57 1752. JOURNAL of the PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES in the POLITICAL CLUB, continued from p. 22. In the Debate begun in your last, the next Speaker was C. Salonius, who Spoke in Subftance thus. Mr. Prefident, T HE fpeech made by the no fome factious perfon, or rather fome Jacobite in difguife, to fpread falle rumours among the vulgar, and to ftir up a divifion in the illuftrious family now upon our throne; but when the people find it followed by A fuch a motion as this, which is, in effect, a motion to remove from the command of our army, a royal prince, who has in that station done his country fuch eminent fervice, I am afraid, they will give fome credit to the groundlefs fuggeftions in that libel; and therefore I wish, that fuch a motion had at least for this year been fufpended: I hope, the noble lord will for this reason wave the motion he has made, in order thereby to prevent its being communicated to the publick by the printed votes of this house. B ble lord, as well as the motion he concluded with, gave me inexpreffible concern; for tho' I believe, I have no great reafon to fear, that his motion will be complied with, yet, as it must appear upon our votes, it may communicate apprehenfions to the people, for which, I am fure, there is not the leaft foundation; and tho' his lordfhip, in every thing he faid, expreffed himself with the utmost delicacy, yet it is a fubject which it is impoffi- C ble to touch, without laying a foundation for adding to our present unhappy divifions a new one, which might be of more fatal confequence than all the rest. This, I fay, Sir, gave me inexpreffible concern; and this concern is greatly heightened, D when I reflect on that falfe, malicious, wicked, and feditious libel, called Conflitutional Queries, which were fo artfully and fo induftriously difperfed at the beginning of this feffion, and which fo defervedly met with the cenfure of both houfes of E parliament. Every gentleman within thefe walls was convinced, that there was not any ground for what was fo wickedly infinuated by those Queries; but what will not the people without doors imagine, when they find that infinuation, I may fay, enforced by the motion now under our confideration? Had that feditious libel refted upon its own fingle authority, it would have been confidered only as an impotent attempt in LGS. February, 1752. Surely, Sir, there can be no danger from our continuing this eftablishment for one year longer: In my opinion, indeed, there never can be any danger either to king or people; for with refpect to our fovereign, as the captain general must be entirely dependent upon the crown, and will always be removeable at the pleasure of the crown, can it be fupposed, that the king would allow him to continue in command, a moment after his being fufpected of endeavouring to form a party for himself in the army? In this refpect, there is a vary great difference between a monarchical and a republican form of government. In either, it is impoffible for a captain general to begin to form for himfelf a party in the army, without incurring fome fufpicion; but the difference is, that in the former, he may be immediately removed as foon as he begins to be fufpected, whereas in the latter he cannot be removed but by a concurrence of a majority of the fenate; H See our Magazine for laf year, p. 460, F and 58 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Feb. I may therefore, I think, Sir, E with great reafon conclude, that in this country, and under our prefent form of government, the fovereign can never be in any danger from having his army under the command of a captain general, and confe. quently the liberties of the people F can never be in danger from the latter's ufurping the fovereign power; but fay gentlemen, our liberties may be endangered not only by a diffe rence between our king and his captain general, but by a concord and agreement between them for oppreff G ing the liberties of the people. This way of arguing is really a fort of Proteus: If we attack him in the shape of a bull, and endeavour to guard against his horns, he turns himself into a horfe, and attacks as with his heels. But to be ferious, if it is poffible to be ferious apon fuch a way of arguing, fuppofe we had a king who had defigns against the liberties of his people, could he derive any advantage from appointing a captain general, which he could not have without fuch an-appointment? The king is, by our conftitution, the chief general of our army, and is not obliged to ap point a deputy, whom we now call captain general, unless he pleases. Can we fuppofe, that any man who has fecret defigns to carry on, will do it by deputy, when he can do it by himself alone? Befides, the captain general must always be a man of high rank, or long fervice: He is already rifer as high as he can rife in our army; and if he had not before, he must by that time have acquired a confiderable fortune of his own, which he is fure of preferving, and tranfmitting to his pofterity, whilft our conftitution is preserved, and he retains his innocence. reasonable to fuppofe, that fuch a man would concur in any scheme for rendering both his life and his fortune precarious, which would be the certain confequence of our conftitution's being overthrown? Is it not more reasonable to fuppofe, that fuch a man will rather be a check upon any arbitrary defigns his fovereign may entertain, than an affistant in carrying those designs into execution? Therefore I muft conclude, that no fovereign who has any such defigns, will ever appoint a captain general; and confequently, that that high office is rather a fecurity for the prefervation of our liberties than the contrary. Is it I hope, Sir, I have demonstrated, to the fatisfaction of the house, that no danger can refult, either to our fovereign or our liberties, from our having a captain general in time of peace. And now with regard to the ufe 1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. B C uffe of that high officer, and the dan- 59 me be convinced, how neceffary it is to have our army always under the command of a captain general, even in time of peace; for then, as I have faid already, it is more difficult to preserve a proper difcipline than in time of war. Men are fo apt to indulge themselves in eafe and idlenefs, that nothing but inevitable neceffity, or immediate danger, can altogether prevent it; nay, even in time of war, when an army is remote from any enemy, or when they despise the enemy they have to do with, they are too apt to relax in their difcipline, notwithstanding the utmoft their general can do, as we may learn from the hiftories of all nations, especially that of the Romans; for in the hiftories of that great people, we often meet with complaints of this kind, and yet their generals had a moft abfolute power over every man in the army under their command. The precedent is therefore fo far from being a bad one, that I am glad of the opportunity we now have to make a precedent, which, I hope, will always be followed, as I think it the only means by which our army can be made ufeful in time of war, or harmless in time of peace; therefore, if the noble lord does not withdraw his motion, I fhall moft heartily give it my negative, and afterwards as heartily concur in the motion for agreeing with our committee, in the refolution now under our confideration. The next and the laft Speech I shall give you in this Debate, was that made by T. Potitius, which was to this Effect. Mr. Prefident, thewed neither conduct nor courage GT upon any one occasion. This, Sir, is fo plain a proof, fo recent an example, that every gendeman who confiders it, muft with HE ingenuity of the noble. lord who spoke last, convinces me of the truth of what has often been faid, that no doctrine in H 2 politicks T-P 60 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Feb. B politicks can be so abfurd as not to admit of fome plausible arguments in its favour; for whether we confider our conftitution of government as a monarchy, or a republick, nothing can be fo contrary to it, nothing fo dangerous, as that of continuing the fame perfon at the head of our army, or indeed of any one of our armies, if we had more than one, for life, or for a great number of years. That it is dangerous even for the molt abfolute monarch to continue the fame general at the head of his army for a great number of years, not only reafon, but the experience of all ages, muft convince us; for without any bad design in such a general, the army will at last become more devoted to him than to their fovereign and from that time he C becomes fovereign in fact tho' not in name, because he must be a very felf denied gentleman indeed, if he allows himself to be difmified, which is generally followed with fomething worse, when he knows that the army will fupport his power, whether his fovereign will or no. but with regard to a juft and wellgrounded fufpicion, furely a king is more liable to be impofed on and blinded, than the majority of a fenate. A captain general of any continuance must be the chief favouArite and prime minifter of his fovereign: In that ftation he will, as ufual, draw lines of circumvallation about the throne, he will invest it fo close that none but his creatures and tools can approach it: In fuch a fituation, how can a king hear of any facts that may tend to give him a fufpicion of his general? But in a republick there will always be fome members in the fenate, who are enemies to the general, or at least greater friends to the liberties of their country, than to the continuance of the fame general in command : Thefe members will always be upon the watch, and will inform the fenate of every fact, that may tend to give them a fufpicion of their general, and if the facts be fully proved, and fuch as manifeftly fhew a folid ground D for fufpicion, the majority will certainly concur in removing him, unlefs they be fuch as have been previoufly corrupted by the general. E This fhews how weak it is to fay, Sir, that the continuing of a captain general can never in this kingdom be of any dangerous confequence to the fovereign, because the king may remove him the moment he begins to form a party for himself in the army; for this party forms itself of course, without any defign, at least without any overt act of his, by his being a long time continued in command; therefore, unless the king removes him upon the general princi- F ple, he may probably without any fufpicion let him continue in command, until it be out of his power to remove him; and I was surprised to hear the noble lord fay, that it is eafier to get a favourite general removed in a monarchy than in a re- G publick. I fhall grant, that it is eafier to raise an unjust and groundless fufpicion in the breaft of a king, than in the majority of a fenate; I fhall readily grant, Sir, that no fovereign can be dethroned by his general, without having been first guilty of fome egregious weakness, because I think it a moft egregious weakness in any fovereign, to allow any man in time of peace to have a fole command over his army: I think, he should never allow it even in time of war, if it be poffible for him to take the field in person; but to allow any one man to continue for many years in such a high station, is fomething more than weaknefs, it is downright madness; for whoever has the greatest influence over the military in any country, will always have the fovereignty in effect, and will diveft the fovereign of the name, as foon as he makes an attempt to diveft him of the command of the military; of which we have 2 |