If Fanning and his children had all been alive, could Fanning have set up the award as a bar to their claim? and how can Devereux have a better right against their heirs? He is striving to retain, contrary to good faith, monies which have accidentally come into his hands, and to make an unconscientious use of a contract which the English government entered into with France for the benefit of a certain class of British subjects, in which the Plaintiffs are included and he is not. 1826. HILL v. REARDON. The LORD CHANCELLOR. Suppose, the person entitled to the moveable property being dead, his executor had gotten a claim allowed, could it be contended that this Court would not compel the executor to do his duty, and would not administer the fund according to the equities attaching upon it? If the French government had paid 100,000 francs to B., as entitled under the will of A., and it turned out that C. D. was the person actually entitled under that will, could it be said that the jurisdiction of the Court was excluded in such a case? I can fancy a hundred cases, in which the decision of the commissioners would not only not be a bar to the person claiming equitable rights, but would even operate in support and in furtherance of them. The decision of the commissioners or of the privy council, in favour of a person claiming as an executor or trustee, would never preclude those, who claimed to be his cestuis que trust, from coming here to assert their rights. If there exist here the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, I should have no doubt of the jurisdiction; if there is not that relation, still we must look minutely at the particulars of the relation in which the parties actually stand, and the conduct of each of them respectively, before we can decide whether the Court has jurisdiction to interfere. June 29. The 1826. HILL ย. REARDON. The LORD CHANCELLOR. When I first read the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor, I confess it startled me, not from any conviction that it was erroneous, but because it gave a shock to the notion which I had previously entertained with respect to cases of this kind; and, if the 59 G. 3. c. 31. is to have the operation which that judgment seems at first to ascribe to it, I cannot help thinking that Parliament has enacted what it would have hesitated to enact, if it had been aware of the true effect of the law which it was making. The judgment of the Vice-Chancellor, if we look at the printed report of it, seems to go the length of saying, that there is no case in which the decision of the commissioners can be affected by any suit in this Court. A proposition of that kind is much too large; and, upon looking at what passed on the hearing of the cause in the Court below, and the course which the argument took on that occasion, I do not think that the Vice-Chancellor meant to go so far as the words of his judgment seem to import. In a case of trust or fraud, I have not the least doubt of the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere. It is said that, in cases of perfectly adverse titles, there is no jurisdiction: suppose it were so, yet there must be jurisdiction to the extent at least of examining whether the titles are perfectly adverse; and, therefore, what is called the preliminary objection cannot be gone into, without a full discussion of the facts and merits of the case. The first question here is, can Devereux be considered a trustee? Is there such a statement of facts on the record, as clothes him with the character of a trustee? and if there is, what is the effect of the conventions and the act of parliament, and the awards of the commissioners, on on the trust so reposed or represented as being reposed in him? Secondly, If the case before the Court is one not of fraud or trust, but of a perfectly adverse title, the ques tion will assume this shape. "You, Devereux, have gotten a decision in your favour from the commissioners. I never claimed before them, and I have no decision awarding compensation to me. But you have gotten that, which, if I had claimed, I should have gotten." How far do these conventions and this act of parliament hit such a case? 1826. HILL V. REARDON. The LORD CHANCELLOR. The first question is, whether an award, made in favour of A. B. by the commissioners acting under the conventions between France and this country, is not only to be conclusive, as between the subjects of this country and the French government, but is also to destroy all demands in equity which third persons might have against A. B., if he had received the money otherwise than through the channel of such award. My opinion is, that the conventions and act of parliament have no such effect. I have some reason to know that the conventions were not meant to affect third persons; and it would be a great surprise on those, who were concerned in framing them, if they were to have that operation. The conventions and the act of parliament meant no more than this, that the decision of the commissioners should be conclusive between the two countries; and that the demand of an English subject, and a judgment in his favour, and a compliance with the judgment, would be a discharge of the government of France: but the equities, with which any persons, receiving money under the adjudication of the commissioners, might be affected, were not at all touched by the conventions and the act. A question 1827. Feb. 6, 7. 1827. HILL บ. REARDON. A question of importance in this case, and, recollecting the French law and English law, of some degree of difficulty also, is this: As the Court is of opinion that the conventions and act of parliament did not shut out equities, as against the persons receiving, whether, under the circumstances of this case, where the claim was made with what I may call an adverse aspect, and where the commissioners may be supposed to have decided in favour of an individual who was claiming adversely, in the sense in which I use these words, this Court, attending to the whole of the record, could attach an equity on the possession of the person having so recovered, and take the funds or any part of them out of his hands. That, however, is a question within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide, and the very power of deciding that question is jurisdiction. I am of opinion, therefore, that these conventions and this act of parliament do not prevent the Court from having jurisdiction: and on the question-whether, upon the whole of this record, the plaintiff has any title which a court of equity can enforce, I should propose to hear one counsel on each side. February 28. April 21. The case was again argued by the Attorney-General (Sir C. Wetherell) for the Plaintiff, and by Mr. Hart and Mr. Fonblanque for Devereux and Reardon. The LORD CHANCELLOR delivered the following judgment: "After giving great consideration to this cause, I am of opinion that this bill must be dismissed. I continue to think that this Court has a jurisdiction to attach equities on the award of the commissioners in some cases: but I do not think that the claim of Devereux and Reardon can be considered as a claim, in respect of of which they can be deemed to be affected by equities (upon the state of this record) in favour of the plaintiffs. Whether the crown could, on any record, sue to affect the award in favour of any subject considered by it as having a better title than the person in whose favour the award is made, is a question I do not deal with; nor the question, whether the plaintiffs had or had not a title, in favour of which they could have claimed an award in their favour. This case is too difficult, upon this record, to dismiss the bill with any costs." 1827. HILL บ. REARDON. On the 12th of April 1827, the Earl of Eldon tendered his resignation of the Great Seal; but he continued to sit for some days in the private room adjoining to Lincoln's Inn Hall. On the 20th of April, Sir John S. Copley, Master of the Rolls, was created Baron Lyndhurst, and appointed Lord Chancellor; and, on the 30th of April, the Great Seal was delivered to him. |