Imatges de pàgina
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after-wards. If instead of making a statical analysis of these systems we study them dynamically, we shall find many cases where a given desire as it grows expands into a sentiment. Here, for instance, is the desire for knowledge, paramount in many intellectual men, beginning in the child, lasting through the life of the man; at first showing itself as the impulse to solve a doubt, to answer a question; going on to others as particular as the first; becoming at last more general, forming the abstract conception of knowledge, unifying these isolated impulses by means of it, recognising the attainment of this' knowledge' as its end; becoming therefore a great abstract desire embracing innumerable possible desires under it. This abstract desire, and not the impulses or desires of the child that led up to it, is that alone which may persist through the greater part of the man's life. Next consider it on its emotional side. At first this is hardly developed. Some simple question is asked by the child and answered or not by the mother: "What's above this room, mother?" "Another room." What's above that room?" "The roof." 'What's above the roof?" "The clouds." "What's above the clouds ? " The sky." "What's above the sky?" "Nothing." What's above nothing?" Nothing." These impulses after knowledge, answered as soon as asked, have no time in which to develop the prospective emotions. But later questions will persist or recur, and the growing youth will try to answer them by his observation and reflection. And if he has formed the abstract desire for knowledge, hope will always arise in him with this desire, and he will win joy again and again with the partial fulfilments of it. As he attains to each fresh piece of knowledge he will say, 'Now I have got this knowledge, what joy!' 'Now I have got it I must not lose it.' And the conservative tendency of joy will make him repeat it again and again, and write it down lest he forget it. And these joys of partial fulfilment will spread to the abstract conception of knowledge, so that it will have something in it which elates him.

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We have here reached the stage at which joy seems to

have been added to the system of desire. For the new truth to which the youth attains, though marking the end of the particular desire for it, is only a step forward in the greater and persistent desire for knowledge.' The new truth soon ceases to be an end, and becomes a means to some further truth. But look at it in relation to the particular desire that has attained to it. This desire was felt, but with attainment is no longer felt. A new attitude has succeeded

-joy. We cannot say, joy has been added to the system of this desire, which is at an end. But joy may belong to the system of the abstract desire for knowledge, which is not at an end. Still it was not this abstract desire that was felt and recognised in consciousness, but the particular desire that has come to an end. The abstract desire for knowledge is the name of a system that persists below consciousness, seldom arises in consciousness, and can never be present as a whole to consciousness. The joy of attainment that is so often felt does not therefore belong to these particular desires; but, coming with their fulfilment, and dividing them from one another, it does belong to the system of this abstract desire, because it subserves its infinite end, knowledge. For the joy helps to stamp the new truth on the mind by repetition of it and by the delight taken in it the tendency of joy being to conserve its object. Therefore the intervals of joy between these particular desires for this or that piece of knowledge belong to this greater system, the desire for knowledge in general.

What is this system? We call it the desire for knowledge. But whatever we call it, this system that has grown out of and expanded from particular desires, and come to include their joys of attainment, which they cannot include, is the same thing as the Love of Knowledge. For consider what it is that makes us hold to the distinction between desire and love, and oppose attempts to identify them. It is because we conceive desire as we feel it in consciousness, as this forward-straining, restless activity, never satisfied until it has attained its goal; whereas love, however much it may have this at times, has also a repose in it, and a satisfaction, so that we hope to find in it our happiness,

which we can never do in desire; and with this repose it has the great contemplative emotions, joy, admiration and wonder with which it regards sometimes its object, knowledge, without the straining after the future and repugnance to the present which belongs to desire.

Love, having these two sides-the one contemplative in respect of the present, and sometimes satisfied with it; the other, in respect of the future, productive, dissatisfied, because desiring something of it has a more complex cognitive attitude than desire, referring both to its object, knowledge, and its end, the attainment or possession of knowledge; whereas desire has only an end-the attainment of knowledge-but no object distinct from this.

Now, what is the conclusion? It is that desire as felt in consciousness is as clearly different from the sentiment as emotion is different from it; that the system of a particular desire is also different from the sentiment, for this system comes to an end with its fulfilment; but that the system of a desire that in becoming abstract persists through a number of particulars, may not be different, for it may expand so as to include all that the sentiment includes and become identical with it. If, then, we are to maintain the distinction between them we must draw it at the point where the contemplative emotions enter-joy, admiration, wonder, and sorrow apart from its desire. We must define the system of desire as excluding these contemplative emotions and their dispositions, but as including the prospective emotions and certain others, this being the conclusion to which the popular conception seems to point. We must say that so far as these contemplative emotions become added to desire and harmonised with it, it ceases to be merely desire and becomes Love.

A.

INDEX

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Arnold (Matthew), on Gray, 306,
307; on Amiel, 354.
Aspiration, as belonging to senti
ments with ideals, 113.
Association, laws of; as useless
for interpreting empirical laws
of character, 16-19.
Astonishment, as the higher,
cognitive variety of surprise,
446, 447.
Attention, as controlled by
emotion, 25; as instinctively
directed to the object of pri-
mary emotion, 181, note.
Avarice, as a sentiment included
in self-love, 57.

Aversion, as implying repug-
nance; as an abstract conative
tendency, 399.

B.

Bacon, on envy, 88, 91; on re.
venge and justice, 233; on
sorrow and friendship, 341 ;
on wonder, 444, 450.
Bain (Alexander), on love, 54; on
problems of character, 83; on
nervous temperament, 139; on
emotion and intellect, 140;
on anger directed to produce
pain, 243; on tendency of
anger and fear to exclude one
another, 254; on tendency of
opposite feelings to exclude
one another, 261; on surprise
as "neutral excitement," 435;
on wonder as containing sur-
prise, 443; on desire, 461.

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