exercise of the rational faculties in judging of the nature and character of a miracle?

The allegations that miracles performed by lying spirits must be a trial too severe for all human sagacity and virtue may be met by the question, how then are we to account for the permission of counterfeit miracles, so closely resembling the true, as often to require profound discernment and laborious inquiry to find out the imposture? If it is consistent with the divine perfections to suffer large portions of mankind to be exposed, by the agency of wicked men, to delusions, which a vast proportion of them are not qualified to detect, how can we confidently exclude the agency of seducing spirits from the dispensations of God? Human craft, although capable of being matched by human sagacity, has yet in certain circumstances, as to civilization and knowledge, the power of deceiving whole communities of men. Why are we to conclude that a similar power of deception may not be committed to demons? Does it follow that enlightened persons making a right use of their faculties must in this case be utterly incapable of separating truth from error?

arm of Omnipotence! What comparison could there be between the performance of the magicians, and the potent word which called hail and fire from heaven, which spread over the land a darkness that might be felt, and which smote all the first-born throughout the realm of Pharaoh? Let us imagine that we ourselves had been witnesses of these scenes, could we have hesitated a moment which to trust, the juggling fiends' of Egypt, or the mighty God of Israel? Would it ever have occurred to us, that the finger of the Lord' was to be resisted, because certain strange things had recently been achieved, either by crafty men, or deceiving spirits? Where, then, is the overpowering trial of faith or discernment implied in such an exhibition?" pp. 17-20.

The same principles apply to the New Testament: demons are introduced only to be baffled: the authority of Christ over them is decisive the faith of no man, possessing a sound mind, could be endangered by comparing their power with that of the Son of God.

"But, after all, the history of the divine dispensations presents us with no such cases. It seems, indeed, impossible, with the Bible open before us, to doubt that superhuman intelligences may have the power of working miracles. Whether that power be inherent in their nature, or only consigned to them by special appointment, is an inquiry of little moment: for if such beings be allowed to interfere at all in human affairs, their interference must, to us, be miraculous, whether they are acting within their own natural sphere or not. But the great and important circumstance to be observed, is, that the exercise of such power is always represented as under limitation and control. In the Old Testament, the nearest approach to a competition of miracles is to be found in the contest between Moses and the necromancers of Egypt. Now let us, purely for the sake of argument, imagine that those impostors had the advantage of preternatural aid; and let us see whether, even in that case, the contest, as it is recorded, could have left on any well-regulated mind a doubt as to the conduct demanded by the occasion. The sorcerers, we will suppose, were enabled, by a confederacy with evil demons, to convert rods into serpents, and water into blood, and to bring up frogs upon the land. But here the efficacy of their enchantments ended; and they were themselves compelled to acknowledge the working of a superior agent. And then followed such an august display of supernatural power as must have convinced any sane mind, that, if there had been any conflict of superhuman agency, it was between inferior spirits and the

prehend from this admission. The only just inference from it is, that in this particular, as in many others, the divine government is profoundly mysterious. Inscrutable, however, as it is, there is nothing in this department of it to unsettle our reliance on miracles performed for purposes obviously unexceptionable and benevolent. There is, in all the dealings of God, so much that is unfathomable by us, that it must be dangerous to frame our views upon the presumption, that this or that particular course of things is incompatible with his perfections. Whether by the agency of men or demons-certain it is, that delusions of the most abominable kind have been successfully practised. But this, assuredly, does not exempt us from the duty of exercising our judg ment on every case of miraculous evidence connected with our salvation. And if we approach the task in a proper temper, we shall not fail to perceive, that the arm of the Lord has been revealed to us in a way that puts to shame all the works of darkness, whether carried on by human or by spiritual agency.

"It may, perhaps, be urged in reply to these remarks, that all deviations from the course of nature, by whatever immediate agency, must be regarded as the work of God, since they cannot take place without his permission; and that, by such permission, he does no less than make the acts his own. Every person, however, at all conversant with inquiries of this nature, must shrink from the aid of so treacherous an argument as this: an argument, which, if admitted, would recoil upon its employer with this dreadful consequence, that the most fearful prodigies of human wickedness and impiety may be ascribed to the special interference of the Almighty. For, if by permitting the acts of demons, God must be supposed to authorize those acts, and to give them his posi

tive and special sanction, why may not the same be said of the most gigantic atrocities of sinful men? But it is needless to dwell longer on this most dangerous defence. It may be difficult, indeed, for us, by any process of reasoning, to discriminate between the active and permissive providence of an Omnipotent, and perfectly independent Being. And yet, every one who has thought at all on this unfathomable subject, must surely perceive that nothing but the darkest confusion can result from any attempt to identify them." pp. 24-27.

Mr. Penrose, of whose treatise on the evidence of the Scripture miracles the substance of this volume was published as a review, taking as his definition of a miracle "an act above the power of man," establishes the two following positions:

"First, that every superhuman act confers on the agent a superhuman authority, when appealed to for that purpose.

"Secondly, that it may safely be concluded, that such authority is not merely superhuman, but absolutely infallible and divine, unless one of two things can be shown; namely, that the pretensions of the agent involve some doctrine clearly incredible or inadmissible, or that they are at variance with some authority at least equally potent. If, on the contrary, any inadmissible doctrine be involved, or any acknowledged authority invaded, then we are bound either to suspend our judgment as to the performance of the miracle, or, at all events, to reject the pretensions of the person by whom the miracle is wrought. And, as to the difficulties which may, in some conceivable cases, attend the application of this rule, it is our duty to rely on the aid and guidance of that power, to whom we are taught to look under all other temptations."-pp. 30, 31.

For the truth of these positions, he appeals to the moral and intellectual constitution of man. The first of them will not, where that constitution is sound, cause any difficulty: the inquirer will arrive at a conviction upon the second by a simple process of reasoning. Finding nothing to repel the evidence before him, that this more than human authority is supreme, he will rely upon such miraculous evidence as indicative of the Divine will: he will not reject it till it can be shown to involve something which renders that belief untenable. As to any imagined instances of rival authority, such, for example, as that of a dead body raised to life by Jesus Christ, and another by Judas Iscariot after his apostacy, the spectator would surely not be induced by them to reject the pretensions in each case as equally worthless: he would fall back upon his conviction that the world is governed by a righteous God; and would, with whatever hesitation in the mean time, eventually take him for his guide, whose doctrine or pretensions involved nothing repugnant to the unalterable principles of right. We are so constituted, that the concurrence of a superhuman act with unimpeachable tenets, must be sufficient to compel the assent of every sound intellect.

From reflections of this nature, the author naturally turns to expose "the despicable sophistry," which accuses the friends of revealed religion of first proving the doctrine by the

miracle, and then the miracle by the doctrine." That all persons who make this charge, are aware of the falsehood and folly of it, we would not affirm. We are bound in charity to suppose that, in many cases, their conduct is to be ascribed not so much to dishonesty of purpose, as to a defect in the reasoning faculty, which renders them objects rather of compassion than of stern censure. The process by which believers in the Christian revelation do arrive at their convictions may be stated in this way:

"In the first place, they believe Jesus of Nazareth to be a teacher of superhuman authority, because he did such mighty works as exceed the power of man.

"Secondly, finding neither in his own life and precepts, nor in the pretensions of other teachers, any thing to limit their reliance on that authority, they hesitate not to confide in it as absolutely conclusive and divine.

"Thirdly, on the strength of his divine commission they receive all his sayings, and believe him to be the Christ the Son of the living God.

"Fourthly, perceiving the truths revealed by him to be capable of a highly moral and beneficial application, they feel strongly confirmed in the justness of their conclusion.

"Lastly, being thus assured of his plenary authority, they rest on it, not only as proving his own peculiar doctrines, but as furnishing an additional and independent sanction to all the moral principles involved in his teaching. So that morality, which before may have appealed only to reason, now appeals to revelation also.

Now where, it may confidently be asked, is the illogical assumption in this proceeding? We have assumed, as an ultimate truth, what we suppose no one will deny, that man only obeys a natural impulse when he suffers himself to be powerfully influenced by great authority. We have also assumed, that the inquirer is in a tolerable state of moral sanity; that he has in him the elements of morality; for, otherwise, the second step in the above process, if taken at all, would be taken in pure ignorance and blindness. Without such assumption, how could we maintain that man is qualified for any inquiry relating to morals or religion? And what sceptic is there so besotted as to maintain, that, before we can become impartial judges in such questions, we must get rid of all our moral preferences and antipathies? No: the argument, as we have put it above, does not circulate. It does not merely bring us back to the point where we began. It sets off on the firm ground of instinctive moral perception; but it pursues a path which rises at every step, till it leads us round to a position infinitely more elevated and commanding than that from which we started; a position which enables us to survey, more clearly than before, all the grand truths of natural religion, while at the same time it opens a prospect of still greater magnificence, even the kingdom of the Redeemer, with the glory thereof."-pp. 42-44.

Should it be alleged that, by allowing an examination of the doctrine to precede our full submission to the force of the miracle, we reduce a miracle to something very inconclusive, since there are disputants who reject the dor

trines even of the Trinity and the Atonement, the reply is, that we are not bound to dispose of this class of difficulties. All that can be expected of the advocates of miracles is, to suggest a criterion which will satisfy the generality of sound understandings.

"He is not obliged to concede that a doctrine is inadmissible, merely because certain strange and incredulous mortals refuse their assent to it. A position is not to be rejected as incredible, unless the common sense and feeling of mankind revolt against it. Thus, if a person claiming the authority of a prophet, were to assure us, that murder and fraud are allowable and even meritorious, we might justly dispute his pretensions, though supported by the most overpowering apparent display of signs and wonders. But it certainly does not follow that we should be justified in rejecting him and his miracles, if he were to tell us of the incarnation of the Son of God; although many persons may be found, who profess themselves incapable of embracing any such incom. prehensible and mysterious article of faith."p. 50.

It would be well if individuals of a sceptical turn of mind would examine into the grounds of their scepticism. In many instances, it is to be feared that, as in old times, there existed persons who loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil; so, likewise, at this day, the resistance to divine truth arises but too often from selfish interests, strong prejudices, and unruly passions.

eternal punishments." Be it so: to his own Maker he must stand or fall.

"But, nevertheless, we should by no means be compelled to admit this sweeping conciasion,-that, by pausing to weigh the doctrine, we render the evidence of miracles altogether nugatory. It may still be safely held, as a general rule, that superhuman acts indicate to homan beings an authority, not only superhuman, but divine; and that, accordingly, they demand our entire submission. And the force of this general rule cannot be destroyed by the failure of its application, in certain extreme or imaginary cases, connected, perhaps, with some peculiar habit of thought, or some anom lous structure of mind."-p. 57.

The difficulties really incident to our inquiries on this subject are only such as may be expected by responsible beings in a state of moral probation.

To confirm and illustrate his argument on the admissibility of a doctrine as an element in our estimate of the force and value of miraculous testimony, Mr. Le Bas introduces some very judicious and important remarks from Mr. Penrose; and subjoins the following passage from Tucker, which we cite here, partly because it is of an original cast, and partly because it may easily be remembered.

"If (says he) a man of honest, judicious character, but a little straitened in present cash, should receive a strong impression in a dream, that his deceased friend had bid him look under a particular bush, where he should find a purse of money; though he had no faith in dreams, it is very likely he might have the curiosity to poke about a little under the bush. If the direction had been, to lay five guiness there, which, on his returning the day after, he should find grown to an hundred, he would hardly care to run the risk: yet, upon the advice being repeated four or five successive

Of possible objections arising from extreme cases, there is no end: and to those who imagine or invent miracles, the purpose of which is to establish monstrous and atrocious principles, it is sufficient to reply that we cannot, unless dreadfully depraved, acquiesce in such principles; the moral constitution of our nature forbids it. "As little," the objector may perhaps rejoin, "can I admit the doctrine of

*If the Pythagorean proposition, for instance, (Eucl. i. 47,) were to impose on mathematicians the Pythagorean maxim of a strict vegetable diet, what carnivorous student of geometry would ever get to the end of the first book of Euclid? Or if we could conceive the doctrine of Fluxions had, some how or other, been combined with an obligation to abstain from the use of wine, does any one believe that it would have gained its present undisputed establishment throughout the scientific world? Should we not, at this very day, have many at hirsty annalist protesting that he was under an absolute inability to comprehend, or to credit, the system?

tions, he might be tempted to try the experi ment. But, if he were commanded to break open a neighbour's house for the money, with an assurance of the deed being lawful and safe, I imagine he would require a better warrant than even twenty dreams, before he would proceed to execution. In like manner, if other persons had told him of having had such dreams, and found them accomplished in all points, upon following their directions, be would want different degrees of evidence to convince him of their being true.

"Therefore, where the facts reported are frivolous, unbecoming, or repugnant to cur ideas of justice and mercy, they carry a higher degree of improbability on that very ac. count: for though we have not so perfect a knowledge of what is agreeable to wisdom and goodness, as to render every thing appearing foolishness and evil, incredible, yet we must and ought to give their due weight to the judgments of our understanding, that salutary guide given us from God, for our general di rection."-pp. 64-66.

"And to this it may be added, (observes Mr. Le Bas,) that the same considerations by which we pronounce on the credibility of a miracle, may fairly be resorted to for the pur pose of judging whether it came from God,