to others, which is the principal foundation of government. The No other branch of the human constitution shows more vifibly our deftination for fociety, nor tends more to our improvement, than appetite for fame or efteem. whole conveniencies of life being derived from mutual aid and fupport in fociety, it ought to be a capital aim, to form connections with others fo ftrict and fo extenfive as to produce a firm reliance on many for fuccour in time of need. Reafon dictates this leffon. But reafon folely is not relied on in a matter of fuch confequence. We are moved by a natural appetite, to be folicitous about esteem and refpect as we are about food when hungry. This appetite, at the same time, is finely adjusted to the moral branch of our constitution, by promoting all the moral virtues. For what infallible means are there to attract love and efteem, other than a virtuous courfe of life? If a man be just and beneficent, if he be temperate modeft and prudent, he will infallibly gain the esteem and love of all who know him. The communication of paffion to related objects, objects, is an illuftrious instance of the care of Providence, to extend focial connections as far as the limited nature of man can admit. This communication of paffion is fa far unhappy as to fpread the malevolent paffions beyond their natural bounds. But let it be remarked, that this unhappy effect regards favages only, who give way to male, volent paffions. Under the discipline of fo, ciety, these paffions are fubdued, and in a good measure eradicated. In their place fucceed the kindly affections, which, meeting with all encouragement, take poffeffion of the mind and govern our whole actions; In this condition, the progrefs of paffion a long related objects, by fpreading the kindly affections through a multitude of individuals, hath a glorious effect. Nothing can be more entertaining to a rational mind, than the economy of the hu→ man paffions, of which I have attempted to give fome faint notion. It must however be confeffed, that our paffions, when they happen to fwell beyond their proper limits, take on a lefs regular appearance. Reason may proclaim our duty, but the will influen ced by paffion, makes gratification always welcome. Hence the power of paffion, which, when in excefs, cannot be refifted but by the utmoft fortitude of mind. It is bent upon gratification; and where proper objects are wanting, it clings to any object at hand without diftinction. Thus joy infpired by a fortunate event, is diffufed upon every person around by acts of benevolence; and refentment for an atrocious injury done by one out of reach, feizes the first object that occurs to vent itself upon. Those who believe in prophecies, even with the accomplishment; and a weak mind is difpofed voluntarily to fulfil a prophecy, in order to gratify its wifh. Shakespear, whom no particle of human nature hath efcaped, however remote from common obfervation, defcribes this weakness : K. Henry. Doth any name particular belong Unto that lodging where I firft did fwoon? Warwick. 'Tis call'd Jerufalem, my Noble Lord. K. Henry. Laud be to God! even there my must end. It hath been prophefy'd to me many years, life I fhould not die but in Jerufalem, Which vainly I fuppos'd the holy land. Second part, Henry IV. a&t 4. fc. last. I could not deny myself the amusement of the foregoing obfervation, though it doth not properly come under my plan. The irregularities of paffion proceeding from peculiar weakneffes and biaffes, I do not undertake to justify; and of these we have had many examples*. It is fufficient that paffions common to all and as generally exerted, are made fubfervient to beneficial purposes. I fhall only obferve, that in a polished fociety inftances of irregular paffions are rare, and that their mischief doth not extend far. * Part 5. of the prefent chapter. 1 CHAP. CHA P. III. BEAUTY. H 241 AVING difcourfed in general of emotions and paffions, I proceed to a more narrow inspection of fome particulars that ferve to unfold the principles of the fine arts. It is the province of a writer upon ethics, to give a full enumeration of all the paffions; and of each separately to affign the nature, the cause, the gratification, and the effects. But a treatise of ethics is not my province. I carry my view no farther than to the elements of criticism, in order to show that the fine arts are a subject of reasoning as well as of taste. An extenfive work would be ill fuited to a defign fo limited; and to keep within moderate bounds, the following plan may contribute. It has already been obferved, that things are the causes of emotions, by means of their properties and attributes *. This ** Chap. 2. part. 1. fect. 1. first note. H h VOL. I. furnisheth |