1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. to be carried on chiefly by foreign B But, Sir, whatever I may have faid about the danger of continuing the poft of captain general in time of peace, I hope, it will not be un- D derftood that I mean to apply it to the present time. The character of the royal prince, now at the head of our army, fecures us against all the dangers I have mentioned, and every danger that can be apprehended. The precedent is that alone which I E find fault with, and it is, in my opinion, a most dangerous precedent : In future times we may have a king indued with lefs wifdom, and more governed by his paffions, than his prefent majeity. Under fuch a king, fuppofe a beloved younger fon F placed at the head of our armies, and continued in that command for a number of years, in peace as well fuch a captain general would of courfe have the difpofal of all civil offices, and of all commiffions in our navy, as well as thofe G in our army. In short, except as to the name, he would be in every respect our fovereign, during the life of his father. Then let us fup as war ; 5 13 pofe, Sir, that the eldeft fon and heir man will certainly be cautious, who From hence, Sir, it is apparent, that though we have at prefent nothing to fear, because of the character of the royal prince that now poffeffes the high poft of captain general, yet from the precedent we have a great deal to fear; and it is in another refpect a precedent of a most dangerous nature, as we are now bleffed with fuch a numerous royal offspring. A prince of the blood 14 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Jan. A blood is by his birth of high rank, and of great power in the kingdom, fo great, that the princes of the blood were in former ages fometimes troublefome to the crown itself, and often oppreffive upon the fubject. If to their high rank, and great power, fhould be added all the most eminent offices in the kingdom, they would eclipfe, they would, with the affiftance of the crown, command both houses of parliament, which in a little time would bring our government to be the very fame with that now efta- B blished in France, an abfolute fovereignty, fupported by the princes of the blood, and countenanced by a parliament, to regifter the edicts of the king's council, but not to refuse any that should be fent them from thence; and I wish, the people may not foon C begin to think, that our parliaments are already of very little more confequence; for there is very little difference between not having the power to refufe, and that of never refufing. co- E Having now, I hope, Sir, fet in D a clear light the danger of continuing the poft of captain general in time of peace, I come next to confider the economy of it; and upon this fubject I mult obferve, that our miniflers fet out in this feffion with more than usual pretences to nomy; upon this pretence we fent 2000 of our brave feamen a begging; but it was at that time foretold, and I now find truly foretold, that our economy would begin and end with our feamen; for the doctrine then inculcated by our mini- F fters was, that we muft fave upon every article of publick expence, yet I find, that not fo much as a thilling is proposed to be faved upon any one article, except that of the feamen; even this article of the captain generalfhip, which, furely, G cannot be faid to be neceffary in time of peace, is charged as high as our minilters can poffibly charge it; for the faving as to the pay of the captain general, we do not owe to them, but to his royal highness, who fcorns to put his country to fuch an expence, at a time when he can do it fo little service; and after he has fet fuch an example of generofity, I am furprized, it is not followed by all the other gentlemen belonging to the military part of the ftaff. Even this would not be without a precedent; for I have been told, that in the year 1717, upon a most able fpeech then made against the staff by a gentleman who is now dead, all the generals belonging to it gave up their pay; and I am very certain, that the publick purfe ftands more in need of compaffion now than it did at that time; but as I cannot pretend to be so able a speaker as that gentleman was, I cannot expect to have the fame fuccefs: Nevertheless, I fhould think, that what I want in ability fhould be made up by the fuperior weight of the example now fet them by his royal highnefs; for there was then no man in England, whofe example either could have, or deserved to have, fuch a commanding influence. If his example fhould have its proper weight, the publick would fave at least 6000l. a year upon the military part of the ftaff; and by reducing the civil part to its old establishment, 3000l. a year more might be faved, which would be a faving of 9000l. a year, a faving which would be far from being inconfiderable, in the prefent diftreffed circumftances of this nation; and in this cafe we should at leaft have this comfort, that if for the fake of a compliment we run ourfelves into a danger, it was a danger that coft us nothing at prefent, whatever it might do in after-times. But, Sir, as I am againft the danger as well as the expence, I must conclude with moving, That this refolution may be recommitted. Upon . 1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Upon this, Servilius Prifcus food up, and spoke to the following Effect. Mr. Prefident, SIR, S the noble lord feldom difap- A 15 lick. These are the only two inftances we have had of generals who commanded in chief our armies in time of war; and therefore I may say, that ever fince we kept up armies in time of peace, it has been the cuftom to continue in commiffion A points the houfe, when there the captain general who commanded is an expectation of hearing him upon any fubject, I did not upon this occafion doubt of hearing from him every argument against the refolution now before us, that could be fuggefted by the moft fruitful invention. Confidering the great prince who is now fo deservedly at the head of our armies, and who has been much too often the fubject of our debates, I was in fome pain left the warmth of his lordship's temper fhould have hurried him into fome indecent expreffion; and I was glad to find, that he spoke not only with great decency, but with more than ufual caution, which fhews, that he is, when neceffary, as much matter of his temper, as of every argument he undertakes. But before I begin to answer his objections against this refolution, I shall state, as briefly as I can, the chief arguments in its fa vour. B our armies in time of war. Would it not then be a moft glaring affront to break through this cuftom in the perfon of his royal highness, who has done fuch fignal fervice to his country? Would not this be a moft ungrateful return for his having fo often and fo chearfully ventured his life in the cause of his country? 'Tis true, the foreign campaigns were a little unlucky; but that was not in the least owing to any failure in him : C His conduct and courage were acknowledged over all Europe; and both were upon a fignal occafion manifefted here at home. There was a time, Sir, when every one thought, and rightly thought, that none but he could fave us. When the enemy was in poffeffion of great part of the island, and defpair fat brooding in every countenance, he flew to our affiftance; and by his prefence and example restored to our troops their former courage, after their having been twice defeated by the rebels. In fhort, I may juftly fay, our fitting here is owing to him; and fhall we make ufe of that privilege for putting a manifeft affront upon him to whom we owe it ? It is very well known, Sir, and must be confeffed by the noble lord himfelf, that ever fince we had an E army, the captain general who commanded in chief our armies in time of war, has always had his commiffion continued to him in time of peace. The duke of Ormond, for having commanded but one forry campaign, had not only his commiffion, but the pay too, continued to him during the queen's life; and after the acceffion of his late majefty, the duke of Marlborough was molt jully restored to his commiffion as captain general of our armies, which was continued to him as long as he lived, though he generously and voluntarily gave up the pay, in order to fave money to the pubH- P D But it is not our gratitude alone, Sir, that militates in favour of this Frefolution: Our fafety is likewise very intimately connected with it. Let us confider, that he must either have nothing at all to do with the army, or he must act as captain general. He cannot act in any inferior capacity; and whilst he acts Gas captain general, he must have fuch officers under him as are proper for one acting in that character. It is therefore neceffary to continue his royal highness in his commiffion as captain 16 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &t. Jani B captain general, in order to preferve discipline in our army; for if he had nothing to do with it, no inferior general would have authority enough to enforce that difcipline, which is neceffary for making our troops ufeful against an enemy, or for pre- A venting their being hurtful to ourfelves. Both the officers and foldiers of an army muft be kept clofe to their exercise in time of peace, otherwise they cannot make the proper use of it in time of war; and to make them keep close to their exercise in time of peace, when men are but too apt to think they may indulge themselves in eafe and idlenefs, requires great authority as well as great power in the commander; for it is better, and, I hope, more agreeable to the nature of C Englishmen, that foldiers fhould be induced to do their duty by a defire of esteem, rather than by the fear of punishment. And as the common foldiers of all armies are but too apt to be guilty of little irregularities, which are very hurtful and vexatious D to the people of the country where they are quartered, or through which they march, for preventing this they must always be kept under the ftricteft difcipline, which requires not only the conftant attendance but the clofeft attention of the inferior E officers; but this attendance and attention it is very difficult to enforce, unless there be some perfon at the head of the army, of great eminence, either from his birth, or from his character as a general. And as that great prince now at the F head of our army is eminent for both, it would be madness in us to render it impoffible for him to have any thing to do with the military. I could mention several other arguments, Sir, in favour of this refo lord had moved for the commiffion and instructions given to the captain general; for if he had, I believe, no one would have objected to his having had a copy of both, which, I am perfuaded, would have prevented his having given himself any trouble upon this occafion. As to the dangers which he was pleased to frighten us with, I believe, moft gentlemen perceived, that they were altogether imaginary. He may as well compare the poft of captain general to that of prime vizir, as to compare it to what the high conftable was of old. There is not the leaft fimilitude between our present conftitution, and that which we had in former ages, nor is it poffible for us to return to our old form of government: I may as well think of returning to what I was when but three years old, as to think that our government may return to what it was 2 or 300 years ago. The king had then an abfolute power over the military, and the exercise of that power was intrusted to the high constable. The marshal, 'tis true, fat with him as a judge in that court of judicature called the court of chivalry; but the marshal had no controul over the orders iffued by the high conftable relating to the military: In this refpect he was fole and abfolute; and almost every man in the kingdom was then reckoned to belong to the military, and confequently fubject to his orders; which makes a very material diffeence between the power the high conflable then had, and the power which a captain general now has, or indeed can have, unless he were to be established by act of parlia ment. The poft of captain general, as now constituted, Sir, is, in time of lution; but thefe, I hope, will G peace, and within the kingdom, fuffice, if I can fhew that there is no foundation for any of the objections that have been made to it; and for this purpose I wish the noble rather a poft of dignity than of power; for all commiffions in the army, and all general orders to the army, or to any confiderable part of 1752. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. it, must be figned by his majefty, and counterfigned by the fecretary at war, who is an officer quite independent of the general, and answerable to parliament for every thing he counterfigns. Then as to courts martial, every one knows, that ferv. A E fuppofitions are ridiculous, because D F 17 any officer into arreft, or he may fufpend him until his majefty's pleature be known, or until he be tried by a court-martial; and as to rewards, he may prefer any officer he pleases, when a vacancy happens in the army; but this preferment must be confirmed by the fovereign, who may disannul it, and grant the commiffion to another, if he please. This is all the power, either of rewards or punishments, which a captain general has in time of peace, and here at home; and this power can never, I think, be dangerous either to king or people. But it may be said, Sir, that the captain general must always have great influence in recommending officers to the king for preferment; and fo he might, were he neither captain general, nor had any thing to do with the army; for it is not the first time we have heard of the influence of a mistress upon fuch occafions. A king, who has a thorough confidence in the knowledge and integrity of his captain general, will, without doubt, be very much influenced by his recommendation; but if he has any wisdom, he will take care, that that influence fhall not be fo manifeftly ftrong as to alienate the dependence of the army from himself; and for this end he will now and then reject the recommendation, if it were for no other reason but because it is the recommendation of his captain general; therefore a man's being in this poft, is often more likely to weaken, than to ftrengthen his influence over his fovereign. Again, it may be faid, that though the captain general has not the abfolute direction, yet he must always have a great weight in every courtmartial where he pleases to make use of his intereft, which may render their fentence more or lefs fevere, especially in cafes where the punishment is arbitrary, and that this may give him a greater power over the whole army, than any one fubje& |