inent. When two such passions coexist in the same breast, the opposition of their aim prevents any sort of union, and accordingly they are not felt otherwise than in succession; the consequence of which must be, either that the passions will balance each other and prevent external action, or that one of them will prevail and accomplish its end. Guarini, in his Pastor Fido, describes beautifully the struggle between love and resentment directed to the same object. (Act i. Sc. 3.)

Ovid paints in lively colors the vibration of mind between two opposite passions directed to the same object. Althea had two brothers much beloved, who were unjustly put to death by her son Meleager in a fit of passion: she was strongly impelled to revenge; but the criminal was her own son. This ought to have withheld her hand; but the story is more interesting, by the violence of the struggle between resentment and maternal love. (Met. lib. 8. l. 445.)

In cases of this kind, one circumstance always augments the fluc tuation: after balancing between two actions, a resolution to prefer one of them is an inchoated gratification of the prevailing passion, which moderates it in some degree; and that circumstance tends to give a superiority to the opposite passion: another circumstance also concurs, that this opposite passion has, by restraint, acquired in the interim some additional force.

148. Love and jealousy connected by a common object, occupy the mind alternately: when the object is considered as beautiful, love prevails: when considered as possibly unfaithful, jealousy prevails. A situation of that kind affords great scope for fluctuation of passion; which is painted to the life by several masterly hands in words as well as in colors. Shakspeare handles the same subject, but in a manner uncommon, and peculiar to himself. In Othello's soliloquy, before putting his wife to death, love and jealousy are represented, each exerting its whole force, but without any struggle. Othello was naturally inflexible; and the tenderest love could not divert him from a purpose he approved as right, not even for a moment; but every thing consistent with such a character is done to reconcile the two opposite passions: he is resolved to put her to death, but he will not shed her blood, nor so much as ruffle her skin : Othello. It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul :

Let me not name it to you, you chaste stars!

It is the cause.

Yet I'll not shed her blood,

Nor scar that whiter skin of hers than snow,

And smooth as monumental alabaster. [Lays down the sword.

Yet she must die; else she'll betray more men.

Put out the light, and then-Put out the light!—

If I quench thee, thou flaming minister,

I can again thy former light restore,

Should I repent: but once put out thy light,

Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature,

147. Coexistent passions as the causes of external effects.-Two coexistent passions having the same tendency.-Two passions of opposite tendencies proceeding from the same cause, considered in different views. Their effect upon action. Instance from Ovid.

I know not where is that Promethean heat

That can thy light relumine.

When I have pluck'd thy rose,

-[Sets down the taper.

I cannot give it vital growth again;

It needs must wither.-I'll smell thee on the tree: [Kissing her.
O balmy breath, that dost almost persuade

Justice to break her sword!-One more; one more;

Be thus when thou art dead, and I will kill thee,

And love thee after. -One more, that's the last;
So sweet was ne'er so fatal! I must weep,

But they are cruel tears! this sorrow's heavenly;
It strikes where it doth love.-

Act V. Sc. 6.

PART V.

INFLUENCE OF PASSION WITH RESPECT ΤΟ OUR PERCEPTIONS, OPINIONS, AND BELIEF.

149. CONSIDERING how intimately our perceptions, passions, and actions are mutually connected, it would be wonderful if they should have no mutual influence. That our actions are too much influenced by passion, is a known truth; but it is not less certain, though not so well known, that passion hath also an influence upon our perceptions, opinions, and belief. For example, the opinions we form of men and things, are generally directed by affection: an advice given by a man of figure, hath great weight; the same advice from one in a low condition is despised or neglected; a man of courage underrates danger; and to the indolent the slightest obstacle appears insurmountable.

150. There is no truth more universally known, than that tranquillity and sedateness are the proper state of mind for accurate perception and cool deliberation; and for that reason, we never regard the opinion even of the wisest man, when we discover prejudice or passion behind the curtain. Passion hath such influence over us, as to give a false light to all its objects. Agreeable passions prepossess the mind in favor of their objects, and disagreeable passions, no less against their objects: a woman is all perfection in her lover's opinion, while in the eye of a rival beauty, she is awkward and disagreeable when the passion of love is gone, beauty vanishes with it,-nothing left of that genteel motion, that sprightly conversation, those numberless graces, which formerly, in the lover's opinion, charmed all hearts. To a zealot every one of his own sect is a saint, while the most upright of a different sect are to him children of perdition: the talent of speaking in a friend is more regarded than

148. Love and jealousy in relation to the same object. Othello.

149. Influence of passion upon our perceptions, opinions, and belief. Examples.

prudent conduct in any other. Nor will this surprise one acquainted with the world: our opinions, the result frequently of various and complicated views, are commonly so slight and wavering, as readily to be susceptible of a bias from passion.

151. With that natural bias another circumstance concurs, to give passion an undue influence on our opinions and belief; and that is a strong tendency in our nature to justify our passions as well as our actions, not to others only, but even to ourselves. That tendency is peculiarly remarkable with respect to disagreeable passions: by its influence, objects are magnified or lessened, circumstances supplied or suppressed, every thing colored and disguised, to answer the end of justification. Hence the foundation of self-deceit, where a man imposes upon himself innocently, and even without suspicion of a bias.

There are subordinate means that contribute to pervert the judgment, and to make us form opinions contrary to truth; of which I shall mention two. First, it was formerly observed, that though ideas seldom start up in the mind without connection, yet that ideas suited to the present tone of mind are readily suggested by any slight connection: the arguments for a favorite opinion are always at hand, while we often search in vain for those that cross our inclination. Second, The mind taking delight in agreeable circumstances or arguments, is deeply impressed with them; while those that are disagreeable are hurried over so as scarce to make an impression: the same argument, by being relished or not relished, weighs so differently, as in truth to make conviction depend more on passion than on reasoning. This observation is fully justified by experience to confine myself to a single instance; the numberless absurd religious tenets that at different times have pestered the world, would be altogether unaccountable but for that irregular bias of passion.

152. We proceed to a more pleasant task, which is, to illustrate the foregoing observations by proper examples. Gratitude, when warm, is often exerted upon the children of the benefactor; especially where he is removed out of reach by death or absence. (See part i. sect. i. of the present chapter.) The passion in this case being exerted for the sake of the benefactor, requires no peculiar excellence in his children: but the practice of doing good to these children produces affection for them, which never fails to advance them in our esteem. By such means, strong connections of affection are often formed among individuals, upon the slight foundation now mentioned.

Envy is a passion, which, being altogether unjustifiable, cannot be excused but by disguising it under some plausible name. At the

150. The proper state of mind for accurate perception and just deliberation.-How agreeable and disagreeable passions prepossess the mind. Instance of a lover; also of a zealot. 151. Tendency to justify our own passions. Influence of such a tendency.-Two subor dinate means that serve to pervert our judgment.

same time, no passion is more eager than envy, to give its object a disagreeable appearance: it magnifies every bad quality, and fixes or the most humbling circumstances:

Cassius. I cannot tell what you and other men
Think of this life; but for my single self,
I had as lief not be, as live to be
In awe of such a thing as I, myself.

I was born free as Cæsar, so were you;
We both have fed as well; and we can both
Endure the winter's cold as well as he.
For once, upon a raw and gusty day,
The troubled Tyber chafing with his shores,
Cæsar says to me, Dar'st thou, Cassius, now
Leap in with me into this angry flood,
And swim to yonder point?-Upon the word,
Accoutred as I was, I plunged in,

And bid him follow; so indeed he did.
The torrent roar'd, and we did buffet it
With lusty sinews; throwing it aside,
And stemming it with hearts of controversy.
But ere we could arrive the point proposed,
Cæsar cried, Help me, Cassius, or I sink.
I, as Eneas, our great ancestor,

Did from the flames of Troy upon his shoulder

The old Anchises bear; so from the waves of Tyber

Did I the tired Cæsar; and this man

Is now become a god, and Cassius is

A wretched creature, and must bend his body

If Cæsar carelessly but nod on him.

He had a fever when he was in Spain,

And when the fit was on him, I did mark

How he did shake. 'Tis true this god did shake;
His coward lips did from their color fly,

And that same eye whose bend doth awe the world,
Did lose its lustre; I did hear him groan;

Aye, and that tongue of his, that bade the Romans
Mark him, and write his speeches in their books,
Alas! it cried- Give me some drink, Titinius,-
As a sick girl. Ye gods, it doth amaze me,

A man of such a feeble temper should

So get a start of this najestic world,

And bear the palm alone.-Julius Cæsar, Act I. Sc. 3.

Gloster, inflamed with resentment against his son Edgar, could even force himself into a momentary conviction that they were not related:

O strange fasten'd villain!

Would he deny his letter?-I never got him.

King Lear, Act II. Sc. 3. 153. When by great sensibility of heart, or other means, grief becomes immoderate, the mind, in order to justify itself, is prone to magnify the cause: and if the real cause admit not of being magnified, the mind seeks a cause for its grief in imagined future events: Busby. Madam, your Majesty is much too sad; You promised when you parted with the King, To lay aside self-harming heaviness,

And entertain a cheerful disposition.

152. Operation of gratitude: often productive of affection.-Envy, how excused. Its action towards its objects.-Speech of Cassius.

Queen. To please the King, I did; to please myself,
I cannot do it. Yet I know no cause

Why I should welcome such a guest as grief;
Save bidding farewell to so sweet a guest
As my sweet Richard: yet again, methinks,
Some unborn sorrow, ripe in Fortune's womb,
Is coming tow'rd me; and my inward soul
With something trembles, yet at nothing grieves,
More than with parting from my lord the king.

Richard II. Act II. Sc. 5.

Resentment at first is vented on the relations of the offender, in order to punish him: but as resentment, when so outrageous, is contrary to conscience, the mind, to justify its passion, is disposed to paint these relations in the blackest colors; and it comes at last to be convinced, that they ought to be punished for their own demerits.

Anger raised by an accidental stroke upon a tender part of the body is sometimes vented upon the undesigning cause. But as the passion in that case is absurd, and as there can be no solid gratification in punishing the innocent, the mind, prone to justify as well as to gratify its passion, deludes itself into a conviction of the action's being voluntary. The conviction, however, is but momentary: the first reflection shows it to be erroneous; and the passion vanisheth almost instantaneously with the conviction. But anger, the most violent of all passions, has still greater influence: it sometimes forces the mind to personify a stock or a stone, if it happen to occasion bodily pain, and even to believe it a voluntary agent, in order to be a proper object of resentment. And that we have really a momentary conviction of its being a voluntary agent, must be evident from considering, that, without such conviction, the passion can neither be justified nor gratified: the imagination can give no aid; for a stock or a stone imagined sensible, cannot be an object of punishment, if the mind be conscious that it is an imagination merely without any reality. Of such personification, involving a conviction of reality, there is one illustrious instance. When the first bridge of boats over the Hellespont was destroyed by a storm, Xerxes fell into a transport of rage, so excessive, that he commanded the sea to be punished with 300 stripes, and a pair of fetters to be. thrown into it, enjoining the following words to be pronounced: "O thou salt and bitter water! thy master hath condemned thee to this punishment for offending him without cause; and is resolved to pass over thee in despite of thy insolence: with reason all men neglect to sacrifice to thee, because thou art both disagreeable and treacherous." (Herodotus, Book vii.)

154. Shakspeare exhibits beautiful examples of the irregular influence of passion in making us believe things to be otherwise than

153. Immoderate grief justifies itself, how?-When entertained towards the relatives of an offender, how resentment justifies itself.-Anger, raised by an accidental stroke, how attempted to be justified?-Xerxes and the Hellespont.