Revisiting the Yom Kippur WarP.R. Kumaraswamy Routledge, 11 de gen. 2013 - 256 pàgines Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history. |
Des de l'interior del llibre
Pàgina 1
... initial surprises and setbacks Israel had bounced back, stopped the Arab offensive, repulsed some enemy advances and reversed the course of the battle. If the Arab military offensive was motivated by a desire to change the status quo in ...
... initial surprises and setbacks Israel had bounced back, stopped the Arab offensive, repulsed some enemy advances and reversed the course of the battle. If the Arab military offensive was motivated by a desire to change the status quo in ...
Pàgina 2
... initial delay could not diminish the military value and political significance of the American airlift. There are thus sufficient reasons to recall the war with 'satisfaction and pride'. As Charles Liebman observed, portraying the Yom ...
... initial delay could not diminish the military value and political significance of the American airlift. There are thus sufficient reasons to recall the war with 'satisfaction and pride'. As Charles Liebman observed, portraying the Yom ...
Pàgina 6
... initial delays in an American airlift remains inconclusive. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was often seen as the prime culprit.10 In this volume Simcha Dinitz, Golda Meir's close confidant and Israel's ambassador in Washington ...
... initial delays in an American airlift remains inconclusive. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was often seen as the prime culprit.10 In this volume Simcha Dinitz, Golda Meir's close confidant and Israel's ambassador in Washington ...
Pàgina 9
... initial request was made shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the request was not approved, let alone implemented. Faced with military reversals, the cabinet 'decision' was seen as a pressure tactic, if not blackmail, to expedite ...
... initial request was made shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the request was not approved, let alone implemented. Faced with military reversals, the cabinet 'decision' was seen as a pressure tactic, if not blackmail, to expedite ...
Pàgina 38
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Continguts
1 | |
11 | |
Aims Coherence and GainDistribution | 36 |
The Lessons of the 1973 War | 70 |
Diplomacy of War and Peace | 104 |
The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War | 127 |
The Israeli Political Elites and the 1973 War | 153 |
The Domestic Fallout of the Yom Kippur Wa | 177 |
Perception Image Formation and Coping in the PreCrisis Stage of the Yom Kippur War | 195 |
New Lessons | 221 |
Abstracts | 238 |
Index | 242 |
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according Agranat Commission air force aircraft airlift alert AMAN AMAN’s American Arab Arab-Israeli Asad attack Aviv Bar-Lev Bartov battle bloc Brezhnev Cairo cease-fire Chief of Staff coalition Command conception conflict Dado decision decision-makers détente diplomacy economic Egypt Egypt and Syria Egyptian Elazar Eli Zeira elite emergency enemy failure front Golan Heights Golda Meir ground forces Harb October Hebrew Heikal Ibid IDF’s influence initial intelligence inter-Arab Israel Israel Air Force Israeli society Israelyan Jerusalem Jordan Kissinger leaders leadership Meir’s Middle East military Minister of Defence missiles Moscow Moshe Dayan Nasser Nixon nuclear offensive operational Palestinian parties peace plans political possible President Prime Minister Rabin reflected reservists Resolution role Sadat September Shazly Sinai situation Six Day War Soviet Union strategic Suez Canal surprise Syrian Tel Aviv territories Third Army threat troops United warning Washington Yitzhak Rabin Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War Zeira