Revisiting the Yom Kippur WarP.R. Kumaraswamy Routledge, 11 de gen. 2013 - 256 pàgines Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history. |
Des de l'interior del llibre
Resultats 1 - 5 de 46.
Pàgina 3
... ground forces within the first 48 hours and was able to capture a territory four times its pre-1967 size. The security establishment was convinced that the Arab powers, especially Egypt, were incapable of launching war and would ...
... ground forces within the first 48 hours and was able to capture a territory four times its pre-1967 size. The security establishment was convinced that the Arab powers, especially Egypt, were incapable of launching war and would ...
Pàgina 6
... military situation on the ground. During the month-long operation, Israel received nearly 24,000 tons of arms, ammunition, tanks, missiles, howitzers, and a host of other noncombatant logistics. Continuing even after cease-fire came to ...
... military situation on the ground. During the month-long operation, Israel received nearly 24,000 tons of arms, ammunition, tanks, missiles, howitzers, and a host of other noncombatant logistics. Continuing even after cease-fire came to ...
Pàgina 15
... ground forces were on a fifty per cent alert and their air force and ground forces had taken up combat positions. The source quoted many Syrian officers who believed 'that this time it will be a war and not just a clash'. Nevertheless ...
... ground forces were on a fifty per cent alert and their air force and ground forces had taken up combat positions. The source quoted many Syrian officers who believed 'that this time it will be a war and not just a clash'. Nevertheless ...
Pàgina 18
... force, navy, anti-aircraft units, and part of the ground forces had been raised. Its analysts had various explanations for these moves: fear of Israeli aggression following the Syrian-Israeli air battle of 13 September; standard ...
... force, navy, anti-aircraft units, and part of the ground forces had been raised. Its analysts had various explanations for these moves: fear of Israeli aggression following the Syrian-Israeli air battle of 13 September; standard ...
Pàgina 41
Heu assolit el vostre límit de visualització per a aquest llibre.
Heu assolit el vostre límit de visualització per a aquest llibre.
Continguts
1 | |
11 | |
Aims Coherence and GainDistribution | 36 |
The Lessons of the 1973 War | 70 |
Diplomacy of War and Peace | 104 |
The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War | 127 |
The Israeli Political Elites and the 1973 War | 153 |
The Domestic Fallout of the Yom Kippur Wa | 177 |
Perception Image Formation and Coping in the PreCrisis Stage of the Yom Kippur War | 195 |
New Lessons | 221 |
Abstracts | 238 |
Index | 242 |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
Frases i termes més freqüents
according Agranat Commission air force aircraft airlift alert AMAN AMAN’s American Arab Arab-Israeli Asad attack Aviv Bar-Lev Bartov battle bloc Brezhnev Cairo cease-fire Chief of Staff coalition Command conception conflict Dado decision decision-makers détente diplomacy economic Egypt Egypt and Syria Egyptian Elazar Eli Zeira elite emergency enemy failure front Golan Heights Golda Meir ground forces Harb October Hebrew Heikal Ibid IDF’s influence initial intelligence inter-Arab Israel Israel Air Force Israeli society Israelyan Jerusalem Jordan Kissinger leaders leadership Meir’s Middle East military Minister of Defence missiles Moscow Moshe Dayan Nasser Nixon nuclear offensive operational Palestinian parties peace plans political possible President Prime Minister Rabin reflected reservists Resolution role Sadat September Shazly Sinai situation Six Day War Soviet Union strategic Suez Canal surprise Syrian Tel Aviv territories Third Army threat troops United warning Washington Yitzhak Rabin Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War Zeira