densation, it is precipitated again upon the earth, which is thence supplied with a regular accession of moisture, and consequent fertility. He could not then be thought an enlightened reasoner who would ascribe to chance the regular correspondence between the various parts of nature; or, would deny that he sees any proof of a designing cause, when plants are so formed as to be nourished by the moisture for which there is this constant provision, and animals so constituted as to be nourished by the plants thus regularly produced. In fact, every research, nay every single experiment in philosophy, is a practical testimony of our general conviction that there is contrivance at the bottom of every phenomenon; and is so far a confutation of the Epicurean atheist, that it shows him to be at variance with the universal experience of mankind, on which that conviction is founded.

It must not be altogether omitted, that in the works of human art and labour, nothing is ever left to chance. The most experienced carpenter makes the most con

stant use of his rule the oldest mason keeps his wall in the perpendicular by his line. It is impossible, ninety-nine times in a hundred, to make a complete circle or a perfect square without the use of instruments. The story of the painter, who, when his art had failed, produced the foam of his horse's mouth by the accidental dash of his brush, has even found a place in history. Why is this, but from our accumulated experience, that chance, in reality, does nothing at all for us?

This then is the outline of the argument from final causes against the production of the world from chance. It is the result of our uniform experience, that no certain effect can be obtained without some regular means of contrivance. But whatever part of the universe we examine, from the minutest insect to the noblest animal, from the meanest plant to that magnificent system which the researches of modern astronomers unfold, we trace the undoubted evidence of means corresponding to their intended object, and attaining their end. Therefore we conclude, by a natural and

irresistible analogy, that a world which exhibits throughout an unbroken chain of contrivances and means, is the effect not of fortuitous concurrence in its constituent parts, whether termed molecules or atoms, but of their regular disposition; and is the work, not of chance, but of an intelligent contriver. For, if we should despise the philosopher, who told us that even the rudest and most imperfect petrifactions of vegetable or animal substances were the work of chance: if this is so well acknowledged, that no one has ever dared to sup-ply the greatest desiderata in philosophy, such as the cause of polarity in the magnet, by attributing it to accidental inclination; and that it would be deemed legitimate proof of insanity in an architect, if he undertook to produce the meanest cabin by the fortuitous concurrence of beams and tiles; we must renounce all consistency of principle, unless we infer that this world, in which we see so many complicated and various means all conspiring to accomplish their prescribed purpose, so many springs of action and motion all coinciding in the most perfect order, was produced,

and only could be produced, according to the regular design of an intelligent Being*.

* If this Chapter had been intended as any thing more than a brief statement of the nature of the argument from final causes, it would have been necessary of course to detail the chief marks of contrivance which the world exhibits, which have here been only alluded to incidentally. But, in addition to the numerous volumes upon this subject, the recent and popular work of Dr. Paley seems to render any fresh enumeration of those instances quite superfluous. I do not mean to say that the subject is exhausted; nor indeed can it be, till every part of the universe is laid open to our inquiry. But perhaps there is some justice in the remark, that it already labours under disadvantage from its unlimited extent. "A single example seems altogether as conclusive as a thousand; and he that cannot discover any traces of contrivance in the formation of an eye, will probably retain his atheism at the end of a whole system of physiology." Edin. Rev. vol. i. p. 289.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF THE

CREATION OF THE WORLD.

SECT. I.

The Probability that some Account of the Creation would be revealed and preserved.

THE preceding survey of two out of the three accounts which have been at different times proposed to explain the phenomenon of an existing world, though brief and rapid, may be sufficient to make it appear, that neither its independent eternal existence, nor its fortuitous production, furnish any thing like a satisfactory solution of the problem. In particular, the undeniable appearance of innumerable instances of design throughout the universe in all its parts, irreconcilable with our experience of accidental effect; and the existence of sentient beings, endued with a faculty of voluntary reflection and motion which does not belong to unorganized or mere vegetable matter; lead us insensibly