315. A parody must be distinguished from every species of ridicule it enlivens a gay subject by imitating some important incident that is serious: it is ludicrous, and may be risible; but ridicule is not a necessary ingredient. Take the following examples, the first of which refers to an expression of Moses:

The skilful nymph reviews her force with care:
Let spades be trumps! she said, and trumps they were.
Rape of the Lock, Canto iii. 45.

The next is in imitation of Achilles' oath in Homer:
But by this lock, this sacred lock, I swear,
(Which never more shall join its parted hair,
Which never more its honors shall renew,
Clipp'd from the lovely head where late it grew),
That while my nostrils draw the vital air,

This hand which won it, shall forever wear.

He spoke, and speaking, in proud triumph spread

The long-contended honors of her head.-Ibid. Canto iv. 183.

The following imitates the history of Agamemnon's sceptre in Homer:

Now meet thy fate, incensed Belinda cried,
And drew a deadly bodkin from her side,
(The same, his ancient personage to deck,
Her great-great-grandsire wore about his neck,
In three seal rings: which after, melted down,
Form'd a vast buckle for his widow's gown:
Her infant grandame's whistle next it grew,
The bells she jingled, and the whistle blew:
Then in a bodkin graced her mother's hairs,
Which long she wore and now Belinda wears).

Ibid. Canto v. 87.

Though ridicule, as observed above, is no necessary ingredient in a parody, yet there is no opposition between them: ridicule may be successfully employed in a parody; and a parody may be employed to promote ridicule.

The interposition of the gods, in the manner of Homer and Virgil, ought to be confined to ludicrous subjects, which are much enlivened by such interposition handled in the form of a parody; witness the Cave of Spleen, Rape of the Lock, canto iv.; the goddess of Discord, Lutrin, canto i.; and the goddess of Indolence, canto ii.

["The secret of parody lies merely in transposing or applying at a venture to any thing, or to the lowest objects, that which is applicable only to certain given things, or to the highest matters. From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a step.' The slightest want of unity of impression destroys the sublime; the detection of the smallest incongruity is an infallible ground to rest the ludicrous upon. But in serious poetry, which aims at riveting our affections, every blow must tell home. The missing a single time is fatal, and undoes the spell. We see how difficult it is to sustain a continued flight of impressive sentiment: how easy it must be then o travesty or burlesque it, to flounder into nonsense, and be witty by playing the fool. It is a common mistake, however, to suppose

that parodies degrade, or imply a stigma on the subject; on the contrary, they in general imply something serious or sacred in the originals. Without this they would be good for nothing; for the immediate contrast would be wanting, and with this they are sure te tell. The best parodies are, accordingly, the best and most striking things reversed. Witness the common travesties of Homer and Virgil."-Hazlitt, Lect. I.]

316. Those who have a talent for ridicule, which is seldom united with a taste for delicate and refined beauties, are quick-sighted in improprieties; and these they eagerly grasp in order to gratify their favorite propensity. Persons galled are provoked to maintain, that ridicule is improper for grave subjects. Subjects really grave are by no means fit for ridicule: but then it is urged against them, that when it is called in question whether a certain subject be really grave, ridicule is the only means of determining the controversy Hence a celebrated question, Whether ridicule be or be not a test of truth? I give this question a place here, because it tends to illustrate the nature of ridicule.

It is

The question stated in accurate terms is, Whether the sense of ridicule be the proper test for distinguishing ridiculous objects, from what are not so. Taking it for granted, that ridicule is not a subject of reasoning, but of sense or taste (see chap. x. compared with chap. vii.), I proceed thus. No person doubts but that our sense of beauty is the true test of what is beautiful; and our sense of grandeur, of what is great or sublime. Is it more doubtful whether our sense of ridicule be the true test of what is ridiculous? not only the true test, but indeed the only test; for this subject comes not, more than beauty or grandeur, under the province of reason. If any subject, by the influence of fashion or custom, have acquired a degree of veneration to which naturally it is not entitled, what are the proper means for wiping off the artificial coloring, and displaying the subject in its true light? the subject without disguise; but if he hesitate, let him apply the test of ridicule, which separates it from its artificial connections, and exposes it naked with all its native improprieties.

A man of true taste sees

317. But it is urged, that the gravest and most serious matters may be set in a ridiculous light. Hardly so; for where an object is neither risible nor improper, it lies not open in any quarter to an attack from ridicule. But supposing the fact, I foresee not any harmful consequence. By the same sort of reasoning, a talent for wit ought to be condemned, because it may be employed to burlesque a great or lofty subject. Such irregular use made of a talent for wit or ridicule, cannot long impose upon mankind: it cannot stand the test of correct and delicate taste; and truth will at last

315. A parody. Example from the Rape of the Lock.-Remarks of Hazlitt.

316. Whether ridicule is a test of truth. Question stated in accurate terms The anthor's argument

prevail even with the vulgar. To condemn a talent for ridicule because it may be perverted to wrong purposes, is not a little ridiculous: could one forbear to smile, if a talent for reasoning were condemned because it also may be perverted? and yet the conclusion in the latter case, would be not less just than in the former: perhaps more just; for no talent is more frequently perverted than that of reason. We had best leave nature to her own operations: the most valuable talents may be abused, and so may that of ridicule: let us bring it under proper culture if we can, without endeavoring to pluck it up by the root. Were we destitute of this test of truth, I know not what might be the consequences: I see not what rule would be left us to prevent splendid trifles passing for matters of importance, and show and form for substance, and superstition or enthusiasm for pure religion.

318. [While there is much truth in the statements above made concerning Ridicule, there is also much and dangerous error.

As Dr. Blair observes: "Many vices might be more successfully exploded by employing ridicule against them, than by serious attacks and arguments. At the same time it must be confessed, that ridicule is an instrument of such a nature, that when managed by unskilful or improper hands, there is hazard of its doing mischief, instead of good, to society. For ridicule is far from being, as some have maintained it to be, a test of truth. On the contrary, it is apt to mislead and seduce, by the colors which it throws upon its objects; and it is often more difficult to judge whether these colors be natural and proper, than it is to distinguish between simple truth and error. Licentious writers, therefore, of the comic class, have too often had it in their power to cast a ridicule upon characters and objects which did not deserve it."

319. Lord Shaftesbury advocated the same false doctrine as Lord Kames; but Dr. Leland has clearly exposed his error, in the following remarks: "The best and wisest men in all ages have always recommended a calm attention and sobriety of mind, a cool and impartial examination and inquiry, as the properest disposition for finding out truth, and judging concerning it. But according to his lordship's representation of the case, those that apply themselves to the searching out of truth, or judging what is really true, serious, and excellent, must endeavor to put themselves in a merry humor, to raise up a gayety of spirit, and seek whether in the object they are examining they cannot find out something that may be justly laughed at. And it is great odds that a man who is thus disposed will find out something fit, as he imagines, to excite his mirth, in the most serious and important subject in the world. Such a temper is so far from being a help to a fair and unprejudiced inquiry, that it is

817. Objection stated and replied to.-Is ridicule to be abandoned ?—Importance of a talent for ridicule. 318. Remark on Kames' doctrine concerning ridicule.-Dr. Blair's observations.

one of the greatest hindrances to it. A strong turn to ridicule has a tendency to disqualify a man for cool and sedate reflection, and to render him impatient of the pains that are necessary to a rational and deliberate search." ****

humor.

320. Dr. Leland proceeds to say:- "Our noble author, indeed, frequently observes that truth cannot be hurt by ridicule, since, when the ridicule is wrong placed, it will not hold. It will readily be allowed that truth and honesty cannot be the subject of just ridicule; but then this supposes that ridicule itself must be brought to the test of cool reason; and accordingly his lordship acknowledges, that it is in reality a serious study to temper and regulate that And thus, after all, we are to return to gravity and serious reason, as the ultimate test and criterion of ridicule, and of every thing else. But though the most excellent things cannot be justly ridiculed, and ridicule, when thus applied, will, in the judgment of thinking men, render' him that uses it ridiculous; yet there are many persons on whom it will have a different effect. The ridicule will be apt to create prejudices in their minds, and to inspire them Contempt, or at least a disregard of things, which, when represented in a proper light, appear to be of the greatest worth and

with a

importance...

Weak and unstable minds have been driven into

atheism, profaneness, and vice, by the force of ridicule, and have

been

made ashamed of that which they ought to esteem their

ניי.glory

CHAPTER XIII.

WIT.

321. WIT is a quality of certain thoughts and expressions: the terma is never applied to an action nor a passion, and as little to an external object.

However difficult it may be, in many instances, to distinguish a witty thought or expression from one that is not so, yet, in general,

it

may be laid down that the term wit is appropriated to such

thoughts and expressions as are ludicrous, and also occasion some degree of surprise by their singularity. Wit, also, in a figurative sense, expresses a talent for inventing ludicrous thoughts or expressions: we say commonly a witty man, or a man of wit.

319. Dr. Leland's strictures upon Shaftesbury.-The method of searching out truth suggested by the wisest men.-Lord Shaftesbury's proposed method. Objections to his

method.

Effect of a strong turn for ridicule.

mate test, of what?-Bad effect of ridiculing sacred things.

820. Remarks on the statement that truth cannot be hurt by ridicule.-Reason the ulti.

1

Wit in its proper sense, as explained above, is distinguishable into two kinds: wit in the thought, and wit in the words or expression, Again, wit in the thought is of two kinds: ludicrous images, and ludicrous combinations of things that have little or no natural relation.

Ludicrous images that occasion surprise by their singularity, as having little or no foundation in nature, are fabricated by the imagination and the imagination is well qualified for the office; being of all our faculties the most active, and the least under restraint. Take the following example:

Shylock. You knew (none so well, none so well as you) of my daughter's flight.

Salino. That's certain: I for my part knew the tailor that made the wings she flew withal. Merchant of Venice, Act III. Sc. 1.

The image here is undoubtedly witty. It is ludicrous and it must occasion surprise; for having no natural foundation, it is altogether unexpected.

[According to Hazlitt, "the ludicrous is where there is a contradiction between the object and our expectations, heightened by some deformity or inconvenience, that is, by its being contrary to what is customary or desirable; as the ridiculous, which is the highest degree of the laughable, is that which is contrary not only to custom, but to sense and reason, or is a voluntary departure from what we have a right to expect from those who are conscious of absurdity and propriety in words, looks, and actions."]

322. The other branch, of wit in the thought, is that only which is taken notice of by Addison, following Locke, who defines it "to lie in the assemblage of ideas; and putting those together, with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congrmy, thereby to make up pleasann promines and agreeable visions in the fancy.' (B. . ch. xi. sect. 2.) It may be defined more concisely, and perhaps more accurately, "A junction of things by distant and fanciful relations, which surprise because they are unexpected." (See chapter i.) The following is a proper example:

We grant, although he had much wit,

He was very shy of using it,

As being loth to wear it out;

And, therefore, bore it not about,
Unless on holidays, or so,

As men their best apparel do.-Hudibras, Canto i.

Wit is of all the most elegant recreation: the image enters the mind with gayety, and gives a sudden flash, which is extremely pleasant. Wit thereby gently elevates without straining, raises mirth without dissoluteness, and relaxes while it entertains.

Szi. To what the term wit is appropriated.-In a figurative sense, to what applied.-Two kinds of wit in the proper sense. Two kinds of wit in thought.-The source of ludicrous images.-Hazlitt's account of the ludicrous.