatus of gamekeepers and spiesin short by expense. But if this pleasure of shooting, so natural to country gentlemen, be made to pay its own expenses, by sending superfluous game to market, more men, it is reasonable to suppose, will thus preserve and augment their game. The love of pleasure and amusement will produce in the owners of game that desire to multiply game, which the love of gain does in the farmer to multiply poultry. Many gentlemen of small fortune will remember, that they cannot enjoy to any extent this pleasure without this resource; that the legal sale of poultry will discountenance poaching; and they will open an account with the poulterer, not to get richer, but to enjoy a great pleasure without an expense, in which, upon other terms, they could not honourably and conscientiously indulge. If country gentlemen of moderate fortune will do this (and we think after a little time they will do it), game may be multiplied and legally supplied to any extent. Another keeper, and another bean-stack, will produce their proportional supply of pheasants. The only reason why the great lord has more game per acre than the little squire is, that he spends more money per acre to preserve it.

For these reasons, we think the experiment of legalising the sale of game ought to be tried. The game laws have been carried to a pitch of oppression which is a disgrace to the country. The prisons are half filled with peasants, shut up for the irregular slaughter of rabbits and birds-a sufficient reason for killing a weasel, but not for imprisoning a man. Something should be done; it is disgraceful to a Government to stand by, and see such enormous evils without interference. It is true, they are not connected with the struggles of party: but still, the happiness of the common people, whatever gentlemen may say, ought every now and then to be considered.

CRUEL TREATMENT OF UNTRIED PRISONERS. 333

CRUEL TREATMENT OF UNTRIED PRISONERS. (E. REVIEW, 1824.)

1. A Letter to the Right Honourable Robert Peel, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, &c. &c. &c. on Prison Labour. By John Headlam, M. A., Chairman of the Quarter Sessions for the North Riding of the County of York. London. Hatchard and Son, 1823.

2. Information and Observations, respecting the proposed Improvements at York Castle. Printed by Order of the Committee

of Magistrates, September, 1823.

IT has been the practice, all over England, for these last fifty years*, not to compel prisoners to work before guilt was proved. Within these last three or four years, however, the magistrates of the North Riding of Yorkshire, considering it improper to support any idle person at the county expense, have resolved, that prisoners committed to the House of Correction for trial, and requiring county support, should work for their livelihood; and no sooner was the tread-mill brought into fashion, than that machine was adopted in the North Riding as the species of labour by which such prisoners were to earn their maintenance. If these magistrates did not consider themselves empowered to burden the county rates for the support of prisoners before trial, who would not contribute to support themselves, it does not appear, from the publication of the Reverend Chairman of the Sessions, that any opinions of Counsel were taken as to the legality of so putting prisoners to work, or of refusing them maintenance if they chose to be idle; but the magistrates themselves decided that such was the law of the land. Thirty miles off, however, the law of the land was differently interpreted; and in the Castle of York large sums were

* Headlam, p. 6.