olfactory sensations. We are disgusted by the touch of certain parasitical insects, or by the cold and clammy touch of snails, slugs, and reptiles; and afterwards the sight of them will arouse this disgust. In distinction from the first type we notice here the absence of vomiting and its accompanying sensations; faint sensations of nausea may indeed be present, but this does not appear to be always the case, unless the sense of smell is also stimulated. In this type we come nearer to an emotion' of disgust, for the violent sensations of the first type are not aroused. The touch of a toad arouses sensations of shuddering rather than of nausea.

Before considering this second type further we must notice that there is a more developed variety of the first in which sensations of disgust are aroused through taste or smell,and, afterwards, indirectly, through association,—but the cause of these sensations is also perceived through sight or touch as when after noticing a disagreeable odour in the neighbourhood of some animal we regard it with disgust; or when we feel disgust at the sight of some dish of food on account of our former experience of its disagreeable taste. And so by association we are disgusted at the sight of animals of filthy habits, and of such as feed on dead bodies,— especially when we are in their near neighbourhood,—and also at human beings who appear unclean in their persons.

This type, with its perception of the object to which the disgusting sensations are due, is probably not primitive. We can trace in many cases its development. In primitive disgust we are absorbed by our internal sensations. The sick infant may only be aware of its disagreeable sensations and of the impulse that expels the liquid from its stomach and mouth. The disgust it feels is a mass of sensation with this impulse. Probably it does not at first perceive the cause, and refer its sensations to that. It is the same with any other voluminous and disagreeable bodily state. We are absorbed by the sensations and impulse connected with them. But the child, as it develops and increases in experience, connects the effect with the cause, and at the sight of the cause has its former disagreeable sensations and impulse revived in a less intense form, and refers these to the

perceived object. Its disgust has become a definite emotion with a definite object.

Now no one would call the impulse and sensations of nausea, vomiting, and cold sweat an emotion any more than those of a colic or of a fever. They may, indeed, become the object of an emotion and excite our fear, but they are not themselves the emotion of disgust. When the later stage is reached, in which attention is no longer engrossed by this impulse and sensations, but directed to a perceived object to which this impulse and sensations are referred, for which the disgust is felt, this experience would commonly be regarded as an emotion.1 There will then have been a shifting of attention from a state of the coenæsthesia to a perceived object, and the same sensations that were at first an object have now fallen into the background, and form part of the subjective state of emotion.

Whether we confine the term emotion to this second stage of development, or extend it also to the first, is a verbal question that, from our point of view, is not of great importance. What is of importance is to recognise that both are the same system in different stages of development, and that this system is one of the fundamental forces of the mind.

2. Of the Innate and Acquired Tendencies of Disgust. We have considered in the last section the two chief varieties of disgust so far as these are aroused by sensations of taste and smell, on the one hand, or by sensations of touch and temperature, on the other, and have seen that, probably, sensations of sight only arouse disgust through association: we have now to distinguish the different tendencies which are manifested in the behaviour of these varieties. In the first and most familiar type, in which the characteristic sensations are those of nausea or of vomiting, there are present the different instinctive or reflex tendencies connected with the extrusion from the body of the offensive substances-the spitting out, the choking, the vomiting, the puffing or blowing out from the nostrils. At first these tendencies are aroused through

1 'The Teacher's Handbook of Psy.' J. Sully, pt. iii. ch. xv. p. 376.

the taste or smell, but soon by association, and, usually in a weaker degree, through sight. "The idiosyncrasy of antipathy," says Preyer, " to many articles of food (even in the fourth and fifth years) went so far that even the sight of such food called forth lively demonstrations of disgust, even choking movements, a phenomenon exhibited by many children and one that leads us to infer a largely developed capacity in discrimination of taste and smell." 1 The same author observes, writing of a child a few days old: "Let the tongue be touched with a solution of quinine, warm and not too much diluted, or with common salt, or let it be smeared with a crystal of tartaric acid, and movements of repulsion readily appear, accompanied with choking. . . ." 2

The movements to which we have referred first occur when that which disgusts us has already found entrance into the body, and it is obvious that it must be differently dealt with according to the part of the body affected. There are, therefore, a variety of different instincts, or reflex tendencies, of ejection, according as the substance is in the mouth or nostrils or throat or stomach. "As we spit out a disagreeable morsel, so we reject an offensive smell by stopping the nose and by driving out the infected air through the protruded lips, with a noise of which various representations are exhibited in the interjections of disgust: Piff! Phew! Phit!" 3

To these instinctive tendencies must be added others when disgust is caused by satiety as the thrusting of an object away with lips or hands. "When the child has sucked enough at the breast that yields milk in great abundance, so that his stomach is full, then he actually pushes the nipple away with his lips (3rd to 5th week). In the 7th month, I saw plainly that the mouth-piece of the bottle was vigorously thrust out with the tongue, almost with disgust. The head had already been turned away some time before."

The turning of the eyes, the head, and the body away is another group of tendencies belonging to disgust. They

1 'The Mind of the Child,'' The Senses and the Will,' ch. iv.

2' On the Development of Mind in the Child,' ch. i.

3 H. Wedgwood, 'On the Origin of Language,' ch. iii. 'Interjections.' Preyer, op. cit.' The Senses and the Will,' ch. iv. pt. 4.

often imply the perception of an object through sight, and then belong to a later stage of disgust to which the term 'emotion' is more properly applied. For it is not things seen that first arouse disgust, but things tasted, smelt, or touched. If these tendencies are partly acquired, they are directed to an end which is not acquired: namely, to exclude from experience or perception, and, later, even from thought, the disgusting object. The end is analogous to that of the primitive tendencies of ejection; for, if those exclude substances from the body, these exclude experiences and thoughts from the mind. "The mind revolts against certain opinions, as the stomach rejects certain foods." 1 'Si quelque proposition vous charme, vous dites la goûter; vous la rejetez au contraire des yeux, du nez, de la bouche, des épaules, et de la main, si elle vous est importune; mais si elle attente à l'ordre moral, les expressions de la lutte violente sont plus énergiques encore ; ce sont les expressions du dégoût physique, du vomissement, de la dyspnée mortelle; elles prennent, dans ce dernier cas, la forme de l'horreur et d'épouvante." 2

As primitive disgust is often aroused by satiety, by the taste, or even at the sight of food for which we have felt an appetite, so is this later emotion of disgust often felt for objects that we have enjoyed to excess. "L'entière satisfaction et le dégoût se tiennent la main."3 The emotion is in this respect like the primitive impulse. There are some things for which we acquire disgust, so that the least occupation of the mind with them tends to arouse it, as stupidity, cowardice, meanness, cunning, ingratitude. There are others which we may enjoy until satiety arouses disgust. But excess in the satisfaction of desire is not so likely to be followed by disgust, where the desire is not of appetitive origin, as where it is. The greedy man at length pushes away his food. The smell of it is now repulsive to him. He turns his eyes from it, and gets up and leaves the room. But in the too prolonged satisfaction of

1 Hazlitt, 'Characteristics,' cxxxvi.

Louis Grandeur, 'De la Physionomie,' ch. iii. p. 44. 3 La Fontaine, quoted 'Dict. Larousse,' Art. 'Dégoût.'

other desires there is the cessation of enjoyment rather than disgust; leading to the discontinuance of our occupation, to the occurrence of some other desire giving a fresh direction to our thoughts. When physical exercise is too prolonged we become fatigued, enjoyment ceases, and there is no longer the former impulse. Fatigue evokes the contrary impulse for rest. If we have to continue walking to reach our destination, we feel repugnance to the exercise, but not usually disgust. When we have too much of the company of those we love, the excess blunts our enjoyment, but produces disgust more often where it is sexual than where it is ordinary affection. What usually arises is a desire for some distraction, without our feeling either disgust or repugnancy, unless the desire be opposed. But the young become disgusted with their home-life, when it is monotonous and their work does not call them forth; and they long for distractions. They feel the monotony, and yet that they are expected to show contentment and even gratitude.

Now, in all these acquired forms of disgust, the tendency which is most conspicuous is this turning of the eyes and body away from the object, so that the mind may be no longer occupied with it. Thus, when the young are disgusted with their homes, their attention and thoughts are directed away from it as much as possible; parents get little interest and attention. Thus, too, we turn away our eyes from the sight of dead bodies, and our minds from the disease and death about us. But it is some time before we acquire this attitude. A naturalist observed children who were watching corpses being brought out of a river. The young ones, who knew nothing of death, were indifferent, the elder ones turned away with repulsion.1 Thus disgust hinders curiosity and all the mental operations that lead us to investigate the nature of things; something" becomes a perpetual source of disgust, and serves as a perpetual repellent to the eye of scrutiny." It is also true that curiosity tends to inhibit disgust, as we see in so many doctors and pathologists whose intellectual curiosity overcomes their disgust at disease. Let 1 Richet, 'L'Homme et l'Intelligence,' ii. p. 60. 2 Bentham, Ration. Judic. Evid,' iv. 292.