1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. have many examples in hiftory, and B C In fhort, Sir, to give any subject a fole and long continued command over our army, is fo contrary to the established maxim of all wife fovereigns, and all wife republicks, and a maxim by the non-observance of which fo many princes, and fo many republicks, have been undone, that I do not wonder to fee the in- D genuity of thofe put to the utmost ftretch, who are attempting to eftablifh a direct contrary maxim; but, I hope, the majority of this house will eafily diftinguish between those arguments, which proceed from a luxuriant fancy, and those which are E founded upon folid reafon and judgment, as well as the experience of all ages and countries; for I have heard no one argument advanced in favour of this new doctrine, but what is contradicted by experience both antient and modern. This is F evidently the cafe with refpect to what they have faid about the discipline of an army; for that military difcipline of the most useful kind may be preserved even in time of peace, without a captain general, we have the experience of the antient Romans, we have the experience of the prefent French, we have the experience of our own army almost ever fince the treaty of Utrecht. G 6i As to the behaviour of the Dutch troops in the laft war, Sir, I have, it is true, heard it condemned by those who had an interest in condemning it; but even by them I never heard the courage of the men, but the conduct of their commanders, condemned; for if their generals gave up a town, before it was neceffary, or neglected to lead the troops on to action when they ought, their ill behaviour was not owing to the want courage or difcipline in the troops, but to the want of conduct, or perhaps to fomething worfe, in their generals; for as the governing party in Holland, at that time, were drawn into the war, in fome meafure, whether they would or no, I doubt much if they defired to have fuccefs. The behaviour of the Dutch troops in the laft war is therefore no way concerned in the present queftion; and as to their behaviour in the war in Q. Anne's time, will any one fay, that K. William, either before or after the revolution, had ever a captain general under him in Holland? Their good behaviour in Q. Anne's war, is therefore an argument rather against than for the refolution now under our confideraon; for if K. William, without a captain general under him, kept the Dutch army in fo good order, and taught them to fight fo regularly and fo defperately when there was occafion for it, furely our present most gracious fovereign, who underflands military difcipline as well as any prince ever did, may, without a coadjutor, do the fame by the Englifh army Nay, that he did do fo, from the day of his acceffion to the breaking out of the Spanish war, is evident from the behaviour of our troops upon every occasion. I am really furprifed, Sir, to hear fo much as an infinuation to the contrary, from any gentleman who has heard of the behaviour of our troops at Cartagena. Tho' the troops fent upon that expedition 62 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Feb; : fo, they will become more fatal to the liberties, than useful against the enemies of their country, it being known by experience, that the most regular, well-difciplined troops are not always the braveft; and even the A difcipline itself must be different in free countries from what it is in arbitrary governments. In the latter, the people are all flaves, and therefore the ftrictest and most severe difcipline may be enforced, if the commander in chief thinks it neceffary, becaufe the foldiers cannot be made to look on themselves as greater flaves than the rest of their countrymen; but in a free country, the difcipline must not be more rigid and fevere than the foldiers themselves generally think neceffary for the fervice, otherwife they will begin to look upon themselves as the only flaves of their country, which will break their fpirits, and confequently render them poltroons. They may then dance prettily through a review, but they will never dance bravely up to an enemy. were mostly new-raised regiments, It is therefore evident from expe- E rience, Sir, that to preferve difcipline in our army, fo as to make them useful against an enemy, we have no occafion for a captain general; and I wish they may behave as well in their quarters at home during the enfuing peace, as they did dur- F ing the lait They cannot behave better: I am afraid, that putting them under a captain general may make them behave worfe; because it may induce them to look upon them felves as a feparate distinct body, and without any connection with the reft G of the people; and I with, they may not at laft begin to think themfelves independent of the crown ; for should they ever begin to think I hope, Sir, I have fhewn, that our having a captain general in time of peace is not only unneceffary but dangerous; and the eftimate upon our table fhews it to be expenlive. I know that methods have been found to enhance every article of publick expence fince his late majefty's acceflion; but how this article has been advanced fo much, I cannot understand; for in the year 1717, and for fome years afterwards, when the duke of Marlborough was our captain general, the article of the ftaff, I mean both the civil and military part of it, amounted to but about 7000l. a year; and how it is now advanced to above 1600ol. is really to me a myftery; therefore, if there were no other reafon, I fhould be for recommitting this refolution, that the committee may inquire into this additional expence, and at least give us a reafon for it before we agree to it 1752. PROCEEDINGS of the I shall now give you a Debate we Mr. Chairman, A POLITICAL CLUB, &c. 63 B D Whether we may be able, Sir, to pay off the whole of our debt, before it becomes neceffary for us to engage in another war, is a question which I fhall not pretend to answer ; but this I will fay, that it is hardly poffible for us, at least it would be extremely dangerous for us, to engage in a new war, before we have paid off a great part of our present debt; for until the whole be paid off, we cannot propofe to carry on any war but upon credit, and what happened to us juft before the end of the laft war, muft convince us of the precariousness of that fupport. Credit, either publick or private, is a fupport that requires a twofold ability: Not only the borrower muft be in fuch circumflances as to be deemed able to repay, but the perfons willing to lend must be in fuch circumflances as to be able to lend. A landed gentleman may have an eflate fo large and fo free, that no one could doubt his being able to repay, and yet he could not borrow a fhilling upon a mortgage of his eftate, unless he could find one who had that fhilling to lend. This might be our cafe, fhould we be forced to engage foon in a new war: We might perhaps find new funds, tho' even that, I fear, would be difficult; but the great difficulty would be, where to find people that had money to Glend. S the treaty concluded laft fummer at Hanover, between his majesty and the States General on the one part, and the elector of Bavaria on the other, as alfo the emprefs queen of Hungary's declarati- C on relating to the faid treaty, have both been so long upon your table, that I must fuppofe them to have been perufed by every member of this house, and as they are both referred to this committee, I think it incumbent upon me, to move for that fupply which is neceffary for enabling his majefty to perform his part of that treaty; but I fhall first beg leave to lay before the house, as far as I am able, his majefty's motives for entering into that treaty, because from thence not only the wisdom but E the neceffity of the measure will appear evident, I hope, to every gentleman that hears me. I believe, I need not ufe many arguments for perfuading gentlemen, that it is the intereft of this nation to preferve peace both at home and abroad: As we F are a trading people, this is at all times our intereft; but at prefent it is more our intereft than ufual, becaufe of the great load of debts we groan under, and because it is not poffible for us to carry on any war, without adding to that load. We have already felt one good effect of peace, by the reduction of the intereft payable to the creditors of the publick, which will enable us to HP. This confideration, Sir, fhould induce us to neglect no measure, that may tend to preferve and fecure the future peace of Europe, for it is now 64 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Feb. To circumftanced that, in my opini- * To prevent any difunion in the empire is therefore, Sir, a meafure which we ought conftantly and chief G ly to purfue. Let us then confider what are the circumitances that may most probably produce any fuch difunion; and we shall prefently find the two chief to be, a powerful French party in Germany, and a vacancy of the imperial throne. It is therefore the bufinefs of all the powers of Europe, who are for preferving the peace thereof, to diminish as much as poffible that party in Germany, which feems to be in the French intereft, and to take care to prevent any vacancy in the imperial throne, by that method, which the laws [of the empire admit, and repeated precedents have authorized: I mean the election of a king of the Romans. Thefe were his majesty's views in concluding the treaty now under your confideration; and I do not think it poffible that any thing could have been contrived more effectual for anfwering both thefe ends. The house of Bavaria have been for half a century devoted to the French intereft; and by that means the house of Austria, and confequently, I may juftly fay, the empire itself has been twice brought to the very brink of perdition. We have had the honour of being chiefly inftrumental in faving them at both these times, firft by the glorious victory at Blenheim obtained by our general the duke of Marlborough, and laftly by that other glorious victory obtained by our present moft gracious fovereign at Dettingen. I fay, by thefe two victories we have twice faved both the empire and the house of Austria from ruin; and now by this treaty, I hope, his majefty has laid a foundation for preventing either being ever again brought into any fuch danger. I must therefore be of opinion, Sir, that if his majefty had in this treaty had no other view but that of gaining the house of Bavaria from the French intereft, and attaching it to the true interest both of Germany and Europe, the treaty would have been well worth the small expence this nation is to be put to on account of it; and I cannot think any gentleman will differ from me, who re flects 1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. flects upon the prodigious expence Thus, I fay, Sir, had his majefty 65 bringing it to perfection at so easy a The other view, towards the fuc- I man |