T

HE fine arts, as obferved above are all of them calculated to give pleasure to the eye or the ear and they never defcend to gratify the taste, touch, or fmell. At the fame time, the feelings of the eye and ear, are of all the feelings of external fenfe, thofe only which are honoured with the name of emotions or paffions. It is alfo obferved above †, that the principles of the fine arts are unfolded by ftudying the fenfitive part of human nature, in order to know what objects of the eye and ear are agreeable, what difagreeable. Thefe obfervations how the ufe of the prefent chapter. We evidently muft be acquainted with the nature and caufes of emotions and paffions, before we can judge with any accuracy how far they are

Introduction.

Introduction. A

under

under the power of the fine arts. The critical art is thus fet in a fine point of view. The inquifitive mind beginning with cri ticism the most agreeable of all amusements, and finding no obftruction in its progress, advances far into the sensitive part of our nature; and gains infenfibly a thorough knowledge of the human heart, of its defires, and of every motive to action; a fcience which of all that can be reached by man, is to him of the greatest import

ance.

Upon a fubject fo extenfive, all that can be expected here, is a general or flight furvey. Some emotions indeed more peculiarly connected with the fine arts, I propofe to handle in feparate chapters; a method that will shorten the general furvey confiderably. And yet, after this circumfcription, fo much matter comes under even a general view of the paffions and emotions, that, to avoid confufion, I find it neceffary to divide this chapter into many parts; in the first of which are handled the causes of those emotions and paffions that are the most common and familiar; for to explain

plain every paffion and emotion, however fingular, would be an endless work. And though I could not well take up lefs ground, without feparating things intimately connected; yet, upon examination, I find the causes of our emotions and paffions to be fo numerous and various, as to make a fubdivision also neceffary by fplitting this first part into feveral fections. Human nature is a complicated machine, and must be fo to answer all its purposes. There have indeed been published to the world, many a fyftem of human nature, that flatter the mind by their fimplicity. But thefe, unluckily, deviate far from truth and reality. According to fome writers, man is entirely a selfish being: according to others, univerfal benevolence is his duty. One founds morality upon fympathy folely, and one upon utility. If any of these systems were of nature's production, the prefent fubject might be foon difcuffed. But the variety of nature is not fo easily reached; and for confuting fuch Utopian fyftems without the intricacy of reasoning, it appears the beft method to

enter

enter into human nature, and to fet before the eye, plainly and candidly, facts as they really exift.

PART I

Caufes evolved of the emotions and passions.

Difference betwixt emotion and passion. Caufes that are the most common and the moft extenfive. extenfive. Paffion confidered as productive of action.

Hefe branches are fo interwoven,

TH

mas to make it neceffary that they be handled together. It is a fact univerfally admitted, that no emotion nor paffion ever ftarts up in the mind, without a known caufe. If I love a perfon, it is for good qualities or good offices: if I have refentment against a man, it must be for fome injury he has done me; and I cannot pity any one, who is under no diftrefs of body or of mind.

The

The circumstances now mentioned, if they cause or occafion a paffion, cannot be entirely indifferent: if they were, they could not move us in any degree. And we find upon examination, that they are not indifferent. Looking back upon the foregoing examples, the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are antecedently agreeable. If an injury were not disagreeable, it would not occafion any refentment against the author; nor would the paffion of pity be raised by an object in distress, if that object did not give us pain. These feelings antecedent to paffion, and which seem to be the caufes of paffion, shall be distinguished by the name of emotions.

What is now faid about the production of paffion, refolves into a very fimple propofition, That we love what is pleasant, and hate what is painful. And indeed it is evident, that without antecedent emotions we could not have any paffions; for a thing must be pleasant or painful, before it can be the object either of love or of hatred.

As it appears from this fhort sketch, that paffions are generated by means of prior emotions,