"Complexum, Consignificans, Privatio, Fictum, Pars, Deus, Equivocum, Transcendens, Ens Rationis, (Sanderson, Compend. Log. Another version is given by Seton in his Dialectica.) (ii) The modern popular view runs in a very different direction. Starting with the postulate that every name which has a meaning must offer occasion to have that meaning unfolded, it is rather apt to extend the 'meaning' so as to make it cover correctness of application in general. Thus the names of simple sensations, which strictly speaking possess denotation only, may yet according to Mill yield a kind of definition, for we may analyze their physical antecedents or accompaniments. This view dates presumably from Locke, whose attitude however towards formal Logic is not one which we can safely imitate. (iii) The view just noticed above shows a not unamiable bias towards making Logic useful, or rather towards converting it into a body of useful rules, for the management of language. My own opinion is that we do best to admit frankly that Logic is only concerned with the 'meaning' in the strictest technical sense of the term, i.e. with the connotation of the term. There are many ways of guiding any one to a right use of words, and of these the comparatively artificial method, of analyzing the term by assigning the proximate elements of its connotation, is the only truly general and formal one, and to this we shall confine the name of Definition. We do not of course restrict ourselves to the scholastic limits above mentioned, but wherever a name admits of analysis in respect of its signification, there we shall claim a definition. But it must be understood at the same time that definition is but one way, and this a somewhat technical way, of conveying a meaning to any one who is in doubt. To raise the requisite experience at first hand, or by exercise of imagination, may often be the most effective plan. But where there is no other way than this available we shall consider that no true definition can be offered. It is about time now to raise the question, how and why Definitions should ever be needed: what, in fact, is the use of them? We found ourselves, the reader will remember, forced to make the preliminary assumption that language is understood in the same sense by all who use it within a circle of common intercourse. No other assumption was possible as a starting point for any science which dealt with the communication of thought. Now, when the Definition expressly disclaims doing anything more than expounding the meaning of a word, it would seem that it merely states what ex hypothesi every one who uses the word is already familiar with, and that therefore every Definition, from its nature, must be useless. Some of the various answers to such an objection are obvious: we will only touch upon those which seem to involve questions of principle. (i) For one thing, then, this is just a useful reminder to us of the advisability of regarding Logic as being an “applied" science. So long as we regard it as being purely formal the definition stands self-condemned as being obviously uncalled for and useless. The only ground on which it can be justified is by assuming that in its practical applications we shall frequently find that our fundamental postulate about language does not hold good. Many persons are constantly diverging, and all of us are occasionally diverging, from the common consensus of sound opinion about the meaning of words. Accordingly definitions are in practice very often of extreme value. These considerations afford an answer, I think, to a difficulty which has often been expressed. By admitting that the demand for a definition is a sort of right instead of a merely occasional concession to our mental indolence or frailty, logicians inevitably provoke a continued repetition of such a demand, and then the question arises, Where are we to stop? How far back are we supposed to go in the assignment of such a series of successive definitions? The true answer is; You have no right to a Definition at all: the mere fact that you ask for one is in itself an admission of the general truth of our postulate about language,-for on what other ground can you suppose that we shall know what you ask for by your question ?—that is, the definition involves confessedly, by virtue of its being asked for, an admission that you consider yourself sound on the subject of language generally, and merely want a partial and exceptional blank supplied. Accordingly all that the definition can propose to do is to supply a link connecting the missing or defective notion with the proximate ones presumed to be sound. (ii) But more than this. We are reminded of another practical departure, and one of a very important nature, from our fundamental postulate. Granted that each person knows exactly what he himself means, it is by no means true that we all speak the same language, even in the same country and at the same time. This opens up the question of technical or special definitions. Special, or Technical Definitions. The Connotation of a term was accepted by us as being the 'meaning' generally assigned to it, allowing of course for the various reserves and explanations which such a way of speaking necessarily demanded. The right so to accept it rested upon the very reasonable postulate that language answered fairly accurately to its obvious functions as a medium of communication. But we must not forget that, side by side with the general language which a whole people have in common, there are a number of special languages in use by particular classes of the same people. Doubtless the great bulk of the words employed are common to both kinds of speech, but there are many which are peculiar to the special ones, and these peculiar elements fully deserve to be considered as a distinct language. If it be asked what right we have to select a certain number of words found in (say) an English dictionary, and spoken by some particular class of persons in that country, and to talk of this selection as a distinct language, the reply is that a language is nothing but a set of words in use by some group of people, and that therefore in the case supposed a distinct set of words, characteristic of or confined to a particular group of people, does certainly constitute a distinct language. Some of the words composing it are doubtless merely substitutes for those elsewhere in general use, but they are quite different words: others are peculiar to it, and symbolize notions unfamiliar or unknown to the bulk of speakers outside its range, in which case the symbols may either be familiar ones with a new signification attached to them, or entirely new variations or creations for the purpose. That is, an otherwise well-known sound may have a special sense put on it, thus becoming a new word, or both sound and sense may be new and special. Moreover, such a language may be the habitual speech of some sections of the community, or it may be the occasional medium resorted to for the discussion of special topics or for use on special oc casions. The reader will easily supply illustrations sufficient, so I need merely indicate, as instances of languages peculiar to certain classes, the slang of thieves, school-boys, and sporting persons, and the whole vocabulary of peculiar expressions required by sailors, miners, and indeed most classes of workmen. As instances of languages only required from time to time by those who want to speak of some very special subject, might be given the terms used by those discoursing of high mathematics or any other advanced science. Many people, doubtless, would be inclined to deny that these ought to be called special languages, and would describe them as English: on the ground that they are included in so-called English dictionaries, and are spoken by Englishmen. I think that it is philosophically more correct to say that such a dictionary includes other than English words, and that most Englishmen can and do speak other tongues than the English. The bearing of these remarks on the subject of Definition is obvious. Just as the common speech universally spoken by the people of any country presupposes a commonly recognized meaning in every word: which meaning, when admitting of analysis, is called connotation, and the enunciation of this connotation is called Definition: so is it with each of these special languages. Their words have exactly the same characteristics and the same functions as any others. They yield proper names, and connotative names, and these latter therefore admit of Definition in its true sense. Nay, as a matter of fact, it is probable that the work of defining these special words is easier, and the definitions are more accurate, than in the case of more generally familiar words. This is merely on the ground that a word confined to a special class is much more likely to retain a uniform and fully recognized signification than one which has to do duty over a very wide area. The term technical, in its widest sense, I understand to apply to such words and such definitions as these: though, where the class of speakers is vulgar, or the subject trivial, we more often designate them by the word slang. The uses of Definition, as hitherto considered, refer only to linguistic conventions, and the divergences which actually exist amongst them. But when we look outside us, to the subject matter to which our language refers, we soon find that the practical aid which a Definition, and still more the process of framing a Definition, may afford, is enormous. We have already pointed out that the central group of essential attributes,-viz. those which constitute the connotation, is surrounded by a much more numerous group, some of which are only just of less importance, or of less general recognition, than the few selected ones. The progress of knowledge has an obvious bearing upon this state of things, as it makes the tenure of the accepted attributes a somewhat precarious one. At any moment some discovery may be made which would certainly in time alter our relative estimate of these attributes, and therefore probably alter the conventional selection by which the meaning is determined. This precarious character of even the best and most accurate current definitions has seemed to some writers so unscientific that they have met it by a rather strong proposal. They have been so convinced of the indeterminateness of the enquiry as to when an attribute can be said to have become 'universally accepted as a part of the meaning' that they have proposed to admit the attribute the moment any person has discovered it. Thus Mr Bain, one of the most philosophical supporters of this view, maintains' that "all newly discovered properties are real predications on their first announcement, although immediately on their first communication they become verbal",-e.g. Faraday's discovery that oxygen is magnetic. This seems to me to be nothing short of a reduction to absurdity of the view in question. As a rule, a fact “immediately on its being communicated" is a very doubtful fact indeed, for only a portion of the statements taken from the last number of the appropriate scientific journal are finally accepted as true. But even if they do finally establish themselves, it is surely stretching the phrase beyond all license to 1 "Deductive Logic," p. 70. |