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proper condition for the inquiry. In every thing on which a question can be started, it may be shewn him, that one prejudice or the other, circumstances in his situation or habits, the present tone of his feelings, or even the state of his health, may influence his decisions. In ordinary cases, only one of these things acts, perhaps, upon his mind; but in judging of Christianity they all operate. Tastes, dispositions, condition of life, the society in which he moves, the hopes and fears of his hearteach of them is to be watched, in the influence it has upon his mind; for from each of them is derived its own particular class of prejudices and objections. There is, therefore, a kind of introductory argument, which the Christian advocate may profitably employ in reasoning with a disbeliever in the Gospel: an argument which may be begun and carried on on ground confessedly common to both parties; which requires nothing to be granted before its application; and to refuse the consideration of which at once puts a man out of the list of reasonable creatures, and beyond the reach of a wise man's arguments. But if he be willing to let every opinion he entertains, every principle that in fluences his conduct or reason, be tried by the fair and open rules of an unprejudiced judgment, and he can be convinced that in human opinion there is often an imperceptible mixture of error, it will be easy to unravel the ruffled skein of sophistries and surmisings that have prevented his belief in Christianity; and he will then have only to weigh the various arguments in its favour, as he would examine those on a different question.

We have good reason to think that the great cause of failure, experienced by some of the most powerful advocates of the gospel, is to be found in their inattention to the considerations we have been advancing. To propound arguments in proof of Christianity can be of no avail, till it is known how far reason itself is respected: and it is beyond all doubt, that, if a man will not be convinced of error when he has erred in a less self-condemning manner, he will never be brought to confess himself mistaken in his opposition to the gospel.

In arguing, then, with a disbeliever, we would endeavour to learn as much of his disposition and intellectual habits as possible. In doing this, we shall rarely fail to discover opinions which have been founded either on caprice or prejudice; and from the conduct of his understanding in respect to these ill-established notions, we should be able to make out a case parallel with his rejection of Christianity and, by convincing him of his error in the one, we should pass with an easy step to his mistake in the other.

We have been particular in explaining our notions on this point, because we think they may be employed to establish important practical conclusions, and because we are doubtful as to their being generally understood. Another reason for our introducing them in this place has been, that the method of argument they inculcate is of a similar nature to that employed in the work on our table. The ingenious author there proves the false reasoning of those who impugn the credibility of the

Christian records, by applying their rules of argument to a history of a different nature; and we would, in a similar manner, and as a preliminary step to the whole scheme of proof, draw an argument from the ordinary preju dices of the mind, to convince our opponent of the unreasonableness of his particular prejudice against the credibility of the gospel. But we must now turn to the more immediate consideration of the work before us.

Mr. Taylor is already well known to the public; and we have had more than one occasion to feel gratified at the result of his literary exertions. His present publication is of greater importance than any of his preceding ones; and the ability he has displayed in its compo sition is worthy of its nature and design. We shall endeavour to give our readers some idea of its purpose and general argument.

It is well known, that a common observation, among writers on Christian evidence, is, that, if we admit the writings of Pliny or Julius Cæsar, or any other ancient records, to be genuine or authentic, we have the same reason to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the books composing the New Testament. Paley, and other authors of treatises on the subject, have argued from this observation, and laid down principles respecting it. But they have not developed or illustrated the original argument, or worked it out so as to show its full application to the subject in debate. To do this, however, is the task Mr. Taylor has imposed upon himself; and he has chosen for his purpose the history of Herodotus, as offering the greatest number of available points in the progress of the inquiry. The work of Herodotus was of sufficiently high antiquity, its authenticity had been repeatedly attacked, and its authority only admitted, after a long inquiry into its pretensions, carried on in various manners, and by a great variety of persons. The evidence, therefore, to be examined, both in the case of the gospel and of the heathen history, was in a great degree similar, and the results of the inquiry of easy application. But one of the most important features in Mr. Taylor's work, is his very judicious and philosophical examination of the nature of historical proof, and of the circumstances which are to be sought for in a chain of substantial evidence. The importance of clear views on this subject cannot be too much insisted upon; and neither he who argues in favour of, nor he who rejects, Christianity, can lay claim to attention, till he is properly informed of the nature of proof by testimony in general. A thousand mistakes, on both sides, are repeatedly made from inattention to this: defences of the gospel are set up, to which the least cunning infidel can find even fair and legitimate objections: Christianity is propounded in its evidences as a subject for examination, and reason is done violence to by the unskilfulness of those who undertake it it is opposed as false, on the strength of arguments to the fallacy of which only the most gross stupidity could blind a man; or on the ground of objections, which, if the nature and value of human testimony were properly considered, would never in fairness have been made. Mr. Taylor has many very admirable remarks on this subject, but we could wish him

to have been even much fuller, and to have un-
folded it in all its bearings and exemplifications.
But we must not pass over this part of the vo-
lume without an extract; and the one we shall
give will recommend itself by its usefulness.
"Every one knows how differently he feels
when called to form an opinion and give a de-
cision upon a subject that falls within the range
of his common knowledge, or upon one relative
to which he has no previous experience. In
the latter case, though the facts may be intel-
ligible, and the evidence ample and conclusive,
and such as he knows not how to resist, yet,
feeling himself on strange ground, and his con-
victions wanting the corroboration of experi-
ence, he can hardly dismiss a lurking distrust,
even of his senses and clearest perceptions.
Ignorance is ever the mother of fear. But one
who has large experience among facts of the
same class, who has had repeated opportunities
of verifying or correcting his past decisions
in similar cases, and of ascertaining the sound-
ness of the principles by which his judgment
has been guided; and who is familiarly ac-
quainted with the various exceptions, or seem-
ing exceptions, to which those principles are
liable; gives, with a prompt confidence, its due
weight to every separate portion of the evi-
dence before him. The facts, though new in
circumstance and form, are old in substance.
He recognises at first sight each by its proper
designation; is not imposed upon by specious
colours; nor does he, from a false caution, ex-
tend suspicions from things doubtful to things

certain.

tion, and of keeping it ever in view, is, that it redeems writings and facts belonging to the first class from that suspicion which may attach to them, merely from their intermixture with those of the second class, and of the third.

"It has, in fact, often been attempted to mingle and confound these three classes of writings and of facts; and the attempt has been made by persons of very opposite intentions. For example: Men of weak judgments, and of a dogmatical and overweening temper, have not seldom prided themselves upon taking under their protection certain works, or certain points of history, generally rejected as spurious or false by men of sound sense; and if they could not assert for such books or facts an incontestable claim to respect, have, at least, endeavoured to foist them within the pale of probability; thus confounding the third class with the second; or sometimes they have laboured to claim a place in the first class, for what belongs only to the second. Such persons seem to be influenced by the feelings of the pleader, whose zeal as an advocate increases in proportion to the demerit of his client.

"On the other hand, intellectual timidity or a sinister intention has induced some critics to act the part of the calumniator, whose practice it is to propagate the infection of slander by flinging the skirt of the guilty over the shoulders of the innocent. Because a work unquestionably genuine has by some accidental connexion become associated with others palpably spurious, therefore it is to be loaded with groundless imputations; and, without even a pretext for suspicion to fix upon, is to be amerced in its just claims upon our confidence. On this system of detraction, ancient books which stand by full right in the first class are thrust down to the second'; while such as may fairly pretend to a place in the second, are made to herd with the last. In all these proceedings the principles of criticism are disre

"Now, although those general principles that are deduced from an extensive acquaintance with ancient literature and history, will not avail to set every question at rest, or to make all facts equally certain; they serve invariably and infallibly to distinguish the certain from the doubtful, or to draw a broad line of separation: on the one side of which will be ranged such facts as cannot with any reasonable pre-garded, and common sense is abused. text, or without absurd suppositions, be called in question; and on the other, such as may fairly and in good faith be made matter of controversy. Nothing is more important to the good management of common affairs, or to the successful prosecution of philosophical inquiries, or to the safe determination of theological questions, than the establishment of this distinction; a distinction to which strong minds resort and are safe, and in the neglect of which the feeble fall into endless perplexities. "No very laborious examination of ancient books is required in order to perceive that they may, on satisfactory grounds, be distributed into three classes: The first including those works-and it is by far the greater numberthe genuineness of which is, in the most absolute sense, indisputable. The second class, such as have a doubtful claim to authenticity, and which, unless some new evidence should be adduced, must always remain liable to controversy. The third class will comprehend those works which are manifestly spurious. A similar distribution may be made of the various narrations that fill the pages of historians; for of these some are incontrovertibly certain; others doubtful; and others certainly false. The obvious advantage of making this distinc

"Absolute certainty in matters of antiquity may result, either from an accumulation of various evidence, to such an amount that numerous deductions may be made from it without affecting the conclusion; or from some particular coincidence of proof, of that kind which admits of no opposite supposition. In most instances, where there is a great accumulation of evidence, there will be found among it some such special proofs.

"A degree of doubt on points of antiquity may arise, either from a mere paucity of direct evidence, or from its indistinctness or ambiguity; or from some internal incongruity in the evidence; or lastly, from a direct opposition of existing testimonies. In the two words Defect and Contrariety, all the sources of doubt are summed up." pp. 4-8.

In the following eight chapters Mr. Taylor examines the credibility of Herodotus as an historian, and the genuineness of his works. He pursues this inquiry by collecting the particulars which are known of the historian's life and character; and by proving, as the first step in the argument, the antiquity of his writings. This is done by showing, in the first place, that the work of Herodotus was in existence before the invention of printing, in the fact that he

has been quoted and alluded to during a thousand years-namely, from 150 to 1150 A. D.; and, lastly, that he is mentioned or quoted by different authors, whose testimony extends, from the first-mentioned period to his own times. This part of the argument being thus complete, our author proceeds to prove, from the genuineness of the work, its general authenticity. The proof in support of this is, that Herodotus, having lived in times of great public excitement, and having written on subjects which would provoke the inquiry of almost every class of persons, could not, had he been so inclined, have foisted untruths upon them. The truth of his narrative is further made out by the testimony of other writers of the same period, who relate or allude to the facts contained in his history. Of these are Thucydides, Pindar, Eschylus, Lysias the Orator, and others, whose repeated incidental mention of the particular events on which the historian wrote, prove their reality beyond all doubt.

This finishes the former part of Mr. Taylor's design; and he next contrasts this well and firmly connected chain of evidence with examples of historical evidence of a less perfect kind. The difference between these is principally owing to the former being derived from deductions from known and accredited information, and the latter coming to us through a medium whose purity entirely depends on the moral qualities of the historian. The examples our author makes use of to illustrate his meaning are taken from the first book of Herodotus himself. In the first part of this, that great man relates events which took place more than a thousand years before he wrote, and of course our assent to his account must be a very modified one. The narrative respecting the Lydian king Croesus, who lived a hundred years prior to Herodotus, and the review of Assyrian, Median, and Persian history, are liable to the same observation, and afford excellent instances of relations claiming our assent in very different degrees.

The next chapter in Mr. Taylor's volume is occupied with remarks on the writers who have undertaken to oppose the pretensions of Herodotus as an historian. These are, among the ancients, Ctesias, Manitho, Diodorus, Strabo, Josephus, and particularly Plutarch. Among the moderns are to be mentioned the celebrated Ludovicus Vives, Parker, Bodin, Wheare, Isaac Vossius, and Voltaire. The objections of these authors, however, are most of them either drawn from those parts of the history which are open to doubt, from the reasons we have already mentioned; or they are founded on mistaken readings of the text, or obstinate and perverse prejudices. This chapter completes the foundation of Mr. Taylor's argument in elucidation of Christian historical evidence. It will have been clearly seen by our readers, how closely every part of it is applicable to the questions which have been started on the subject, and how admirably it is adapted, like the general theorem of a mathematician, to be applied to a vast variety of cases, but particularly to that of Christian historical evidence. The remaining portion of the volume is devoted to the consideration of miscellaneous to

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pics more or less connected with the main subject, and some of them containing remarks of the greatest value. We give, as best adapted to our purpose, the following, which, with our extract from the former part of the volume, will give our readers a complete idea of this interesting work.

"We must yet revert for a moment to the subject of the miraculous knowledge of languages:

"The displays of the Divine power and wisdom in the material world, are all, in truth, equally admirable, equally astonishing; yet, from the narrowness of our range of intellectual vision, and the imperfection of our reasoning powers, it will ever happen that particular instances, in which either the fitness of the means to the end, or the excellence and beauty of the workmanship, are peculiarly apparent, will affect our minds more strongly than some other results of the same invariable intelligence. And thus, among those unwonted manifestations of the presence of the Supreme Agent by which the truth of the Christian religion was attested, there are some which more sensibly than others declare the hand of God.

"We hazard, then, the assertion, that, among the miracles recorded in the New Testament, none will so much fix the attention of reflecting minds as the gift of tongues.' Nor, perhaps, is there one which stands further removed from all possible supposition of a merely physi cal agency, or of illusion or imposture."

"Inasmuch as the miraculous impartation of languages was a work wrought upon that substance of whose mechanism and ordinary laws we are acquainted by consciousness, we feel qualified, in some measure, to follow or to scrutinize the Divine agency further beneath the surface, than in the case of supernatural changes effected on brute matter or on the animal frame. Or if the movements of the Divine hand are equally inscrutable in this as in every other operation, yet, at least, the knowledge we possess of the ordinary processes of the mind in accumulating ideas, puts us in a position to contemplate more nearly this wondrous bestowment of a sudden intellectual wealth.

"If the human mind, as well as the material world, was to become the subject of supernatural agency, there are several imaginable modes in which this end might be accomplished. For example: its sensibilities and its perceptions of moral good might be so quickened or perfected as should ensure an invariably virtuous choice. Or its powers of continuous reasoning, and of intuitive comprehension, might be so strengthened and expanded, as should bring the most remote, or complicated, or multifarious conse quences, within the range of its easy and instantaneous apprehension. Or its powers of combination might receive an impulse of such activity and exactness, as should place under its command, in the happiest order, all possible ideas that the material and immaterial worlds may furnish. Any such extraordinary exaltations of the faculties would indeed draw the eyes of mankind upon the individual. these gifts, how dazzling or excellent soever they might be, are still of an indefinite kind, and therefore not well adapted to the purpose

But

of attesting the presence of a supernatural | astonishing exemplification of the powers of agency. mind.

Nor do the ever-admirable works of the Creator offer to our inspection any piece of machinery more amazing than that by which this rapid and complicated movement is effected. Even if one system of signs only had been known to man, the steady, exact, and incalculably rapid performances of this immaterial machinery, which connects mind with mind, might seem complicated and difficult enough. A faculty which enables its possessor, without error, without embarrassment, without conscious effort, to play upon fifty or a hundred thousand keys, distinguished from each other by the minutest differences, holds forth, surely, a high proof of the infinite power and intelligence of the Creator! But the human mind is capable of sustaining, without confusion, a double, a treble, a quadruple, complication of this intricate apparatus. For, by a certain process, though indeed a toilsome one, there may be inserted upon. this first set of so many thousand keys, the threads of which one might imagine a breath of disturbance must throw into hopeless entanglements, another, and yet another, myriad of signs. And though, if the interior of the machine could be laid open, it must seem packed with a dense, countless crowd of ever-moving atoms, yet the commanding faculty, to whose management the boundless wealth is committed, not at all bewildered,

"If, then, the proof of that fact is to be the ultimate reason of the interposition, then, something must be imparted which shall be at once definite in itself, appreciable by others, and manifestly beyond the attainment of those who possess it-by ordinary means. Knowledge then must be the subject of a communication made for such a purpose. This knowledge must be exact and copious; or it would not stand beyond the suspicion of fortuity. It must be of difficult attainment, or the possession of it would not seem supernatural. It must also be familiar, or the proof could not be addressed to the multitude. Now if, on these premises, we compare the several kinds of knowledge which might be made the subject of such a supernatural communication, we shall see reason to acknowledge the proof of a Divine wisdom in the selection actually made. "A knowledge of the abstract principles of mathematical or physical science, or of the laws of the material world, could never be estimated or understood by the mass of mankind. None but philosophers, and hardly those, could receive the force of a proof so constituted. In like manner, a knowledge of past events could not be generally ascertained to be true. Nor could a supernatural knowledge of present transactions, remote in place, afford the means of a ready, an unambiguous conviction. The know-oppressed, or hurried, but rather strengthened ledge of the future is indeed peculiarly adapted to compel a conviction of a Divine interposition; and this means has, in fact, been abundantly employed in constructing the proof of the truth of religion. But this evidence is one which, in its nature, must be kept in store for the benefit of after-times.

"What remains, then, but the knowledge of living languages, for the accomplishment of the specific purpose in view?-A language is a vast collection of particular and definite facts; and such a knowledge of it as is implied in the ability to maintain fluent discourse, intelligible to natives, is not a vague possession of indistinct notions, but a firin hold of five times ten thousand exact recollections. A living language is, moreover, a collection of particular facts, familiarly known to the mass of the people. So that a pretension to speak it may be judged of as competently by an artizan as by a scholar: indeed, nothing less than a vernacular use of his native tongue would gain the ear of an uneducated person. Again; a familiar and available knowledge of a foreign language is an acquirement in a high degree laborious and difficult to most men;-an acquirement which few adults make with entire success-which many could never make; and one which, in the progress of it, can neither be well hurried nor hidden. The existence, therefore, of an opulent profusion of this peculiar species of knowledge among the members of a promiscuous association, most of whom were manifestly destitute of those powers of mind and of those sedulous habits which would be indispensable even to a much inferior degree of proficiency, exhibited the highest imaginable attestation of a supernatural agency.

"The instantaneous recollection and due collocation of words in common discourse, is an Rel. Mag.-No. 6.

in its throne and rule by the accumulation of affairs-calmly, yet with the rapidity of the lightning flash, calls up the obscurest particle, from the mingled millions-marshals its various hosts, and orders the array of speech, at the command of faculties still higher in dignity than itself. Such are the powers of the human mind-such, rather let us say, is the excellent workmanship of God!

"Yet the labour of years is ordinarily required to furnish the mind with new sets of signs. Nor, indeed, is every mind naturally susceptible of this elaborated repletion of its machinery. But here we have a record of unquestioned genuineness, and bearing every possible mark of authenticity, in which it is affirmed that many of the members of an association, gathered chiefly from the lower classes possessed this rare command of various tongues. We hear them calmly instructed in the right use of the amazing endowment; and the writer, not boastful of the possession in himself, or in the sect of which he was a leader, enforces rather the dictates of true wisdom, and recommends his argument as much by plain good sense as by shining eloquence. Let these facts, so marvellous, yet so consistent, be explained, if they may, on any supposition which excludes the immediate agency of God." pp. 192-198.

We close this valuable and useful work with the highest satisfaction at its contents, and with a strong recommendation of it to the attention of our readers. If it have any faults, they are to be found in the too slight connection which the author has made between his theorem and his practical problem; or rather, in his not having more distinctly and strongly shown the validity of his reasoning in application to the subject of Christian evidence. The same fault may be found with some of the sub4 A

sequent chapters of the work; in which, beautiful as are the illustrations and forcible the arguments, they are not presented to the mind of an ordinary reader with that closeness of application which shows him the horns of the dilemma, and compels his assent to the truth.

Let the Materialist come forth with his prob lenis and his experiments, with his mastery over forms and elements, and his laws and principles: we dare meet him with his own weapons, and contend with him in his own sphere, let him narrow it as he will. Let the Sceptic, who finds his wisdom in doubting, bold out our Scriptures as the least credible of all histories: we are ready to argue with him on grounds which he dares not, for his own con

Of the subject, in general, of which Mr. Taylor has treated, we have already spoken; and we think ourselves particularly fortunate in having been again able to present to our readers a work of such value on Christian evi-sistency's sake, refuse. Let the Moralist heap dence. In our last Number we reviewed a publication on the same important branch of theological study*, taken in a different point of view, and meeting objections of a different class. In our notice of the present work we have had to praise the same vigour of thought which distinguishes the essay of Mr. Hampden, and the same acuteness in examining the historical evidence which that gentleman displayed in the investigation of religious analogies.

There is yet another branch of Christian evidence which we should rejoice to see treated, but the undertaking would require the grasp of a mighty intellect, and the elevation of the devoutest spirit-we mean, the testimonies adducible in proof of Christianity from the nature of man himself, in the fearfulness and wonders of his being, and in the mighty mysteries which are developed by every thought he conceives, by every action he purposes, and even by the very throbbings of his heart. We are no advocates of Aristotelian subtleties; we are no friends of German divinity: we would noither tolerate the mystics of the last century, nor the schoolmen of the middle ages, could they even solve us their fantastic problems: but we would advance, by all means in our power, that study of human nature, that diving into the deep places of the heart, that calling up of the spirit from its retirements, and that unfolding of the hundred times folded mantle in which we are bound up, which is the higher and sublimer part of that science which the wise old heathen taught, when he said Ivæ CAUTOV. The more we have had occasion to think on this subject, the more we are convinced, that, without laying aside one atom of Christian simplicity, the most extensive view of our human nature might be taken, in all its multiplied dependencies and connexions; and from which an argument of the most powerful description might be drawn, in answer to the perverse reasonings of falsely named philosophers. But, as we cannot at present pursue this subject farther, let us observe, in conclusion, that the investigation of this branch of evidence would be only particularly useful to minds of a certain class, and requiring a particular method of conviction. To all, however, whose hope and rejoicing are founded on the Gospel, it is matter of deep and earnest delight to know, that, whether or not they want other proof of its truth than the spirit within them gives; whether they are confirmed or unconfirmed in their belief, there is no want of proofs, whatever doubts may arise; no want of answers, whatever questionings may be started.

*Hampden on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity.

up gems from the old rich treasuries of his lore in the ancient East or philosophizing Greece, and we will take, from the simple casket that the Galilean peasants have left us, pearls that will surpass his costliest jewels. Or, lastly, let the Philosopher of a nobler rank, the speculator on the harmonizing principles of our being, meet us with his high and subtle questions: there is no mountain-top of science, no spot in the wide firmament of thought, to which the mind of man may soar, where the Christian scheme will not be found the development of the sublimest mysteries.

Such is our estimate of the resources we have to prove the truth of our faith; and we trust that every day will bring forth some practical exemplification of our remarks.

From the Assistant of Education.

JOY.

WHO sings of joy-who bids the golden
strings

Wake to the waving of her bounding wings-
Joy took her flight from earth when Adam fell,
And where can Joy with Adam's children
dwell?

Her home is heaven; for her Lord is there;

Upon whose eye, whose footstep she attends,
Lives in his smile, and where he condescends
To fix his palace, there doth Joy repair.
Yet earth has joys-so earth can testify:
By fancy pictured to the eager eye,
And in the ear of inexperience sung
With syren strains, and fascinating tongue;
But still evading the deluded mind,
Grasped, they dissolve, and leave no trace be-

hind:

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