first of judicial requisites, that of publicity, there must be a public; and that, to fix a court of justice in the middle of Salisbury plain, or of Dartmoor forest, however necessary in respect of geometrical precision, would be to sacrifice that great benefit to a vain show of consistency. Besides which, time itself is a far more valuable and important commodity in cities than in villages, and less inconvenience would be sustained by a rural suitor in the loss of three or four days than by a commercial or manufacturing one in the sacrifice of as many hours. The places of most trade and greatest population in a county ought therefore (but still with some regard to distance) to be preferred for the judgment seats; and in some few instances, though but a few, this consideration would lead to the desertion of the existing county town, and the transference of its judicial honours to a happier rival. The number of these provincial tribunals, keeping in view a reasonable degree of approximation to Bentham's theory, may be calculated at about one hundred, dispersed at average distances of from ten to fifteen or twenty miles asunder all over the country. A single judge, with the occasional aid of a deputy, should preside in each, having both legal and equitable jurisdiction, and without restriction as to the amount in value of the subject matter of contention, except that, for matters exceeding a certain amount, say 5007., it might be made competent to either of the litigating parties to remove the cause, at its commencement, either to London or to one of the greater district tribunals; which last might be from six to ten or twelve in number, stationed in as many of the largest towns in the kingdom, at as nearly equal distances, as may be found practicable or convenient. These should have concurrent jurisdiction with the rest; and to them, not by way of appeal, but (as already said) at the option of either party, and in the first instance, might be removed any cause involving the decision of property beyond a fixed amount in value; perhaps, also, upon the certificate of counsel, of any cause whatever involving a point of peculiar nicety or importance. The judges presiding in these last courts should be elevated above the others in point both of rank and emolument, and the relative importance of the places in which they are stationed (such as Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol, &c.) no less than the magnitude of the interests subjected to their jurisdiction, would probably attract a permanently resident bar within their respective spheres; an advantage which might reasonably be expected to be wanting in the minor tribunals, and the absence of which must be there supplied, by permission to the parties themselves, or to their attornies, to perform the part of advocates. However, when it is considered that such a plan as this would put an end to the judges' circuits, and that the courts of quarter sessions, as well as all county and borough courts, and others having

peculiar jurisdiction, together with the country part of the administration of the bankrupt laws, would be merged in one regular judicial system, it is more than probable that the now greatly over-stocked bar of the capital would soon disperse itself over the country, and leave no such deficiency to be complained of. The scheme thus hastily sketched would not of necessity embrace any change in the organization of the great courts at Westminster, although it is probable that there also extensive and very beneficial alterations would gradually suggest themselves, and force their way to adoption. The only consequence which would at first follow is, that the judges, having no longer to go circuits, would be enabled to sit constantly and without interruption to the regular discharge of their duties. The courts at Westminster might exercise, in certain matters, concurrent jurisdiction all over the country with the superior provincial tribunals; but, from all alike, there should be but one appeal (and that on points of law only) to one supreme central court, in which the Lord Chancellor might be made to preside; abolishing the anomalous jurisdictions of the House of Lords and of the council; with authority to call to his assistance all or any of the judges of the supreme courts at Westminster as he might find occasion. Supposing the ecclesiastical and maritime jurisdictions, and those also in bankruptcy, &c. still to be kept distinct from the rest of the judicial establishments of the country (the expediency of which separation involves, however, another question, and one of great moment, although it might well be reserved for after discussion), the same supreme court of appeal should extend to these also; but for mistakes in matters of fact only, the remedy ought to be by rehearing, not by appeal; the rehear ing to be had either before the same or before another court of concurrent jurisdiction; perhaps at the sole option of the party demanding it.

We are far from insensible either of the ridicule which attaches itself, in certain quarters, to the schemes of reformers, or of the serious difficulties which present themselves to the execution of any, even the most apparently simple and plausible; nor is it with the smallest hope of immediate adoption that we offer the visionary fabric of our own contemplations to public attention. Still less do we claim the merit of originality for our present design, the best recommendation of which consists in the attempt to adapt, in some measure, to our existing establishments the most indisputable axioms of Bentham's philosophy. To the ridicule, which we know must accompany the promulgation of any such endeavour, we profess absolute indifference. For the practical difficulties involved in it we have all due respect, and are willing to admit their existence to the fullest extent that can

be required of us, even in attempting to obviate the objections resulting from them. In the first place, we are quite ready to admit, that no system of judicial organization, of the nature above suggested, can possibly be built upon the existing forms of procedure. So far, however, from this being an objection, we hold it a strong and prevailing argument in favour of any plan, that its accomplishment must necessarily comprehend the resolution into first principles, and the adaptation to the simple and inexpensive forms of natural procedure, of the complicated system which it is proposed to re-organize. The reform of our judicial establishment, upon any plan of extensive utility, must necessarily go hand in hand with a reparation of the entire machine; and it is our chief ground of quarrel with Mr. Cooper, that his plan of reform is calculated to answer no other purpose than that of greasing the wheels of the carriage, and enabling it to go a few miles further on the road, and must inevitably end in its demolition, which, if too sudden and violent, will be to the great injury of the passengers, whose comfort and safety depend on a timely survey of the rotten timbers, and a re construction of the yet serviceable materials. We are not over-fond of metaphorical illustrations of mere matters of fact; but it so happens that hardly any one has yet written about law-reform without falling into that mode of discussion; and it is therefore without surprise that we find ourselves insensibly reached by the same infection. At all events, our old waggon is at least as good a simile as Mr. Sugden's palace, or Mr. Cooper's flower-garden: (i) but we have done with it, and proceed shortly, and in plain prose, to the consideration of another and very plausible ground of objection to the plan of district courts, consisting in the alleged difficulty of providing fit judges for so many tribunals.

We must here again call Mr. Bentham into the field; not as an auxiliary—he might well disdain so unequal an office-but as our leader in the march of improvement. The difficulty, then, we allow to be great, though we cannot admit it as insurmountable, even supposing the system to remain in other respects unaltered; but reform your procedure at the same time that you re-organize your judicial establishment, and the difficulty, we

(i) "Our author had better, perhaps, on this occasion," says Mr. Bentham, observing on 3 Blackstone's Comm. 268, have kept clear of allegories: he should have considered whether they might not be retorted on him with some retaliation. He should have considered, that it is not easier to him to turn the law into a castle, than it is to the imaginations of impoverished suitors to people it with harpies. He should have thought of the den of Cacus, to whose enfeebled optics, to whose habits of dark secret rapine, nothing was so hateful, nothing so dangerous, as the light of day."

Fragm. on Government. Pref. p. xxxii. Note.

think, altogether vanishes. The need which some persons imagine of offering such inducements of rank and emolument as would tempt a successful practitioner to condescend to the acceptance of the judicial office, is merely conventional. The duties of that high office are not only in themselves quite distinct from those of an advocate, but of a nature so widely different-it may be said even opposite-that we should be almost inclined to consider it impossible that the requisite qualifications for the performance of each could co-exist in the same individual, did we not find that, in point of fact, it is sometimes otherwise, and that great forensic talent is occasionally accompanied by the highest judicial qualifications. Still, we may maintain, that, even under the present system, such instances constitute rather the exception than the rule; and, if that system were remodelled, and a natural and reasonable code of procedure established, it would soon be discovered that minds prepared by study, and disciplined to habits of philosophical reflection and combination, are essentially far better fitted for the exercise of the high functions now treated of, than those which have been merely sharpened by the practice of wordy conflict, and, at the same time too probably narrowed by the inevitable tendency of that practice to the generation of partial modes of thinking.

To estimate correctly the force of objections to the multiplication of courts of concurrent jurisdiction, consisting in the alleged impossibility of providing an adequate remuneration for so great a number of judges, it is necessary, first, to take into our calculation the actual number and expence of the several petty civil and criminal jurisdictions which (as we have already seen) might thus be swept away and abolished. And, if still further satisfaction be required on the ground of economy, let the multitude of ecclesiastical courts spread over the country be thrown into the scale: (k)

(k) The returns lately made to Parliament "of all courts exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and of all courts exercising peculiar and exempt jurisdiction, in England and Wales," present a list of no fewer than 267; but, although some of these returns exhibit a commendable degree of precision, others are very deficient in pointing out the distinction between the courts of ordinary and those of peculiar jurisdiction; and (what is of still more importance) between those exercising contentious jurisdiction, and those performing only certain administrative functions, with sufficient accuracy to lead to any correct results. One circumstance, however, very observable is, the extraordinary disproportion in the number of these several jurisdictions existing in different dioceses, than which nothing can be more whimsical and capricious. Thus, while the dioceses of Bath and Wells reckon twenty-seven; of Bristol, eleven; of Litchfield and Coventry, thirty one; of Lincoln, twenty-seven; of Salisbury, fourteen; of London, thirteen; of Worcester, nineteen; of York forty; those of St. Asaph, Bangor, Llandaff, Carlisle, have but one each; and those of St. David's, Ely, Gloucester, Peterborough, Rochester, Winchester, Carlisle, Durham, from two to four, respectively. Upon the whole, these returns are extremely instructive, though they might be usefully enlarged and amended. What member of Parliament will move for similar returns of all courts exercising civil and criminal jurisdiction throughout the kingdom?

transfer to our few tribunals all such parts of these jurisdictions as do not relate to matters of mere church discipline; and inquire if the expence thus saved to the public will not, in itself, be sufficient for the maintenance of the whole establishment.

For this purpose, we have next to ask, what might be reasonably demanded as an adequate remuneration for the proposed district judges? Not, surely, such as would be at all commensurate with the salaries of our present judges at Westminster-the liberal amount of which we do not pronounce excessive, or beyond what is due to the dignity of the judicial office, as represented in the persons of our first magistrates. But, reserving this high rate of emolument for the central courts of the metropolis, and allowing to the new judges of the greater provincial tribunals (those to be established at such places as Manchester, Birmingham, &c.) a more or less approximating amount of salary-say, from 2,000l. to 3,000l. per annum-we see no reason for thinking that a far smaller rate, varying in amount, perhaps, according to the population or wealth of the district, from 600l. to 1000l., would not hold out a sufficient inducement to a very competent class of persons, especially when united with the hope of promotion from the lower to the higher and more lucrative places. Not only a certain standing at the bar, but a certain length of constant professional attendance in some of the superior courts, might be made an indispensable qualification; and, to render the office more worthy the aim of an honourable ambition, its higher gradations might be rendered unattainable, except by a regular course of probation in the inferior. That the mode of payment of these, as of all other judicial offices, should be by salary only, not by fees, is a point we consider so completely settled in the science of legislation, as not to admit of argument; and we believe that publicity, coupled with the hope of advancement, would afford a sufficient security for the regular discharge of the duty, even without the aids recommended by Mr. Bentham, to which we therefore merely refer, for the satisfaction of such as may still believe in the superior efficacy of the fee-system. One only other observation which occurs on this subject is, that the great question whether the public ought to be at the entire expence of a judicial establishment, or whether that expence should, either in the whole, or in any and what proportions, be sustained by the parties litigant, is by no means necessarily involved in that of the mode of payment; an observation which we make, not for the purpose of intimating any doubt in our own minds on that question, but to avoid mistake and consequent prejudice.

We have wandered far from Mr. Cooper, and now hasten to make that gentleman and our readers amends by reverting to the plan of his work, and his scheme for the improvement of the Court