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UCH is the nature of man, that his powers and faculties are foon blunted by exercife. The returns of fleep,

fufpending all activity, are not alone fufficient to preserve him in vigor. During his waking hours, amufement by intervals is requifite to 'unbend his mind from serious occupation. The imagination, of all our faculties the most active, and not always

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reft even in fleep, contributes more than any other caufe to recruit the mind and reftore its vigor, by amufing us with gay and ludicrous images; and when relaxation is neceffary, fuch amusement is much relished. But there are other fources of amufement befide the imagination. Many objects, natural as well as artificial, may be distinguished by the epithet of rifible, because they raise in us a peculiar emotion exVOL. I. U u preffed

preffed externally by laughter. This is a pleasant emotion; and being alfo mirthful, it most fuccessfully unbends the mind and recruits the fpirits.

Ludicrous is a general term, fignifying, as we may conjecture from its derivation, what is playfome, fportive, or jocular. Ludicrous therefore seems the genus, of which rifible is a fpecies, limited as above to what makes us laugh.

However eafy it may be, concerning any particular object, to fay whether it be rifible or not; it seems difficult, if at all practicable, to establish beforehand any general character by which objects of this kind may be diftinguished from others. Nor is this a fingular cafe. Upon a review, we find the fame difficulty in most of the articles already handled. There is nothing more eafy, viewing a particular object, than to pronounce that it is beautiful or ugly, grand or little but were we to attempt general rules for ranging objects under different claffes, according to thefe qualities, we should find ourselves utterly at a lofs. There is a feparate caufe which increases the difficulty

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culty of distinguishing rifible objects by a general character. All men are not equally affected by rifible objects; and even the fame person is more difpofed to laugh at one time than another. In high spirits a thing will make us laugh outright, that will fcarce provoke a fmile when we are in a grave mood. We must therefore abandon the thought of attempting general rules for distinguishing risible objects from others. Rifible objects however are circumfcribed within certain limits, which I fhall fuggeft, without pretending to any degree of accuracy. And, in the firft place, I obferve, that no object is rifible but what appears flight, little, or trifling. For man is fo conftituted as to be seriously affected with every thing that is of importance to his own intereft or to that of others. Secondly, with refpect to the works both of nature and of art, nothing is rifible but what deviates from the common nature of the fubject: it must be some particular out of rule, fome remarkable defect or excefs, a very long visage, for example, or a very short Hence nothing juft, proper, decent, beautiful,

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Ch. VII. beautiful, proportioned, or grand, is rifible. A real diftrefs raifes pity, and therefore cannot be rifible. But a flight or imaginary distress, which moves not pity, is rifible. The adventure of the fulling-mills in Don Quixote is extremely rifible; fo is the scene where Sancho, in a dark night, tumbles into a pit, and attaches himself to the fide by hand and foot, there hanging in terrible difmay till the morning, when he discovers himself to be within a foot of the bottom. A nofe remarkably long or fhort is rifible; but to want the nose altogether, far from provoking laughter, raises horror in the specta

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From what is faid, it will readily be conjectured, that the emotion, raised by a risible object is of a nature fo fingular as scarce to find place while the mind is occupied with any other paffion or emotion. And this conjecture is verified by experience. We fcarce ever find this emotion blended with any other. other. One emotion I must except, and that is contempt raised by some fort of improprieties. Every improper act infpires us with fome degree of contempt for the

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author. And if an improper act be at the fame time rifible and provoke laughter, of which blunders and abfurdities are noted inftances, the two emotions of contempt and of laughter unite intimately in the mind, and produce externally what is termed a laugh of derifion or of fcorn. Hence objects that cause laughter, may be distinguished into two kinds. They are either rifible or ridiculous. A rifible object is mirthful only; a ridiculous object is both mirthful and contemptible. The first raises an emotion of laughter that is altogether pleasant: the emotion of laughter raised by the other, is qualified with that of contempt; and the mixed emotion, partly pleasant partly painful, is termed the emotion of ridicule. I avenge myself of the pain a ridiculous object gives me by a laugh of derifion. A rifible object, on the other hand, gives me no pain: it is altogether pleasant by a certain fort of titillation, which is expreffed externally by mirthful laughter. Ridicule will be more fully explained afterward: the prefent chapter is appropriated to the other emotion.

Rifible objects are fo common and fo well understood,