Revisiting the Yom Kippur WarP.R. Kumaraswamy Routledge, 11 de gen. 2013 - 256 pàgines Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history. |
Des de l'interior del llibre
Pàgina 1
... enemy advances and reversed the course of the battle. If the Arab military offensive was motivated by a desire to change the status quo in Sinai or on the Golan Heights, Israel had throttled them. The October 1973 cease-fire lines ...
... enemy advances and reversed the course of the battle. If the Arab military offensive was motivated by a desire to change the status quo in Sinai or on the Golan Heights, Israel had throttled them. The October 1973 cease-fire lines ...
Pàgina 3
... enemy air and ground forces within the first 48 hours and was able to capture a territory four times its pre-1967 size. The security establishment was convinced that the Arab powers, especially Egypt, were incapable of launching war and ...
... enemy air and ground forces within the first 48 hours and was able to capture a territory four times its pre-1967 size. The security establishment was convinced that the Arab powers, especially Egypt, were incapable of launching war and ...
Pàgina 4
... enemy. The possibility of Israel being taken by surprise was not considered seriously. In the words of one former intelligence official: 'You cannot suspect a stupid enemy of deceiving you who are smarter, because the mere fact that he ...
... enemy. The possibility of Israel being taken by surprise was not considered seriously. In the words of one former intelligence official: 'You cannot suspect a stupid enemy of deceiving you who are smarter, because the mere fact that he ...
Pàgina 5
... enemy territory and away from lsrael's population centres. Even the possession of a vast area following the 1967 war and the need to defend so many strategic points and geographical areas did not basically dilute this desire and ...
... enemy territory and away from lsrael's population centres. Even the possession of a vast area following the 1967 war and the need to defend so many strategic points and geographical areas did not basically dilute this desire and ...
Pàgina 8
... enemy does not have the capability or the intent to go to War, then you do not look for the reason Why there was no ... enemy forces first in the Egyptian front and later in the Syrian front. However, because of inefficient and ...
... enemy does not have the capability or the intent to go to War, then you do not look for the reason Why there was no ... enemy forces first in the Egyptian front and later in the Syrian front. However, because of inefficient and ...
Continguts
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11 | |
Aims Coherence and GainDistribution | 36 |
The Lessons of the 1973 War | 70 |
Diplomacy of War and Peace | 104 |
The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War | 127 |
The Israeli Political Elites and the 1973 War | 153 |
The Domestic Fallout of the Yom Kippur Wa | 177 |
Perception Image Formation and Coping in the PreCrisis Stage of the Yom Kippur War | 195 |
New Lessons | 221 |
Abstracts | 238 |
Index | 242 |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
Frases i termes més freqüents
according Agranat Commission air force aircraft airlift alert AMAN AMAN’s American Arab Arab-Israeli Asad attack Aviv Bar-Lev Bartov battle bloc Brezhnev Cairo cease-fire Chief of Staff coalition Command conception conflict Dado decision decision-makers détente diplomacy economic Egypt Egypt and Syria Egyptian Elazar Eli Zeira elite emergency enemy failure front Golan Heights Golda Meir ground forces Harb October Hebrew Heikal Ibid IDF’s influence initial intelligence inter-Arab Israel Israel Air Force Israeli society Israelyan Jerusalem Jordan Kissinger leaders leadership Meir’s Middle East military Minister of Defence missiles Moscow Moshe Dayan Nasser Nixon nuclear offensive operational Palestinian parties peace plans political possible President Prime Minister Rabin reflected reservists Resolution role Sadat September Shazly Sinai situation Six Day War Soviet Union strategic Suez Canal surprise Syrian Tel Aviv territories Third Army threat troops United warning Washington Yitzhak Rabin Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War Zeira