become so comprehenfive. We must therefore reft fatisfied with an explanation of the more obvious modifications.

In forming a comparison betwixt pleafant paffions of different kinds, we conceive fome of them to be grofs fome refined. Those pleasures of external fenfe that are felt as at the organ of fenfe, are conceived to be corporeal or grofs*. The pleasures of the eye and ear are felt to be internal; and for that reafon are conceived to be more pure and refined.

The focial affections are conceived by all to be more refined than the selfish. Sympathy and humanity are reckoned the finest temper of mind; and for that reason, the prevalence of the focial affections in the progrefs of fociety, is held to be a refinement in our nature. A favage is unqualified for any pleasure but what is thoroughly or nearly selfish: therefore a favage is incapable of comparing felfish and social pleasure. But a man after acquiring a high relish of the latter, lofes not thereby a tafte for the former. This man can judge, and he

*See the introduction.

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VOL. I.

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will

will give preference to focial pleasures as more sweet and refined, In fact they maintain that character, not only in the direct feeling, but also when we make them the fubject of reflection. The focial paffions are by far more agreeable than the felfish, and rife much higher in our esteem.

Refined manners and polite behaviour, muft not be deemed altogether artificial. Men accustomed to the fweets of fociety, who cultivate humanity, find an elegant pleasure in preferring others and making them happy, of which the proud or selfish fcarce have a conception.

... Ridicule, which chiefly arifes from pride, a felfish paffion, is at beft but a grofs pleafure. A people, it is true, must have emerged out of barbarity before they can have a taste for ridicule. But it is too rough an entertainment for thofe who are highly polished and refined. Ridicule is banished France, and is lofing ground daily in England.

Other modifications of pleafant paffions will be occafionally mentioned hereafter. Particularly the modifications of high and low

are

are handled in the chapter of grandeur and fublimity; and the modifications of dignified and mean, in the chapter of dignity and meannefs.

Interrupted existence of emotions and paffions. Their growth and decay.

W

Ere emotions of the fame nature. with colour and figure, to continue in their prefent ftate till varied by fome operating caufe, the condition of man would be deplorable. It is ordered wifely, that emotions fhould more resemble another attribute of matter, viz. motion, which requires the conftant exertion of an operating caufe, and ceases when the caufe is withdrawn. An emotion may fubfift while its caufe is prefent; and when its caufe is removed, may fubfift by means of an idea, though in a fainter degree. But the moment another thought breaks in and occupies the mind, fo as to exclude not only this caufe, but alfo its idea, the emotion S 2

.

is

is gone: it is no longer felt. If it return with its cause or idea, it again vanisheth with them when other thoughts crowd in. This obfervation is applicable to emotions and paffions of every kind. And these accordingly are connected with perceptions and ideas, fo intimately as not to have any independent existence. A ftrong paffion, it is true, hath a mighty influence to detain its object in the mind; but not fo as to detain it for ever. A fucceffion of perceptions or ideas is unavoidable*: the object of the paffion may be often recalled; but however interesting, it must by intervals yield to other objects. For this reafon, a paffion rarely continues long with an equal degree of vigour. It is felt strong and moderate, in a pretty quick fucceffion. The fame object makes not always the fame impreffion; because the mind, being of a limited capacity, cannot, at the fame inftant, give great attention to a plurality of objects, The ftrength of a paffion depends on the impreffion made by its caufe; and a cause

* See this point explained afterwards, chap. 9.

makes

makes its strongest impreffion, when happening to be the fingle interesting object, it attracts our whole attention *. Its impreffion is flighter when our attention is divided betwixt it and other objects; and at that time the paffion is flighter in proportion..

When emotions and paffions are felt thus by intervals and have not a continued existence, it may be thought a nice problem, to ascertain their identity, and to determine when they are the fame when different. In a ftrict philofophic view, every fingle impreffion made even by the fame object, is distinguishable from what have gone before, and from what fucceed. Neither is an emotion raised by an idea the fame with what is raised by a fight of the object. But fuch accuracy is not found in common apprehenfion, nor is neceffary in common language. The emotions raised by a fine landscape in its fucceffive appearances, are not diftinguished from each other, nor even from thofe raised by fucceffivo

t

* See the appendix, containing definitions and explanation of terms, fet. 33.

ideas