man, must the world speedily be filled with, if such principles were to obtain within it any considerable currency!

Again: the interpretation of Scripture is freely given to the "understanding, penetrated and moved by the Christian idea."* And who shall judge whether the understanding of an individual is so penetrated and moved? Shall his qualification be judged of by another? Who is that other, and how shall the man be made to yield to his judgment, and to guide himself by it? And, if such a plan could be acted upon for a time, in a particular congregation, how is it possible to conduct the whole Church on the same? It is not the Church in Germany that is concerned, but the whole Church of Christ. Whatsoever mode is correctly invented for Germany, must be the right mode for Christendom. God has not many ways, but one only. Or, on the other hand, shall the individual judge for himself? Then observe the dilemma. Either he is a bold self-sufficient man, and then the interpretation of the Scripture is given, not to the "understanding penetrated," &c., but to the man who thinks that his understanding is so: or, he is a modest man, and fears to make so favourable an affirmation concerning himself, and then he dares not attempt to interpret the Scriptures at all; but stands by, while some forward and reckless spirit profanely handles them. "The understanding, penetrated and moved by the divine idea," is then the substitute for "the gift of the Holy Ghost, which Timothy had through the laying on of Paul's hands"—the gift of God in a man called, recognised, authorized, and ordained unto this responsible work. From hence what confusion of interpretations, all of equal authority, or of no authority at all! What certainty can a conscientious man attain to in this way as to the meaning of the word of God?-and will not the greater part of men conclude that it has no fixed meaning, and that it is a matter of indifference whether it have

or not.

But, secondly, will this movement benefit the Roman Catholics? Again, we think not. It is in the highest degree improbable that any considerable number of priests will answer to Ronge's call. In the case of the Abbé de la Mennais, so long as he was uncondemned by his lawful superiors and judges, he had a large number of followers; he was almost worshipped by his friends; he had influence with all; his talents were confessed, and admired, and spoken of; and his opinions worked

Die Grundlage des Christlichen Glabens soll uns einzig und allein die Heilige Schrift seyn, deren Auffassung und Auslegung der von der Christlichen Idee durchdrungenen und bewegten Vernunft freigegeben ist,

a silent way even at Rome itself. But no sooner was the condemnation of his views pronounced by the lawful authority, than he was forsaken, repudiated, shunned, and his name consigned to oblivion, while the pit of Radicalism and irreligion swallowed him up as an outcast; and so it will be again in this case. And, were it otherwise, what can an intelligent Roman Catholic find in the new thing to invite his regard? Shall he embrace the indefinite for the thing defined-the abstract and imaginary for the thing realized even with all its evils? Shall he throw himself loose from his vows, for that which acknowledges, no vows? Shall he forsake that fabric which has stood the buffetings of a thousand years, and which has witnessed the fall of so many around it, to enter another which has the elements of dissolution clinging to every beam and every fibre of it? It is folly to suppose so. Many, no doubt there are, who sigh and cry for the abominations which have gathered around those institutions to which they cleave; many others whom Satan strongly goads to impatience; many oppressed ones, and witnesses of oppression, who secretly commit their cause to God, and who intercede for their brethren, although sick with long deferred hope. Certainly those of them who most truly follow their Lord and Master in the path of self-denial, and who give their lives for their brethren-those by whom the fulfilment of God's will and the purifying of his Church is longed for the most are the very men who will be the last in accepting of any invitation to break their bonds. Nay, they will never do it.

As to Ronge himself, it would be the height of injustice, not to say of uncharity, to think hardly of him. He is a nobleminded man, who is unable to stifle his consciousness of what is due to men he commands always our pity and often our admiration his mistakes are those of his generation: his very excellencies have hurried him into error-for his ignorance, his instructors and their system are to blame. He has now become the victim of the popular whirlwind which he raised. The wild absurdity and miserable wrong-headedness which the congregations and their representatives have displayed are the natural fruit of a wicked and hypocritical religious system, from under which they have rashly fled. Unruliness has been the offspring of misrule; and the one is as inexcusable as the other.

We must wait for the day when the Lord shall himself roll away from his Church the reproach of ages. For that day, all the tumults and disturbances of the present are the preparation; and they are also, no doubt, the token that it is not very far off.

73

ART. IV. Thoughts on the Rule of Conscientious Subscription, on the Purpose of the Thirty-nine Articles, and on our Present Perils from the Romish System. By the Rev. FREDERICK D. MAURICE, Chaplain of Guy's Hospital, and Professor of English Literature in King's College, London. London: J. H. Parker.

́ ́«FOR if all opinion, as such, is involuntary in its nature." We recollect being puzzled by this sentiment, though it emanated from a very different source from that which put forth its apparent parallel, that "a man is no more responsible for his belief than he is for the colour of his skin." These are fascinating and dangerous propositions, which, like certain mathematical formulæ, are mere symbols of knowledge, without clear meaning but to the instructed. For whilst nothing can be more false than these propositions, in their popular acceptation, nothing can be more true in their expanded and full sense, since we entertain no doubt that, to a rightly constituted mind, the full evidence of truth is irresistible; for we believe that the author of our nature simply and absolutely constituted its convictions for truth, and not for falsehood.

The very structure and popular use of language, indeed, point to this conclusion; for we never say that falsehood produces conviction, excepting when it is subtlety presented in the garb of truth.

If, however, it be true, that a man is "not responsible for his belief" that "opinion, as such, is involuntary;" then is it equally true, that he is not responsible for the consequences of his belief or opinion. This inevitable inference shows the necessity of guarding such propositions against the dangerous abuses to which they are liable, and to justify which they are too often quoted.

An involuntary opinion" upon a subject is that final decision which our convictions force upon us, after having carefully examined all that can be known concerning it. Thus, then, the responsibility is shifted back to the volitions and qualifications under which the requisite information for settling opinions was sought for: and thus, the sentiments stand forth stripped of their fascinating disguise. For, upon condition of his having fulfilled these implied conditions for settling his belief, the infidel may be safely left in possession of either of these two formula to account for his opinions; since, in the majority of cases, unbelief in the doctrines of Christianity, and in those accredited formularies in which the piety and wisdom of others have delivered them to us, can be traced, up either to ignorance or dis

honesty, or to both conjointly. Hence the value of an opinion which emanates from one who claims to be regarded as an authority, depends, as one of its conditions, upon our conviction that he has formed it with a full knowledge of the subject, in all its relations—a severe test of truth indeed! Nor is this the whole. For imperfectly circumstanced as our moral nature now is, not only is a full knowledge of the subject, generally speaking, requisite for the formation of an opinion to which the propounder is justified in claiming the assent of others, but also honesty of purpose, and a mind free from bias-free from the wish to believe one side rather than the other.

Nor is this all. There is a certain amount of disciplined strength of understanding required for the comprehension of the minuter relations of the many component parts of higher questions, without which an opinion upon them must be rather the result of conjecture than of irresistible conviction.

In proportion, then, as we can prove the ignorance, or imperfect information, or intellectual disqualification, of an objector to generally received doctrines, we prove that his belief cannot be called "involuntary," in the sense of his not being responsible for the unavoidable evils of its falsehood. For example: it is the opinion of some that one of the Articles of the English Church is Calvinistic; that is, that it was drawn up in reference to certain published dogmas of Calvin. This is denied by another, who attempts to prove that it involves an anachronism; since, "when the Articles were drawn, the doctrines of Calvin were little or not at all known; his first work advocating them having been published only a year before the Articles."* By such a test as this many opinions, upon which men fearlessly act, as if belief in them were "involuntary," might be exploded. And further: the most perfect knowledge of a subject without perfect integrity is insufficient to constitute an "involuntary opinion," which shall render its holder irresponsible before the highest tribunal. And is this always found? Is it ever found in forming opinions upon points affecting our strongest feelings and interest? Alas! human nature makes the exceptions rare indeed.

It follows from this, that when we are told, "I cannot help believing, or disbelieving, certain doctrines," much is to be asked before such an one can be sheltered under the general truth, that "opinion is involuntary;" or that he " is no more responsible for his belief than for the colour of his skin." Opinions as to many of the facts of the natural world are involuntary, because they force themselves upon our senses, and refer to first princi

* H. J. Rose.

ples, from which there is no further appeal. No man can help believing that the moon rises, waxes, wanes, disappears, and again appears. But of what value was the opinion of the village philosopher, who solved the lunar problem to a friend of ours by telling him that the old moons were chopped up into stars? Galileo, we believe, was no more responsible for the opinion for which he was imprisoned than for the colour of his skin; for it was formed under circumstances which made its adoption as much a law of his moral nature, as the colour of his skin was of his physical nature.

Opinion-belief-practical convictions of truth, upon which a man will stake his property, life, and happiness, can arise but from two sources. First, the completest knowledge, which makes opinion "involuntary," because it leads us down to the ideas implanted in us by our Maker, from which there is no appeal. And, secondly, from our conviction of the knowledge, sound judgment, and integrity of others who have become our instructors. He who fashioned our nature has made this last kind of belief far more common than the other. It is possible, for example, that the loaf of bread I buy to sustain life may be poisoned; but my opinion, or belief, that it is not, is as satisfactory to my mind (under the usual circumstances of life), as his is, who should previously analyse it, and see lying before him its elementary parts composed of nutritious aliment. Certainly, however, these two kinds of practical belief are not to be confounded, and classed under the same head. For the opinion of the competent analyser of the loaf is "involuntary," because he sees before him facts appealing to the senses, which constitute a tribunal admitting of no further appeal. Whereas the opinion, or belief, of the other depends upon probabilities which, npon the whole, mainly rule the affairs of life. Selfinterest is the mainspring of worldly transactions; and the buyer knows, and rightly acts upon his knowledge, that it is more for the interest of the vender to sell him wholesome food than poisoned.

In thus trusting, then, to others for our opinions on subjects of vital importance, we are only obeying a law of our moral nature, constituting one of the most important links in the great chain which binds together human society. And opinions thus formed are often "involuntary"-i. e., we cannot help believing, and so are not responsible for consequences. We may illustrate this important proposition thus:

If a stranger should unexpectedly give another information of a valuable legacy of land and houses left to him in a distant country, his first opinion of the truth of the statement would be