CHAPTER IX. THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER. 1. The Qualities of Conduct. The method of observation, as directed to the knowledge of character, gives no knowledge of what the forces of character are; seems to give this, because we attribute to character the qualities observed in conduct, PP. 94-97.-Analysis of the method of characterisation of Theophrastus, La Bruyère and others: a quality of conduct, an emotional disposition, or a sentiment (or several of them together) employed to construct a character, pp. 97–100. 2. The Conception of Conduct. Conduct as the expression or behaviour of some system of character is a part of this system; the will of this system implicated in it : the qualities of conduct in this sense also qualities of character; we can voluntarily aim at acquiring such qualities, pp. 100-103. -Other qualities, proper to character itself, as qualifying its emotions and sentiments; thence taken to qualify the conduct of these systems. Hence two kinds of qualities, (1) those first observed in conduct and attributed afterwards to character; (2) those first belonging to character and attributed afterwards to conduct. Our conception of character, taken at first to include the systems of the emotions and sentiments, now to be advanced a further stage to include both kinds of qualities, pp. 103-104. CHAPTER X. OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS AND SENTIMENTS. This problem suggested by the last addition to our conception of character: What qualities of character any given emotion or sentiment tends to foster. Assumption that every sentiment tends to acquire the qualities it needs, as it tends to organise the emotions it needs, pp. 105-109.-Of the injustice of our affections, pp. 109-110. CHAPTER XI. OF THE RELATIVE ETHICS OF THE SENTIMENTS. 1. Of the Virtues of Sentiments. In the first stage of Love its qualities and virtues develop spontaneously; in the second stage, only through effort and reflection, as we become conscious of possessing these qualities in insufficient degree. Hence the Ideals of a sentiment, pp. 111-112. 2. Of the Ideals of Sentiments. All the qualities of a sentiment may suggest such ideals, and tend to develop certain emotions appropriate to them, as aspiration, admiration, remorse and shame, pp. 112-113. b* 3. Of the Duties of Sentiments. Besides ideals and the special emotions supporting them, sentiments of love tend to develop duties relative to their ends, with complementary emotions of self-approval and self-reproach. These three, the virtues as the fruit of their wills, the ideals as the aspirations of their wills, and the duties as the commands of their wills constitute the Relative Ethics of sentiments, pp. 113-116.— Particular sentiments, besides those they have in common, apt to have virtues and duties distinctive of them, pp. 116-117. -The function of ideas of duty to arouse the self-control of the system as a whole, pp. 117-118.-Hate, in distinction from love, has no relative ethics, and tends to destroy all sense of obligation toward its object, pp. 118-119. 4. Of the Distinction between the Relative Ethics of Sentiments and the Conscience. The Relative Ethics of sentiments partial to their objects, the Ethics of conscience approximate to impartiality, pp. 119–120. CHAPTER XII. THE SENTIMENTS AS THE SOURCE OF TYPES OF CHARACTER. The qualities which a particular sentiment acquires tend to qualify the character as a whole; but those qualities of the character which it does not need, tend, apart from other influences, to atrophy. Hence every sentiment tends to develop a type of character of its own, pp. 121-127. CHAPTER XIII. OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE TEMPERAMENT ON THE CHARACTER 1. Of the Distinction between Temper and Temperament. Our temperament part of the innate constitution of the mind, including, not the emotional dispositions in general, but the particular manner in which these are felt and manifested by different persons. The way in which, in a given individual, a particular emotion is felt and manifested is its temper in him ; the way in which the emotions in general are felt and manifested by him is his temperament, pp. 128-129.-The temper of an emotion subject to great change in the course of life, pp 130–131. 2. The Doctrine of the Temperaments. Its assumption that certain emotional qualities attach to all emotions. The superficiality of the sanguine, the depth of the bilious, as affecting their character as a whole. The irascible, though superficial in respect of anger, not therefore in respect of all other emotions. The child superficial in many directions, but generally liable to feel fear more deeply than adults Impossible to suppose that the 'depth of the bilious attaches to all their sentiments, pp. 131-137.-Conflicting opinions concerning the nervous and the phlegmatic. The quickness of the nervous may not attach to all mental processes, and may not include quickness in respect of emotion. The slowness of the phlegmatic may be due to deficient energy or to low grade of intelligence. They may be quick in responding to the stimuli of certain emotions, as anger or fear. Slowness may be due to lack of interest, or to self-control, pp. 137-142. 3. Of the Chief Defects of the Classical Doctrine of the Temperaments. (1) The assumption that the same emotional quality pervades all the emotions in the same type of temperament. (2) The distinctions between the types are based on conceptions of degree which are necessarily vague. (3) These types are exaggerations. The sanguine and bilious at opposite poles in respect of superficiality and depth; somewhere between them all existing temperaments must be found. The nervous and phlegmatic at opposite poles in respect of quickness and slowness; somewhere between them all existing temperaments must be found. All real temperaments mixtures of the four pure temperaments in varying proportions. (4) The classical doctrine does not enable us to infer anything of the temperament of a given individual beyond what we have observed it to be, pp. 142-147. OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL TEMPERS ON THE STABILITY OF SENTIMENTS (1). 1. How Far the Temper of one Emotion Involves a Corresponding Temper in Other Emotions. The natural tempers of fear and anger probably not the same in either sex, p. 148.-Sensibility to an emotion taken to mean the degree and manner of its response to stimuli.-Five qualities of sensibility (1) range; (2) quickness of response; (3) delicacy; (4) intensity, and (5) durability of the emotional response, PP. 149-150.-Cannot infer that the natural temper of one emotion attaches to all others, but may infer that it attaches to other emotions having affinities with its own. Thus the joyous temper renders us correspondingly insensible to repugnance, sorrow, despondency and despair, but correspondingly sensible to hope and confidence. The sorrowful temper renders us correspondingly sensible to despondency and despair, but correspondingly insensible to joy, hope and confidence, pp. 150-157. 2. Of the Influence on the Stability of Sentiments of Tempers that have a Broad Sensibility to Joy. The more the sensibility to joy approaches the widest possible range, the more it increases the instability of all sentiments; the more widely and evenly it is distributed over a given class of objects, the more unstable it renders the sentiments formed for members 1. Of the Influence of the Tempers that have a Narrow or Restricted In proportion as the range of sensibility to joy, in respect of a given 1. The Meaning to be Assigned to the Terms Instinct and Emotion. Emotion defined to include both a cognitive and conative attitude as well as an attitude of feeling, p. 178.-Emotion, a system, be- cause its constituents are organised for an end. Three principal parts in the system of an emotion, (1) the emotion itself in con- sciousness, (2) the instincts and other tendencies organised in the nervous system or in subconsciousness, (3) the external behaviour by which the end of the emotion is attained, pp. 179-180.-The term 'instinctive' most generally used to denote behaviour the capacity to form which is inherited; some- times also used to denote emotions when aroused by stimuli innately connected with their excitement. The term instinct' defined as an inherited disposition excited innately by certain stimuli, evoking innately in response a specific kind of behaviour, and directed innately to achieve a certain end, pp. 180-183.- Some instincts produce actions complete and useful; others, actions incomplete and useless apart from other and acquired actions combined with them. Human instincts belong to the latter class, and become serviceable through other actions 2. The Relation of Instinct to Emotion. The system of a primary emotion may contain several instincts. One or other of these instincts may be excited, and evoke the specific behaviour characteristic of it, without simultaneously exciting the emotion. One or other of these instincts may sometimes be found organised in the system of different emotions. An emotion tends to include in its system all instincts and other dispositions that subserve its end, pp. 185–192. 3. Of the Significance of the Physiological Theory of Emotion for the Science of Character. The functional changes connected with an emotion either do or do not subserve its end. On the whole, though their influence is often bad, they do subserve it, when not too marked. The function of its instincts is to furnish the proximate ends of the emotion, and a specific mode of behaviour instrumental to this end, pp. 192-194.-The excitement and maintenance of emotions by ideas destroys the original balance of the instincts, and renders possible the debasement, as well as the elevation, of human character, pp. 195–196. CHAPTER II. FEAR. 1. Of the Meanings to be given to the Terms End,'' Object' and' Cause' of Emotion. Emotions are systems because they have ends, namely, those results which they are organised to achieve in order to satisfy their impulses. Cause' means some conspicuous condition on which the emotion depends; 'object,' the thing to which the emotion is referred, pp. 197-199. : 2. The Primitive Varieties of Fear. These to be distinguished by some instinctive mode of behaviour peculiar to each, and the proximate end to which this behaviour is directed as (1) flight, (2) concealment, (3) silence, (4) a clinging to something, (5) a shrinking from something, (6) immobility or simulation of death, (7) crying out for protection, (8) defence by aggressive actions, (9) disinterested action on behalf of young, PP. 199-206. 3. The Varieties and Functions of Fear in the Sentiments. The end of primitive fears to safeguard the organism. Man develops other ends and new forms of behaviour adapted to them, PP. 206-207.-There are endless different ways in which man learns to counteract the occurrence of some event that he fears because of his love of an object, pp. 207-210. |