Revisiting the Yom Kippur WarP.R. Kumaraswamy Routledge, 11 de gen. 2013 - 256 pàgines Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history. |
Des de l'interior del llibre
Resultats 1 - 5 de 26.
Pàgina 6
... AMAN, one cannot ignore that Prime Minister Meir's cabinet had as many as four former generals and chiefs of staff and none of them differed with AMAN's assessment of low probabilities of a war.11 As Gabriel Sheffer analyses, the Mapai ...
... AMAN, one cannot ignore that Prime Minister Meir's cabinet had as many as four former generals and chiefs of staff and none of them differed with AMAN's assessment of low probabilities of a war.11 As Gabriel Sheffer analyses, the Mapai ...
Pàgina 7
... AMAN's inability to read the April-May noises, camouflaged the Egyptian intentions and planning. Following a few false alarms in early 1973, the Egyptian military build up in September was dismissed as part Introduction 7.
... AMAN's inability to read the April-May noises, camouflaged the Egyptian intentions and planning. Following a few false alarms in early 1973, the Egyptian military build up in September was dismissed as part Introduction 7.
Pàgina 8
... AMAN enjoyed the complete monopoly over the flow of information and assessments. This monopoly coupled with the ... AMAN's position. Following reports of a combined Egyptian-Syrian military build up, Chief of Staff Elazar ordered a ...
... AMAN enjoyed the complete monopoly over the flow of information and assessments. This monopoly coupled with the ... AMAN's position. Following reports of a combined Egyptian-Syrian military build up, Chief of Staff Elazar ordered a ...
Pàgina 12
P.R. Kumaraswamy. Israel's intelligence agencies, primarily Military Intelligence (AMAN), closely followed these ... AMAN's failure to provide the warning it was committed to provide is unique, principally because of the immense ...
P.R. Kumaraswamy. Israel's intelligence agencies, primarily Military Intelligence (AMAN), closely followed these ... AMAN's failure to provide the warning it was committed to provide is unique, principally because of the immense ...
Pàgina 13
... AMAN's 1972 report.H In addition to providing Egypt's war plan, AMAN obtained and distributed the Syrian war plan as well about six months before the war.12 Israel was well aware of Egypt's need to be able to counter IAF deep ...
... AMAN's 1972 report.H In addition to providing Egypt's war plan, AMAN obtained and distributed the Syrian war plan as well about six months before the war.12 Israel was well aware of Egypt's need to be able to counter IAF deep ...
Continguts
1 | |
11 | |
Aims Coherence and GainDistribution | 36 |
The Lessons of the 1973 War | 70 |
Diplomacy of War and Peace | 104 |
The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War | 127 |
The Israeli Political Elites and the 1973 War | 153 |
The Domestic Fallout of the Yom Kippur Wa | 177 |
Perception Image Formation and Coping in the PreCrisis Stage of the Yom Kippur War | 195 |
New Lessons | 221 |
Abstracts | 238 |
Index | 242 |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
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according Agranat Commission air force aircraft airlift alert AMAN AMAN’s American Arab Arab-Israeli Asad attack Aviv Bar-Lev Bartov battle bloc Brezhnev Cairo cease-fire Chief of Staff coalition Command conception conflict Dado decision decision-makers détente diplomacy economic Egypt Egypt and Syria Egyptian Elazar Eli Zeira elite emergency enemy failure front Golan Heights Golda Meir ground forces Harb October Hebrew Heikal Ibid IDF’s influence initial intelligence inter-Arab Israel Israel Air Force Israeli society Israelyan Jerusalem Jordan Kissinger leaders leadership Meir’s Middle East military Minister of Defence missiles Moscow Moshe Dayan Nasser Nixon nuclear offensive operational Palestinian parties peace plans political possible President Prime Minister Rabin reflected reservists Resolution role Sadat September Shazly Sinai situation Six Day War Soviet Union strategic Suez Canal surprise Syrian Tel Aviv territories Third Army threat troops United warning Washington Yitzhak Rabin Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War Zeira