labours at length comes forth in a work of finished execution, and becomes a permanent addition to the classic and literary wealth of the nation. It is not so often by flashes of inspiration, as by power and patience united, that works are reared and ripened for immortality. It is not in the hasty effervescence of a mind under sudden and sanguine excitement, that a service so precious to society is generally rendered. It is when a strong and at the same time a stedfast mind gives its collected energies to the task; and not only brings its own independent judgment, but, laboriously collecting the lights of past erudition, brings them also to bear on the subject of its investigations." A task like that which Dr. Chalmers has described, may be no herculean labour to a man of vigorous intellect, occupying the station of a Professor in one of the Northern Universities. There is assigned to him a single and well defined department of education; so that, by bringing his best energies to bear on one particular line of research, it may be presumed that the result of his investigations will entitle him to hold some rank among the luminaries of his age. Very different is the situation of a Tutor in Seminaries of the order with which the respected Author of these "Elements of Mental and Moral Science" stands connected. In the Theological Academy at Blackburn, as in other Dissenting Colleges for the education of young men with a view to the Christian Ministry, we presume that the entire burden of tuition devolves upon two, or, at the most, upon three tutors, who have usually, in addition to their college avocations, some engagements in pulpit, if not even in pastoral labours. It is not surprising then, that but few of them should have been contributors, by authorship to the progress either of physical or of intellectual science. Under these circumstances, we felt prepared to enter on the examination of Mr. Payne's volume, not with candour only, but with certain prepossessions in his favour. "The subsequent pages," says the Author, in his prefatory remarks, "owe their origin to the professional engagements of the Writer. Expected to impart instruction to the students committed to his care in the philosophy of the human mind, as well as on subjects strictly theological, he devoted all the time he could command, to the task of drawing up a course of lectures on the Elements of Mental and Moral Science, which should be made to combine, as far as he found it practicable, comprehension with brevity. His object was not originality, but usefulness; and whether he attained that end by presenting the statements of others, or what might be more properly denominated his own, was to him a matter of no importance whatever. He ventures to state, however, that the present work is not a mere compilation. He has endeavoured at least to think for himself; and though he has mainly adopted the views and the system of the late Dr. Thomas Brown, the attentive reader will perceive that he differs from that writer on several important points." These intimations of the Author in the outset of his work appear to us to be modest, manly, and ingenuous. No competent reader will peruse his volume, without soon acquiring and cherishing that respect for the Writer, which is inspired by the accumulating evidence presented, page after page, of a mind disci plined by habits of clear conception, of acute discrimination, of accurate definition, and of sound reasoning. A mind thus gifted and thus trained, must and will think for itself. Mr. Payne writes like a man who is at home in the investigations on which he enters, and who feels entitled, not only to indulge indepen dency of thought, but also to give expression to his sentiments in a tone of decision. We must confess, however, that we are not prepared to coincide with the Author in the extent either of admiration or of approbation, with which he so often introduces the name and the opinions of the late Dr. Thomas Brown. We would not say that Dr. Brown was too much of a poet to be a philosopher, but we do say that, in our opinion, there is too much poetry in his philosophy. After repeated perusals of his Lectures, we are quite incapable of asserting with his admirer, that his "poetry is invariably subordinated to the reasoning.' We think he frequently begins to embellish an opinion, by the aid of his splendid imagination, before he has fairly and fully presented it to the eye of the intellect. He often employs a diction which is rhetorical, rather than philosophical, and which is far more adapted to advocate a favourite theory, than to exhibit the process of an intellectual analysis. In the outlines of his system, and in the nomenclature he has adopted, he appears ambitious of a novelty in his statements, which is often productive of obscurity. But that which we most of all regret in the fascinating lectures of Dr. Brown, is the discordance of many of his ethical sentiments with the spirit and tener of Divine Revelation. We are not surprised that Mr. Payne, with all his admiration for his favourite Author, should feel compelled to say: "It pains me greatly to be obliged to differ so materially; but I am constrained to think that, on the subject of morals, he is less to be trusted as a guide, than on any other part of his course." Is he, we cannot but ask, to be, on this momentous subject, trusted at all? De not his reasonings evidently proceed on the supposition, that he is to endeavour to account for all the principles and all the susceptibilities which human nature, in its present state, develops, and for all the sufferings to which hu man nature, in its present state, is liable, death itself not excepted, without recognising the awful fact of man's degeneracy, or tracing to the real cause the physical evils which abound in our world? Does he not undertake to vindicate the goodness of the Deity, in the appointment of death, without any reference to the entrance or the existence of moral evil, by attempting to show that a succession of races of mortal men is productive of a greater amount of enjoyment, than the continuance of the same race in life and happiness? Can the same mind indulge in reasonings, and rest in conclusions such as these, and yet yield itself to the dictates, and embrace the disclosures of Revelation? To us it appears impossible; and if so, what must be the tendency of Dr. Brown's speculations on morals! But it is now incumbent on us to enter more particularly on an examination of the work before us. In an introductory chapter, Mr. Payne presents to the consideration of the reader, the inducements to enter on the study proposed, and exhibits briefly-perhaps too briefly-the bearing of mental philosophy on science in general, and its tendency to promote, in a very high degree, the most beneficial discipline of the mind. We fully concur with him in the opinion, that no studies can be better adapted to induce habits of accuracy and of energy, in the exercise of intellect, than the researches of mental science. In the second and third chapters, Mr. Payne points out the Object of Intellectual Science; the mode in which our inquiries should be conducted; and the true nature of the powers and susceptibilities of the mind. He very clearly and correctly states, that "the faculties of the mind, or its powers and susceptibilities, are not to be distinguished from the mind itself. The words denote the constitution it has received from its Creator, by which it is capable of existing in all those different states which form the consciousness of life. The states of thought and feeling, in which the mind is capable of existing, which constitute the phenomena of the mind-all, indeed, which can be known of the mind-are incalculable in point of number. Yet, the mind is not made up of parts; it cannot therefore consist of a number of separate susceptibilities. But, though simple and indivisible, it may be capable of producing and undergoing changes, which are not in their nature less different from each other, than are the circumstances in which they arise. We are not to conceive of the emotions of joy, sorrow, hope, fear, &c. as so many feelings laid up, so to speak, in the mind-feelings distinct from the mind: they are the mind itself, in different states, or affected in various ways. They only exist, accordingly, when they are felt." In the sixth chapter, Mr. Payne proceeds to the Analysis and Arrangement of the Mental Phenomena. We concur with him in the opinion, that the classification given by Dr. Reid, and in part adopted by Mr. Dugald Stewart, is far from accuracy. "Dissatisfied with all previous arrangements," says our author, "Dr. Brown presents us with one entirely original. The reader will observe, that it is in harmony with the leading principles of his system, viz. that the business of the intellectual philosopher is to analyse and classify the phenomena of mind; which phenomena are to be no otherwise regarded than as the mind itself in various states of thought and feeling." Of these leading principles, we have already expressed approbation, but we are not prepared to follow Mr. Payne's guide in his classification and designation of the mental phenomena. "Of these states or affections of mind, when we consider them in all their variety, there is one physical distinction that cannot fail to strike us. Some of them arise in consequence of the operation of external things; the others, in consequence of mere previous feelings of the mind itself. In this difference, then, of their antecedents, (i. e. as being external or internal.) we have a ground of primary division. The Now it might be shown, that Emotions, We should have been greatly surprised if Mr. Payne had not pointed out the inaccuracy of Dr. Brown's language. Justice requires us to notice his animadversion. "I would not be understood as expressing full approbation of the phraseology of the first general division, viz. the external affections of the mind. I am well aware that the concluding words will sufficiently indicate, to those who are accustomed to think on such subjects, that the adjective external is merely intended to suggest that the cause of these affections is out of the mind. It may, however, be misunderstood. It may lead some to imagine, that there are affections which are not in the mind, &c. I am disposed to regret that some other mode of designation was not employed by this writer; yet, as the matter is of subordinate importance, and as a uniform nomenclature in intellectual science, as well as in physical, is very desirable, it is not my intention to deviate from it in the subsequent discussions." This determination on the part of Mr. Payne, we cannot but regret. We readily admit the desirableness of a uniform nomenclature, but we should deprecate the adoption of Dr. Brown's, were it not for the conviction we feel, that this is unnecessary, and that there danger whatever of its being generally approved. no Having arrived at the sixth chapter, Mr. Payne appears to abandon the division of his have altered his plan of arrangement, after the work into chapters. We presume he must first part of his volume was in print. This, although not very important, produces a want of symmetry in the general structure of the book. Much valuable information and able discussion will be found in our author's "General "Classification of our Sensations," according Remarks concerning Sensation;" and in his to the organs through which they are received. He then proceeds to the Second General Di Vision-the INTERNAL AFFECTIONS. Adopting | country and age would have had another name Dr. Brown's arrangement, he subdivides these into the two orders of INTELLECTUAL STATES OF MIND and EMOTIONS. All the varieties of the Intellectual states of mind, he refers to two classes; viz. Simple suggestions and Relative suggestions. This part of the work before us is in a high degree interesting and important: at the same time, we feel it to be unnecessary to attempt a particular analysis of its trains of thought, as it professedly, though ably, follows the guidance of Dr. Brown. After stating, according to Dr. Brown's theory, the primary and the secondary laws of suggestion, Mr. Payne has the following passage, which we give to our readers as a pleasurable relief from the perusal of our general strictures, and as a favourable specimen of the author's style. "The general power of suggestion itself may be more vigorous in one mind than in another; or there may be, in different minds, original tendencies to different species of suggestions. to transmit to the reverence and the emulation of the ages that are to follow.'" The illustration is interesting, and the pas sage is eloquent; but is Dr. Brown correct in representing memory as nothing more than a species of suggestion, and therefore as having no claim to rank among the simple and original faculties of the mind? Mr. Payne thinks that he is, and maintains, that "memory is not a distinct power, but conception, i. e. suggestion, co-existing with the notion of time." The remembrance," he affirms, "of a past event, is the notion or conception of that event, as a past event; or in other words, it is the notion, combined with a feeling, that it stands in the relation of priority to our present consciousness." Now we confess that this analysis is not, in our estimation, satisfactory. To say nothing of the singular use of the word “feeling," and the phrase "feeling of a relation," which Dr. Brown so often employs, the question may be asked, how is it to be accounted for, that a conception of a past event, or a past impression, arises in the mind, and is recognised by the mind as one, not now awakened for the first time, but only revived? And the right answer, we conceive, must be, that the Author of our being has endowed us with a faculty for that express purpose, to which distinct faculty we are accustomed to give the name of Memory. The mere principle of suggestion does not appear to us available for the purpose to which it is applied. Too much is ascribed to its operation. It is true, that one thought may sug gest another thought to an indefinite extent; but if, to the energy of the suggesting princi ple, there be ascribed the revival of the past, and its recognition as the past, then we think, that there is attributed to the principle of suggestion that which it cannot achieve-that which has its own characteristic peculiaritythat which is one of the most wondrous of all the operations of the human mind—that which, in short, we usually understand by memory. "To illustrate this subject, let us suppose, that, in three individuals, the principle of suggestion exhibits the following varieties. To the mind of the first, the objects which he beholds habitually suggest resembling objects; to that of the second, contrary or contrasted objects; to that of the third, contiguous objects. The splendid imagery of the poet is built upon analogy-upon the shadowy resemblances of objects to each other, or rather upon their tendency to awaken similar emotions. There is thus an analogy between a veteran chief, to whom the remembrance only of glory remains, and a majestic oak, stripped by age of its. verdure; the sight of one may therefore recall the other. But if there be not a natural tendency to suggestions of analogy, or if the mind of an observer be dull and cold,-the two objects, in consequence of the faintness of the resembling and connecting emotion which they produce, will not be likely to suggest each other. In order to the suggestion, in this case, it would be necessary, that some master mind should have previously placed them before his Mr. Payne distributes emotions into three view in the relation of contiguity; and then classes: those which are immediate, those they will of course, recall each other by the which are retrospective, and those which are third law of suggestion. In the former case, prospective. To the first class are referred the the man is a genius; in the latter, a mere imi-emotions awakened by the pleasures of taste, tator. An equal variety and beauty of imagery may flow from the pen of an inferior poet; but his splendid figures are not the creations of his own mind; i. e. they are not the suggestions of analogy, but of contiguity. Copious readings and a retentive memory,' says Dr. Brown, may give to an individual of very humble talent, a greater profusion of splendid images than existed in any one of the individual minds on whose sublime conceptions he has dwelt, till they have become, in one sense of the word, his own. If half the conceptions which are stored in his mind, and which rise in it now in its trains of thought, by simple suggestion, as readily as they arose in like manner, in accordance with some train of thought in the mind of their original authors, had but risen by the suggestion of analogy, as they now arise by the suggestion of former proximity; what we call memory, which is, in truth, only the same suggestion in different circumstances, would have been fancy, or genius; and his those which arise from moral approbation and disapprobation-from love and hatred-from sympathy-from pride and humility. To the class of retrospective emotions are assigned, such as arise from anger-gratitude-regret and gladness-remorse and self-approbation. It is on the last of these only, that our limits will allow us to offer any strictures. Mr. Payne considers Conscience as the susceptibility of experiencing those emotions of approbation, or disapprobation and condemnation, which are awakened by a retrospect of the moral demerit, or the moral excellence, of our own con duct." "By an original law of the mind, self-approbation, or self-condemnation, arises, as an individual conceives himself innocent or guilty, whether that conviction be well or ill founded. This view of the nature of conscience is free, it is imagined, from the objections which are urged against the common statements in regard to it. It does not identify it with the judgment, nor does it render it independent of the judgment. It accounts for the diversity of its operations, and it confines its influence to ourselves." This representation of conscience appears to us to be defective, rather than inaccurate. It does not seem objectionable as far as it goes; but it does not, in our view, go far enough. It does not extend to a full analysis of those operations and emotions which are usually ascribed to conscience. The "susceptibility" of which Mr. Payne speaks, is, we conceive, only one of the elements which enter into its nature, and one which is roused to emotion by certain intellectual decisions. Now, these decisions obviously proceed on some principles or notions of merit or demerit, derived either from reason or from revelation. There is a comparison (frequently effected, indeed, with almost instantaneous promptitude) between some acknowledged standard of rectitude and our own conduct; and the result of that comparison is, first, a decision, either acquitting or condemning, and then, a correspondent emotion pleasurable or painful, consequent on that decision. That comparison and that decision we ascribe to the judging faculty; for, by the faculty of judgment, we understand the power by which we compare together our ideas, and ascertain their agreements or their differences. To this faculty we attribute all the decisions of the mind, whether on questions of morals or questions of facts, or any other questions on which the mind may employ its energies. We do not, indeed, "identify the judgment with the conscience," because we regard the decisions of the judgment as constituting only a part of the operations of conscience; neither can we, with Mr. Payne, identify conscience with the " susceptibility" of certain emotions, because we regard that susceptibility as constituting only a part of that complexity and combination to which we give the name of conscience. The latter part of this able work, consisting of about eighty pages, is an exhibition of the ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE. For this province of inquiry, we regard our author as highly gifted; and we should have considered his work as still more valuable, had he devoted an ampler proportion of his volume to ethical discussions. The reasons for a conciseness on this part of his subject, such as the title of the book scarcely prepared us to expect, are thus stated in the close of the preface. "A regard to brevity has prevented the author's enlarging on some points upon which he wished to enter more fully. He deemed it, on various accounts, inexpedient, that the work should extend beyond one volume. Should it happen to obtain so much favour from the public, as to render a second edition necessary, he has it in contemplation to expand considerably that part which treats on Moral Science." We sincerely hope, and even with no small confidence expect, that such a desirable necessity will arise out of the extensive circulation of the present edition. The perspicacity of the author's mind, his evident familiarity with ethical researches, and his just conceptions of the homage to be paid to Divine Revelation, inspire us with no ordinary confidence. He even ventures, in this part of his work, not only to differ in opinion from Dr. Brown, (as, indeed, he never hesitates to do, if his judg ment dictate a variation,) but altogether to abandon his guidance; and we cannot but regard the exposure of the fallacy of Dr. Brown's ethical reasonings, as among the most valuable and important of the services which Mr. Payne has rendered to the cause of truth. He justly observes, that "Dr. Brown's theory of morals proceeds on a practical forgetfulness of the distinction which exists, as he himself admits, between what is, and what ought to be, in human conduct.-We must either admit that every state of mind, of every human being, is rightand right because it exists;-or that we must seek for some moral rule, by which to try its rectitude. Now Dr. Brown places that standard, not in the law of God, but in the mind itself. Those actions and affections which excite certain emotions of approbation, are right, and right on that account. Taking this for granted, the system supplies us with no certain measure of the rectitude of any action, or of any affection of mind whatever. The whole system of morals is thus involved in doubt and uncertainty." We will only add a few sentences, which exhibit the leading views which Mr. Payne himself entertains and enforces, and of which we wish to express entire and unqualified approbation. "Our existence as creatures is to be ascribed to the mere good pleasure of God. The relations which bind society together, depend entirely upon the sovereign will of Him who gave us our being; but the conduct to which these relations oblige us, is by no means arbitrary. Having determined to constitute the relations, He could not but enjoin upon us the conduct which His word prescribes;-He could not but fail to command us to love and obey Him.Since the relations we sustain were constituted by God, since he is the Judge of the affections and conduct which harmonize with these relations, that which appears right to Him, being right on that account-Rectitude may be regarded as conformity to the moral nature of God, the ultimate standard of Virtue.-Now, we know nothing of God but what he has revealed to us; that Revelation, then, must be the standard of rectitude, by exhibiting to us his perfect and glorious nature. And if the Bible present us with a more full development of the Divine character than the external and visible universe, it must be a more perfect criterion of rectitude.-It must demand and deserve the most implicit obedience. I agree with Dr. Chalmers in thinking that the question is not What thinkest thou? but, How readest thou?'-The Divine authority of the Bible being established, the sole office of reason is, to ascertain the meaning of its communica tions; and not sit in judgment upon the reasonableness of those doctrines which are clearly shown to constitute integral parts of that communication.-I cannot bring myself to oppose formally and at length, the notion that expediency is the standard of rectitude. That a Christian Moralist-a man who professes to believe that the Bible is a revelation from God; or, in other words, that He has condescended to teach us, in his word, what is truth and duty should depart from this rule, and adopt that of expediency, or any other, in preference to it, is to me, I acknowledge, passing strange." As a whole, we strongly recommend this work to the attention of our readers. It contains more valuable information, more correct sentiment, more clear, condensed, and conclusive reasoning, on the subjects of mental and moral science, than any single volume we ever perused. Ungentle hearts, and strangers rude, We recommend it especially to theological THIS volume is in part a republication of the Author's earlier compositions in verse, comprising all that he deems worth reprinting. Of these, the leading piece is the autumnal Excursion, which gave its title to the former volume, and of which, nine years ago, we made a favourable report, as the most pleasing descriptive poem that had appeared since Leyden's Scenes of Infancy. The scene of the excursion is laid in "The scented heath, the sheafy vale, The hills and streams of Teviotdale;"— the haunts where the Author's earliest "life and loveliest hopes were nursed." The poem is modestly styled "a rhyming epistle;" and it is all the better for being so. It has the ease, and flow, and warmth of epistolary composition, combined with the grace and melody of verse. Delicacy, rather than force, tenderness and elegance, rather than brilliancy, together with an unaffected simplicity, characterize the attempt to recall and picture "The heaths which once his fathers trod, Amidst the wild to worship God; The tales which fired his boyish eye With patriot feelings, proud and high; The sacred Sabbath's mild repose; The social evening's saintly close, When ancient Zion's solemn song Arose the lonely banks among; The music of the mountain rills; The moonlight sleeping on the hills; The STARRY SCRIPTURES of the sky, By God's own finger graved on high On Heaven's expanded scroll-whose To every tribe doth knowledge teach,When silent Night unlocks the seals, And to forgetful Man reveals The wonders of eternal might, In living lines of glorious light!" * "Now scatter'd far the smiling flowers That grew around these rustic bowers: speech -O, lovely was the blest control, Or kindling 'midst the mountain storm,- I dreamt not of the workings deep Long from those native haunts estranged, p. 31-34. Since the date of this poem, the Author's "bodings" have been fully realized; and the second part of his volume consists of poems written in South Africa. The landscape is now changed indeed, and the Author's descriptive powers are exercised upon scenes till now unvisited by the muse, unseen by poet's eye. Campbell (but not Thomas Campbell), Latrobe and Burchell, Dr. Philip and Mr. Thompson, have made us acquainted with the general character of South African scenery: it has been reserved for Mr. Pringle to give us, not a bird's eye, but a bard's eye view of the wild desert, and to make its barren wilds tributary to the fancy. We do not much like the rough gallop of the following lines, but we forgive the measure for the sake of the poetry, as we should do a jolting road leading through a beautiful country "Afar in the Desert I love to ride, With the silent Bush-boy alone by my side: |