1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c.

have many examples in hiftory, and
a very recent one in our own time,
with regard to the young Sophy of
Perfia, who was dethroned by Kouli
Kan, for attempting to put a period
to his military power, by clapping
up a peace with the Turks; and the A
many revolutions that have fince
happened in that empire, together
with its prefent unfettled and melan-
choly fituation, fhould be a warning
to us, not to expofe our fovereign to
any fuch danger, which we have
the greater reafon to guard againft,
as we have our own liberties and pri-
vileges, as well as the honour, dig-
nity, and life of our fovereign at
ftake; for all would certainly be
fwallowed up in fuch a fatal contest.

B

C

In fhort, Sir, to give any subject a fole and long continued command over our army, is fo contrary to the established maxim of all wife fovereigns, and all wife republicks, and a maxim by the non-observance of which fo many princes, and fo many republicks, have been undone, that I do not wonder to fee the in- D genuity of thofe put to the utmost ftretch, who are attempting to eftablifh a direct contrary maxim; but, I hope, the majority of this house will eafily diftinguish between those arguments, which proceed from a luxuriant fancy, and those which are E founded upon folid reafon and judgment, as well as the experience of all ages and countries; for I have heard no one argument advanced in favour of this new doctrine, but what is contradicted by experience both antient and modern. This is F evidently the cafe with refpect to what they have faid about the discipline of an army; for that military difcipline of the most useful kind may be preserved even in time of peace, without a captain general, we have the experience of the antient Romans, we have the experience of the prefent French, we have the experience of our own army almost ever fince the treaty of Utrecht.

G

6i

As to the behaviour of the Dutch troops in the laft war, Sir, I have, it is true, heard it condemned by those who had an interest in condemning it; but even by them I never heard the courage of the men, but the conduct of their commanders, condemned; for if their generals gave up a town, before it was neceffary, or neglected to lead the troops on to action when they ought, their ill behaviour was not owing to the want courage or difcipline in the troops, but to the want of conduct, or perhaps to fomething worfe, in their generals; for as the governing party in Holland, at that time, were drawn into the war, in fome meafure, whether they would or no, I doubt much if they defired to have fuccefs. The behaviour of the Dutch troops in the laft war is therefore no way concerned in the present queftion; and as to their behaviour in the war in Q. Anne's time, will any one fay, that K. William, either before or after the revolution, had ever a captain general under him in Holland? Their good behaviour in Q. Anne's war, is therefore an argument rather against than for the refolution now under our confideraon; for if K. William, without a captain general under him, kept the Dutch army in fo good order, and taught them to fight fo regularly and fo defperately when there was occafion for it, furely our present most gracious fovereign, who underflands military difcipline as well as any prince ever did, may, without a coadjutor, do the fame by the Englifh army Nay, that he did do fo, from the day of his acceffion to the breaking out of the Spanish war, is evident from the behaviour of our troops upon every occasion.

I am really furprifed, Sir, to hear fo much as an infinuation to the contrary, from any gentleman who has heard of the behaviour of our troops at Cartagena. Tho' the troops fent upon that expedition

62

PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Feb;

:

fo, they will become more fatal to the liberties, than useful against the enemies of their country, it being known by experience, that the most regular, well-difciplined troops are not always the braveft; and even the A difcipline itself must be different in free countries from what it is in arbitrary governments. In the latter, the people are all flaves, and therefore the ftrictest and most severe difcipline may be enforced, if the commander in chief thinks it neceffary, becaufe the foldiers cannot be made to look on themselves as greater flaves than the rest of their countrymen; but in a free country, the difcipline must not be more rigid and fevere than the foldiers themselves generally think neceffary for the fervice, otherwife they will begin to look upon themselves as the only flaves of their country, which will break their fpirits, and confequently render them poltroons. They may then dance prettily through a review, but they will never dance bravely up to an enemy.

were mostly new-raised regiments,
yet did they not march upon that
rafh, that ridiculous attack of fort
St. Lazare, with fuch intrepidity,
and perfifted in it with fuch obftina-
cy, that Don Blas himself, the Spa-
nish commander, could not help ex-
claiming, that it was pity fuch brave
men fhould be fo facrificed? His
majefty himself was witnefs of their
behaviour at Dettingen, he there
faw the full-ripened fruits of his care
and toil Our troops, tho' galled in
flank by a numerous battery of can- B
non, and attacked in front by the
flower of the French army, they
fuftained, they repelled, they re-
turned the attack, and drove multi-
tudes of the enemy into the river
Maine, which to most of them may
be called the river Styx, for they C
paffed it only by pafling into the
next world. Again at Fontenoy,
Sir: I wish I could draw a veil over
the fatal day; but wherever the fault
lay, I am fure, it was not owing to
the British troops; for if they were
at laft forced to retire, it was not D
occafioned either by their want of
courage, or want of discipline; and
I may from all accounts fay the fame
of every fatal rencounter they were
afterwards engaged in, during the
Iate war.

It is therefore evident from expe- E rience, Sir, that to preferve difcipline in our army, fo as to make them useful against an enemy, we have no occafion for a captain general; and I wish they may behave as well in their quarters at home during the enfuing peace, as they did dur- F ing the lait They cannot behave better: I am afraid, that putting them under a captain general may make them behave worfe; because it may induce them to look upon them felves as a feparate distinct body, and without any connection with the reft G of the people; and I with, they may not at laft begin to think themfelves independent of the crown ; for should they ever begin to think

I hope, Sir, I have fhewn, that our having a captain general in time of peace is not only unneceffary but dangerous; and the eftimate upon our table fhews it to be expenlive. I know that methods have been found to enhance every article of publick expence fince his late majefty's acceflion; but how this article has been advanced fo much, I cannot understand; for in the year 1717, and for fome years afterwards, when the duke of Marlborough was our captain general, the article of the ftaff, I mean both the civil and military part of it, amounted to but about 7000l. a year; and how it is now advanced to above 1600ol. is really to me a myftery; therefore, if there were no other reafon, I fhould be for recommitting this refolution, that the committee may inquire into this additional expence, and at least give us a reafon for it before we agree to it

1752. PROCEEDINGS of the

I shall now give you a Debate we
bad in our Club upon the important
Question, Whether the Sum of
30,000l. fhould be granted for en-
abling his Majefty to make good
his Engagements with the Elector A
of Bavaria, pursuant to Treaty ?
Which Debate was opened by Ser-
vilius Prifcus, whofe Speech upon
this Occafion was in Subftance as
follows, viz.

Mr. Chairman,
SIR,

A

POLITICAL CLUB, &c. 63
pay off a confiderable part of our
debt yearly; and if peace continues
but a few years, these annual pay-
ments will fo much increase the stock
of ready money in the nation, that
I have not the least doubt of our be-
ing able to make a farther reduction,
with the confent of every person
concerned; for as we have not hi-
therto, fo I hope, we never fhall
make the leaft alteration in this re-
fpe&, without fuch consent.

B

D

Whether we may be able, Sir, to pay off the whole of our debt, before it becomes neceffary for us to engage in another war, is a question which I fhall not pretend to answer ; but this I will fay, that it is hardly poffible for us, at least it would be extremely dangerous for us, to engage in a new war, before we have paid off a great part of our present debt; for until the whole be paid off, we cannot propofe to carry on any war but upon credit, and what happened to us juft before the end of the laft war, muft convince us of the precariousness of that fupport. Credit, either publick or private, is a fupport that requires a twofold ability: Not only the borrower muft be in fuch circumflances as to be deemed able to repay, but the perfons willing to lend must be in fuch circumflances as to be able to lend. A landed gentleman may have an eflate fo large and fo free, that no one could doubt his being able to repay, and yet he could not borrow a fhilling upon a mortgage of his eftate, unless he could find one who had that fhilling to lend. This might be our cafe, fhould we be forced to engage foon in a new war: We might perhaps find new funds, tho' even that, I fear, would be difficult; but the great difficulty would be, where to find people that had money to Glend.

S the treaty concluded laft fummer at Hanover, between his majesty and the States General on the one part, and the elector of Bavaria on the other, as alfo the emprefs queen of Hungary's declarati- C on relating to the faid treaty, have both been so long upon your table, that I must fuppofe them to have been perufed by every member of this house, and as they are both referred to this committee, I think it incumbent upon me, to move for that fupply which is neceffary for enabling his majefty to perform his part of that treaty; but I fhall first beg leave to lay before the house, as far as I am able, his majefty's motives for entering into that treaty, because from thence not only the wisdom but E the neceffity of the measure will appear evident, I hope, to every gentleman that hears me. I believe, I need not ufe many arguments for perfuading gentlemen, that it is the intereft of this nation to preferve peace both at home and abroad: As we F are a trading people, this is at all times our intereft; but at prefent it is more our intereft than ufual, becaufe of the great load of debts we groan under, and because it is not poffible for us to carry on any war, without adding to that load. We have already felt one good effect of peace, by the reduction of the intereft payable to the creditors of the publick, which will enable us to HP.

This confideration, Sir, fhould induce us to neglect no measure, that may tend to preferve and fecure the future peace of Europe, for it is now

64 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Feb.

To circumftanced that, in my opini-
on, no war can happen, in which
we can avoid being involved; but
that peace must always be precarious,
which depends upon the will of any
one prince or ftate to break it, and
the only way to prevent its being in A
the will, is to prevent its being in
the power of any one to do fo.
How are we to do this? Certainly,
by forming fuch a defenfive confede-
racy among the powers of Europe,
who are most likely to continue in
the fame fentiments with us, as may B
make it very dangerous for any one
to difturb the tranquillity thereof, by
attacking any one of his neighbours.
The Dutch, we are certain, will in
this refpect be always of the fame
fentiments with us, and the empire
of Germany we can hardly doubt of; C
for I believe, fcarcely an instance
can of late be found in history, when
that empire was the aggreffor. A
defenfive confederacy between the
Dutch, the empire of Germany, and
this nation, is therefore what we
ought to cultivate as much as poffi- D
ble; and to render the empire a ufe-
ful member of this confederacy, we
ought to take every method that can
be thought of to prevent any difuni-
on among the conftituent members
of that great and formidable body;
for while it remains united, and in E
close confederacy with the Dutch
and us, for preferving the peace of
Europe, I believe, no one will ven-
ture to break it. If any difputes
should happen, I believe, the parties
concerned will chufe to terminate
their differences in an amicable man- F
ner by our mediation, rather than
either fide will venture to draw our
refentment upon it, by beginning the
attack.

*

To prevent any difunion in the empire is therefore, Sir, a meafure which we ought conftantly and chief G ly to purfue. Let us then confider what are the circumitances that may most probably produce any fuch difunion; and we shall prefently find the two

chief to be, a powerful French party in Germany, and a vacancy of the imperial throne. It is therefore the bufinefs of all the powers of Europe, who are for preferving the peace thereof, to diminish as much as poffible that party in Germany,

which feems to be in the French intereft, and to take care to prevent any vacancy in the imperial throne, by that method, which the laws [of the empire admit, and repeated precedents have authorized: I mean the election of a king of the Romans. Thefe were his majesty's views in concluding the treaty now under your confideration; and I do not think it poffible that any thing could have been contrived more effectual for anfwering both thefe ends. The house of Bavaria have been for half a century devoted to the French intereft; and by that means the house of Austria, and confequently, I may juftly fay, the empire itself has been twice brought to the very brink of perdition. We have had the honour of being chiefly inftrumental in faving them at both these times, firft by the glorious victory at Blenheim obtained by our general the duke of Marlborough, and laftly by that other glorious victory obtained by our present moft gracious fovereign at Dettingen. I fay, by thefe two victories we have twice faved both the empire and the house of Austria from ruin; and now by this treaty, I hope, his majefty has laid a foundation for preventing either being ever again brought into any fuch danger.

I must therefore be of opinion, Sir, that if his majefty had in this treaty had no other view but that of gaining the house of Bavaria from the French intereft, and attaching it to the true interest both of Germany and Europe, the treaty would have been well worth the small expence this nation is to be put to on account of it; and I cannot think any gentleman will differ from me, who re

flects

1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c.

flects upon the prodigious expence
this nation was put to by faving the
houfe of Auftria and the empire in
Q. Anne's reign, or by faving them
again in the laft war; for both the
one and the other I muft impute to
Bavaria's having been gained by the A
French; because I am perfuaded,
that at the beginning of Q. Anne's
reign the French would have agreed
to give the house of Auftria an equi-
table and reasonable satisfaction for
its pretenfion to the Spanish fucceffi-
on, and a fufficient barrier to the B
Dutch, if they had not been fure of
making a diverfion in Germany by
means of the family of Bavaria;
and again, upon the death of the
late emperor Charles VI. can any
one imagine, that the old cardinal
would have engaged his country in C
a war, or that Pruffia would have
attacked Silefia, if there had been a
thorough union between the houses
of Auftria and Bavaria ? Both these
wars, which have coft this nation fo
many millions, would therefore have
been prevented, had fuch a wife D
measure as this been resolved on be-
fore the death of K. William ; and
that he thought of it before his death,
I do not in the least question; but
there was at that time in this coun-
try fuch a great party against him,
and fuch a violent oppofition to all E
his measures, that he defpaired of
getting fuch a treaty as this approv-
ed of by parliament, and this made
him lay afide all thoughts of enter-
ing into any fuch.

Thus, I fay, Sir, had his majefty
had no other view in concluding this F
treaty, but that of gaining the house
of Bavaria from the French intereft,
it would have been well worth the
price we are to pay for it; but when
we confider, how much it may con-
tribute towards the fuccefs of the
other view, meaning that of pre- G
venting a vacancy in the imperial
throne, we cannot enough admire
his majesty's wildom in contriving
this measure, or his conduct in
February, 1752.

65

bringing it to perfection at so easy a
rate; for confidering the large fub-
fidies paid by France to fome of the
other princes of the empire, we can-
not doubt of our having been outbid
by France; but his majefty by his
ministers laid the circumftances of
Europe, and particularly of Germa-
ny, fo clearly before the court of
Bavaria, and placed in fo ftrong a
light the confequences of their con-
tinuing their attachment to France,
that they at laft agreed to accept of
a lefs fubfidy from us, than they
might probably have had, and per-
haps were offered by the court of
Versailles.

The other view, towards the fuc-
cefs of which I have faid that this
treaty muft greatly contribute, is a
view, Sir, that every gentleman
muft grant to be abfolutely neceffary
for preferving the peace of Europe;
for fhould the present emperor hap-
pen to die before the election of a
king of the Romans, every one muft
foresee that a war, and a very gene-
ral one too, would be the infallible
confequence. The treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle put an end, as far as it was
poffible, to all the difputes then fub-
fifting among the princes of Europe;
but no treaty can put an end to the
ambitious views of fome of them :
Thefe views remain only fufpended,
and will no longer remain fufpended,
than an opportunity offers for carry-
ing them into execution: A vacancy
of the Imperial throne would be
fuch an opportunity as they would
certainly lay hold of: We fhould
then again hear of armies marching,
either to attack or defend, from eve-
ry corner of Europe; and this nati-
on would again be reduced to the
neceffity of draining its manufactures
for foldiers, and its commerce for
failors, and of launching out its mil-
lions yearly. The life of the pre-
fent emperor I fhall admit to be a
very good one, and I hope, will be
a lafting one; but no certain depen-
dence can be had upon the life of any

I

man