of the land tax, or in the discharge of any debt, | taken to have been lawfully entitled to such

or such other incumbrances, or part thereof, as the said Court shall authorize to be paid, affecting the same lands, &c.; or where such money shall not be so applied, then the same shall be laid out and invested, under the like direction of the Court, in the purchase of other lands, &c., which shall be conveyed and settled upon the like uses, and in the same manner, as the lands, &c., which shall be so purchased, taken, or used; and until such purchase shall be made the said money shall, by order of the said Court, be invested by the said Accountant General in his name in the purchase of three per cent. Consolidated, or three per cent. Reduced Bank Annuities; and until the said Bank Annuities shall be ordered by the said Court to be sold for the purposes aforesaid, the dividends shall be paid, by the order of the said Court, to the person who would for the time being have been entitled to the rents and profits of the lands, &c.

land, &c., according to such possession, until the contrary shall be shown to the satisfaction of the said Court of Exchequer; and the dividends or interest of the Bank Annuities to be purchased with such money, and also the capital of such Bank Annuities, shall be applied and disposed of accordingly, unless it shall be made to appear to the said Court that such possession was a wrongful possession, and that some other person was lawfully entitled to such lands, &c., or to some estate or interest therein.

Investment of Money in certain Cases.

35. If the compensation money be refused, or the titles to the property not made, or if persons to whom money be assessed cannot be found, the money to be paid into the Bank, subject to the order of the Court of Exchequer.

Payment of Expenses.

this act, the purchase money for the same shall be required to be paid into the Court of Exchequer, and to be applied in the purchase of other lands, &c., to be settled to the like uses, the Court of Exchequer may order the expences of all purchases, or so much as the Court shall deem reasonable, together with the necessary costs and expences of obtaining such order, to be paid by the said Commissioners, or any six or more of them; and the said Commissioners shall and may reimburse themselves all such payments out of the rates.

32. Provided, that if any money so agreed 36. Where, by reason of any disability or or assessed to be paid for any lands, &c., pur- incapacity of the person or corporation enchased, taken, or used for the purposes afore-titled to any lands, &c., to be purchased under said, belonging to any corporation, or to any person under any disability or incapacity as aforesaid, shall be less than the sum of two hundred pounds, and shall amount to or exceed the sum of twenty pounds, the same shall, at the option of the person for the time being entitled to the rents and profits of the lands, &c., or of his guardian or committee, to be signified in writing, be paid into the Bank of England in the name and with the privity of the said Accountant General; or otherwise the same shall be paid, at the like option, to two or more trustees to be nominated by the person making such option, and approved by six or more of the Commissioners taking such lands, &c., such nomination and approbation to be signified in writing under the hands of the nominating and approving parties, in order that such principal money and the dividends and interest arising therefrom may be applied in manner herein-before directed, so far as the case be applicable, without obtaining or being required to obtain the direction or approbation of the said Court of Exchequer.

33. Provided, that when such money shall be less than the sum of twenty pounds, then the same shall be applied to the use of the person who would for the time being have been entitled to the rents and profits of the lands, &c., in such manner as the said Commissioners, or any six or more of them, shall think fit; or in case of lunacy, idiotcy, or infancy, then to his guardian or committee, to and for the use and benefit of such person so entitled.

Persons entitled.

34. That where any question shall arise touching the title of any person to any money to be paid, in pursuance of this act, for the purchase of any lands, &c., the person who shall have been in possession of such lands, &c., at the time of such purchase, and all persons claiming under such person, or under the possession of such person, shall be deemed and

Consent of Proprietors.

37. It shall not be lawful for any Court of Sewers, in making any new walls, &c., and other works, to take down, remove, or make use of any house or building, or any garden, yard, or paddock, or any park, planted walk, or avenue to a house, or any inclosed ground planted as an ornament or shelter to a house, or planted and set apart as a nursery for trees, without the consent in writing of the owner or proprietor thereof.

Land vested in Commissioners.

38. Upon payment or tender of such sum as shall have been contracted or agreed for, or assessed by such juries, for the purchase of any such messuages, &c., or as a compensation for losses or damages, to the proprietor, within thirty days after the same shall be so agreed for or assessed, or upon payment of such sum, within thirty days, into the Bank of England, for the use of the persons entitled thereto, &c., the Commissioners, and their agents, &c., may enter upon such messuages, &c.; and such messuages, &c., together with the yearly profits, and all the estate, &c., shall become vested in the said Commissioners for ever; and such payment or tender shall bar the dower of the wife of such person, and all estates tail, and in reversion, &c.

[To be continued in our next.]

Tanner, Alfred Octavius, 4, James Place, John Pullen, the elder, 34, Fore Street, CripHackney Road.

Thompson, Thomas, Brighthelmstone, Sussex. William Wallis Skene, late of same place, de

Tinsley, Charles, 17, Upper George Street, Edmund Huntley, 6, Furnival's Inn; assigned
Edgeware Road.
to William Pyne, 10, Duke Street, St.
James's.

376 Attornys to be admitted.-Replies to C. L. Commissioners' Questions on Costs.

Clerk's Names.

To whom articled.

Woollett, Thomas, the younger, No. 3, Cum- William Griffiths, Monmouth, co. Monmouth. berland Terrace, Pentonville.

Wontner, Thomas, 9, Old Bailey.

John Carter, Lord Mayor's Court Office,
Royal Exchange.

Wyndham, Elwardus, 50, Great Coram Thomas Pring, Crediton, Devon; assigned to
Street.
John Ellis Clowes, 10, King's Bench Walk,
Temple.

Young, John, 31, Fleet Street.

Pearson, George Wray, Sunderland, near the
Sea, Durham. [16th Aug. for last day of
Michaelmas.]

Samuel Dendy, Breams's Buildings, Chancery
Lane.

Thomas Proud, same place.

FOR RE-ADMISSION IN THE KING'S BENCH.

Cooke, John, late of Cowbridge, co. Glamor. | Pearson, George Wray, Sunderland, near the gan, now of Ledbury, co. Hereford.

Herbert, Morgan, Lampeter, co. Cardigan.
Marshall, John Hough, 10, Lancaster Place,
Waterloo Bridge.

Sea, co. Durham.

Sibley, Henry, late of No. 6, Staple Inn.

REPLIES TO THE COMMON LAW COMMISSIONERS' QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF COSTS ".

1. THE office fees are too large. When formerly the officers did the business for which they were granted, they were, perhaps unobjectionable. Now the attorneys do every thing, except the mere formal part of affixing some stamp, or mark, uttering a few words, or making some short entry. Where these forms are necessary, they should be paid for on the quantum valeat principle. 2. Perhaps it does not much matter whether the officers of the Courts are paid by fees, or a fixed salary. If the necessary fees be reduced to a fair scale, probably neither the profession nor the public will give themselves further trouble.

6. Certainly not, for the reasons given in the two preceding replies.

6. I do not intend to propose any plan, but hope my suggestions may assist in the formation of one.

7. Under the present system, perhaps, there is no case wherein the proceedings are carried through many stages, and certainly none where trial is had, in which the attorney would not be justified in charging extra costs. If an improved plan of remuneration be adopted, probably they may be altogether avoided in common cases. Where they must be charged, the unsuccessful party frequently ought to pay them; but it would be difficult to legislate, or make regulations on the subject.

3. The present remuneration of the attorney is not satisfactory in two respects: first, as to the manner; and, secondly, as to 8. I think the rule referred to is producthe amount. First, there should be no temp- tive of hardship. It is often prudent to add tation to make pleadings or other proceed- counts, to anticipate particular views of the ings of an unnecessary length, in order to case, which may not, however, arise at the obtain compensation that way; nor should trial. Sometimes they may be added for the attorney be compelled to take gratuitous the sake of recompense. In these last introuble. And, secondly, the present allow-stances, a just scale of costs would cure the ances are not adequate to the risk, responsi- evil. bility, outlay, &c. of the professional man.

4. I do not know that there would be any great objection to the principle mentioned in this query, if applied to common cases; but I think the plan of ascertaining the amount of the fee bad, because, in my opinion, the lawyer's services should be better requited than at present.

a L. O. Vol. 6, p. 276.

9. I think, to make the profession more respectable and respected, an alteration in costs is indispensable. Necessary fees should be fairly reduced: unnecessary ones totally abolished. Nothing is clearer than that professional men, who have been liberally and expensively educated, and who are, or should be, men of great moral and intellectual acquirements (for to them are entrusted the property, the life, and the cha

377

Be assured, there is too little fiction in this case; and I shall be most happy to see the lash fall on the backs of those who can, without mercy and remorse, use it towards one who has been doomed to feel it, without any other cause than to subdue the little remaining spirit of man to the apathy of an idiot. Your's ever respectfully,

Selections from Correspondence.-Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor. racter-which is more than life-of others) | or visitors, to take evidence on oath touching should be liberally rewarded, and receive all these matters; and if the very walls would proper countenance and protection from the not speak, there are always those not unjudicial and other authorities. There is too observant witnesses, who could, and on oath would," the tale unfold." great a blindness as to this truth. Those who look no further than pounds, shillings, and pence, are not qualified to give opinions, or to legislate on this matter. No ground should exist for degrading bickerings as to charges, nor should lawyers be encouraged to do little by granting them but little remuneration. The charges allowed ought to be such as to prompt them to use their best exertions for their clients' interest, and to spare them the necessity of resorting to indirect means to obtain that compensation which they are unjustly restrained from obtaining directly.

SELECTIONS

FROM CORRESPONDENCE.
No. XXXI.

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE LUNATIC COMMISSION ACT. 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 36.

G.

To the Editor of the Legal Observer.
Sir,

ONE, &c.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.-RENT.

To the Editor of the Legal Observer.
Sir,

By the second section of the Act for the
Limitation of Actions and Suits relating to
Real Property, and for simplifying the reme-
dies for trying the rights thereto, it is provided
that no land or rent shall be recovered but
within twenty years after the right of action
shall have accrued to the claimant, or some
person whose estate he claims. Is it intended
by this that all rent (that is to say rent due
from a tenant to his landlord in the common
acceptation of the word rent,) may be recovered
at any time within twenty years; or how is it
to be understood ?
Sept. 4, 1833.

STUDENT.

SUPERIOR COURTS.

Court of Chancery.

CONTINGENT PROPERTY.BANK

RUPTCY.

Circumstances under which it was held, thal an annuity granted out of an expectancy which had not accrued before the grantor's bankruptcy, is not a debt provable under the commission.

Visitors are herein appointed for superintending, inspecting, &c. but I do not observe that the visitors are clothed with sufficient, if any power, to perfect the object of their appointment. How are these visitors to ascertain, in private lodging houses, the general treatment | ANNUITY. by the keepers, such as giving the patient improper food, administering restraint, coercion, or correction unnecessarily, or injuriously to his mental state? The unfortunate person himself can tell no tales, the books of account may be, and I know in many cases to be, any thing but true. Two keepers, in a private house, can give inferior food and charge for the best; lash the poor fellow's arms all day to give a keeper a holiday, and at an early hour in the evening strap him to his bed, that both keepers may enjoy the salubrity of the evening air in a country walk. Does such treatment befit a case of a highly respectable youth, of good fortune, in good bodily health, between twenty and thirty years of age? Under such, and much more severe treatment, is there, can there be, any hope of recovery ? My own observation warrants me in saying, the lonely, isolated being, lapses from inoffensive excitement into idiotcy, helpless and hopeless, hurried on by temporary consciousness of his infirmity, and the cruelty and insult of his vulgar, heartless menials.

In this case I saw no remedy, and I see none in the act in question. I should therefore suggest a power to be vested in the visitor

In this case, a person had granted an annuity out of property which he expected to accrue to him in right of his wife. Subsequently, and before the property did so come to him, he became bankrupt; and the question was, whether the annuity could be considered as a debt provable on the estate. The Master of the Rolls held, that it was not a debt to be proved against the estate, but that it must be paid without reference to the bankruptcy. The Lord Chancellor, upon appeal to him, alfirmed that decision, and observed, that the arguments against it had wholly failed. The terms of the covenant clearly showed that it was no debt, but a contract founded on a contingency which might never have occurred-namely, the succeeding of the bankrupt to the property of his wife.

Lyde v. Mynn. Sittings in Lincoln's Inn Hall, August 3, 1833.

378

Superior Courts: K. B. Practice Court.

King's Bench Practice Court.

ATTORNEY.-AGENT.-VENUE.

An attorney waives his privilege of suing in the county of Middlesex, by employing another to bring his action.

In this case the plaintiff, who is an attorney, brought his action for work and labour against the defendant. He employed another attorney to sue for him. The venue was laid in the county of Middlesex, and an application on the common affidavit that the cause of action arose in the county of Sussex and not elsewhere, was made, and the venue accordingly directed to be changed into the latter county. A rule nisi was obtained for bringing back the venue, on the ground that the plaintiff being a privileged person, was entitled to have his cause tried in the county of Middlesex.

GAME ACT.-VARIANCE.- CONVICTION.-DE

SCRIPTION.-CERTIORARI,

The mode in which a conviction under the I and 2 W. 4. c. 3. § 30, (the Game Act) for a trespass in the day time, should allege the offence to have been committed.

By $45, the conviction itself cannot be removed; and therefore a verified copy of the conviction may be used in order to ascertain its validity.

In this case, a rule nisi had been obtained for a habeas corpus, to remove Samuel Mellor into this Court, from his confinement in the county gaol of Stafford, in which he was imprisoned, on a commitment under the 1 & 2 W. 4. c. 32. § 30, the new Game Act, for an alleged trespass in pursuit of game; on the ground that the commitment and the conviction were defective. In the commitment, it was alleged that the deIn support of this rule, it was contended, fendant "did on the 7th February, in the that as it would appear from the record that year of our Lord 1833, at the parish of Stokethe plaintiff was an attorney, that was sufficient upon-Trent in the said county, unlawfully to shew that he sued in that character, although commit a trespass, by entering and being in he employed another attorney to bring the the day time of the same day upon a common or action. The case of Tagg v. Madan, 1 B. & waste piece of land called Witley Moor, lying P. 629, was cited in support of the argument. within the manor of Bucknall, in the said There the Court said, "We cannot know from county, in the possession or occupation of this record that the plaintiff was an attorney." Daniel Bird Baddeley there, in search of game.” The reason in that case for the Court's non- The conviction stated that the defendant "did interference, did not exist in the present, for on the 17th day of February last past, unlawfully it must clearly appear in the present case, that enter in the day time upon certain lands, in the the plaintiff was an attorney. As the Court parish of Stoke-upon-Trent, in the county would in that case have interfered, if it could aforesaid, in the possession and occupation have seen that the plaintiff was an attorney; of Daniel Bird Buddeley, and there unlawfully in this case it would interfere, as it could see was in the day time upon the said land there that the plaintiff was an attorney. in pursuit of game, and did then and there by Against the rule it was contended, that what-so entering and being on the said land aforeever might be the privilege of the plaintiff to sue in the county of Middlesex as an attorney, he had waived that privilege by employing another attorney to sue for him. The rule, therefore, for bringing back the venue must be discharged, and the cause be tried in the county of Middlesex.

Taunton, J.-In an action for work and labour, the defendant may certainly move to change the venue from the county in which the action is originally brought, on the usual affidavit that the cause of action arose in another county, and not elsewhere. The plaintiff may in many instances bring back the venue; and one of those is, where the plaintiff sues as a privileged person. The question here is, whether the plaintiff has discarded his character of a privileged person, and sues as a common person. By employing another attorney to bring the action, he has waived his privilege, and sues here as a common person; and it does not necessarily follow that he is suing for work and labour done in his character of an attorney, because, being an attorney, he brings an action for work and labour done by him. He is therefore not entitled to bring back the venue. Rule discharged; the costs to be costs in the

cause.

Harrington v. Page, T. T. 1833. K B. P. C.

said commit a trespass in search of game." In making the motion for the rule, affidavits were produced, verifying a copy of the commitment and a copy of the conviction, which had been given by a clerk of the Justice in the presence of the latter, to the attorney who appeared on behalf of the defendant. An affidavit was also produced, in which it was deposed, that the trespass in question had been committed over a common or waste, over which common rights existed, and which common or waste was not in the exclusive occupation of Mr. Baddeley or of any other person, and that gentleman was not lord of the manor. It was contended that the commitment was bad, for it did not aver that Mr. Baddeley was lord of the manor, although it alleged that the property in wastes was vested in the lord by the tenth section of the act. Secondly, that even if a valid conviction would cure the defect, the conviction here was for a separate offence, and therefore was not sufficient to support the commitment. The rule nisi having been obtained

Shutt appeared, to shew cause on behalf of the magistrate,

Platt appeared, to shew cause on the part of Mr. Baddeley; and he contended, that by the the Court in any way to take cognizance of operation of section 45, it was impossible for the conviction. The language of that section "that no summary conviction in pursu

was,