The Belgians, finding themselves opposed by inferior troops, seized the opportunity to adopt a more active attitude; and reconnaissances which were made in some force resulted in minor encounters in various localities. The retreat of the enemy from the Marne was the signal for a vigorous offensive, which threw the Germans back to Louvain, and seriously threatened the railway, which was one of their chief lines of supply. This display of activity proved that the Belgian army was not a negligible quantity; and, when the line of battle in France began to approach the Belgian frontier, the necessity of ridding themselves of the menace to their right flank became evident to the Germans. The troops in Belgium were rapidly reinforced; the heavy siege artillery, of which Austrian howitzers formed part, was brought up; and the place fell after ten days' attack, the details of which need not be described.

The fall of Antwerp was a serious loss to the Allies, because it deprived them of the co-operation of the Belgian army against the German flank and rear during the subsequent operations. Except for immunity from these attacks, it conferred no immediate material advantage on the Germans. Owing to its peculiar situation it cannot be used as a base for naval operations at any time without violating the neutrality of Holland, which holds the approach from the sea. It is not, indeed, to be supposed that the Germans would hesitate to use the neutral waters of the Scheldt if it suited their purpose to do so; but they are unlikely to provoke the hostility of the Dutch while their hands are fully occupied with the Allied army in the west and with Russia in the east. The moral advantage resulting from the possession of Belgium's last stronghold was, however, considerable. It made their military occupation of the country effective; and it gave them, prospectively, the coveted 'window on the sea,' which they hope to retain till the conclusion of the war, and to make the base of further conquests in the future if the result of the present war should not satisfy all their ambitions.

The downfall of cherished ideas is apt to cause a reaction. The speedy destruction of the modern forts which formed the outer defences of Antwerp, and which

were generally believed to be proof against artillery, succeeding similar experiences at Liège, Namur, and Maubeuge, has caused popular opinion to swing to the opposite extreme, and to suppose that the days of permanent fortifications are ended. This sudden revulsion of opinion seems premature. The triumph of the modern howitzer over the armoured fort must be regarded as an episode in the long contest for supremacy between guns and armour. Each improvement in guns has necessitated a corresponding advance in protective structures; and hitherto-on land at least-the gun has always come out second-best. At sea the conditions are different. There is a limit to the size of ships, and, consequently, to the combined weight of guns and armour that can be kept afloat. The result has been that the gun has emerged triumphant, because victory can be won only by offensive action; and a ship which, though able to resist the enemy's shells, could not carry guns to penetrate his armour would be useless in war. On land the weight of defensive structures is not so rigidly restricted; and the variety of materials that might be used is only limited by the power of invention. of invention. On the other hand, the weight of the gun must be within the capacity of the existing means of transport under service conditions. The 28 cm. Austrian howitzer owes its presence in the field to the invention of motor transport, and in weight it has probably reached the practicable limit. It also needs a concrete platform which takes long to construct; and its immobility debars its use in positions where it would be liable to capture. The 42 cm. German howitzer is permanently mounted on a railway truck of special design; and its sphere of action is, therefore, confined to existing railway systems of standard gauge."

There are other considerations which must be borne

* A description of the 42 cm. howitzer appeared in the 'Engineer' of Nov. 20. These howitzers may, conceivably, have been employed in the attack of Maubeuge and Antwerp, but there is no direct evidence of their having been used at all. The 28 cm. howitzer could have effected all that has been attributed to the larger piece; and there is some evidence of its having been used at Namur. The largest German field howitzer has a calibre of 21 cm. and a maximum range of about 8000 yards. The highexplosive shell weighs 260 lbs. For transport the gun is dismounted and placed on a special wagon. Baulks of timber are carried to form a firingplatform.

in mind. A fort, much more a cupola, is not a large target for high-angle fire at long ranges; and adequate arrangements for observation are necessary to make the fire effective. There is no doubt that the defences of Antwerp and the other fortresses successfully attacked had been carefully reconnoitred by enemy spies in peace, and the ranges ascertained. These places, Antwerp especially, abounded in spies, who are believed to have helped materially to direct the fire. The means for denying a possible enemy such advantages are obvious.

The defence of a modern fortress depends largely on the use of mobile armament and the provision of adequate entrenchments for the infantry of the garrison in the intervals between the detached forts. If suitable and timely preparations had been made, it is likely that the defence of Antwerp might have been considerably prolonged. The Germans deferred attacking for so long that the Belgians appear to have thought they did not intend to attempt the enterprise. Up to the day before the bombardment of the outer forts began, the official reports from Antwerp displayed this optimistic attitude. The work of entrenching was, in consequence, begun too late, with the result that it was very far from completion when the infantry attack began to develop. The trenches were not only inadequate in profile, but faulty in design; and, while the firing line was much exposed in the front trenches, the cover provided for supports and reserves was quite insufficient. The enemy's artillery made the position practically untenable before their infantry came to close quarters. When we consider how successful the French and British troops have been in holding hastily constructed entrenchments against attacks of unprecedented violence, we can imagine what might have been achieved at Antwerp had proper foresight been exercised and the requisite engineering skill been available. The gallantry of the Belgian infantry could not compensate for the defective nature of the defences.

Those who may imagine that the days of permanent fortification are ended will do well to reflect on the part which the eastern defences of France, especially the section between Verdun and Toul, have played in the war. They compelled the Germans to adopt the circuitous line of invasion through Belgium, entailing disadvantages

which have had a material effect on the course of the campaign. The violation of Belgian neutrality brought the Belgian and British forces into line with the army of France. The Belgian resistance, which owed its efficacy to the fortress of Liège, gave time for the concentration of the Allied armies. The long lines of communication have proved a source of serious embarrassment, and their exposure by the advance to the Marne contributed materially to the victory of the Allies, and obliged the Germans to relinquish the offensive. The enemy's position was insecure until the prolongation of their right flank covered the lines of communication, while this great extension of their line obliged them to keep an immense army in France when troops were badly needed in the eastern theatre of war.

The Belgian field-army made good its retreat by the strip of territory which lies between the Dutch frontier and the Scheldt, and formed up on the left of the Allies' line between Dixmude and Nieuport, where it has sustained repeated and violent attacks. The German force released by the fall of Antwerp was probably between 60,000 and 120,000, the former figure being that given in a statement published by the Press Bureau. The Berlin war-news gave its strength as 200,000 men, which is doubtless one of a series of fictitious statements designed to mislead and impress the Allies, which were published at that time. In this category may be placed the announcement that the objective of the German attacks was Calais, to which wide publicity was given, this being quickly followed by the publication of an article by General Baron von Ardenne, in which a speculative scheme for the attack of England from the Channel ports was discussed. It seems reasonable to suppose that these and other threatening rumours which gained currency at that period were expected to cause nervousness in this country, and to induce the Government to keep troops back for home defence which were urgently required to reinforce our army in France. The idea of an advance on Calais was, moreover, calculated to capture the imagination of the German public, and to arouse the ardour of the troops. It is hard to find any other hypothesis to account for the sudden importance

attached to the possession of Calais, which the enemy might have appropriated without opposition at any time during September.

A battle cannot be won, nor can a war be brought to a decisive conclusion, merely by the capture of a geographical objective. Victory in battle implies the rout of the portion of the enemy's forces engaged and the destruction of their moral to an extent that will prevent their being reorganised so as again to become an efficient fighting force for a considerable time. A decisive issue to a war can only be attained by destroying the enemy's armies, and by breaking the spirit of the government and the nation, so as to prevent new armies being raised such as those the French placed in the field during the latter part of the war of 1870-71, and to obviate unorganised resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare. It is evident that the mere conquest of the coast-line would not achieve any of these results. In battle a geographical objective may be assigned to define the direction of an attack, and to insure the co-operation of different bodies employed in its execution, and the concentration of their efforts on the attainment of one specific object. Calais is obviously too remote to fulfil any of these purposes.

An attack on England by sea from the Channel ports would require the defeat of the British Fleet as a necessary antecedent. A surprise attack, by evading the Fleet, could not be effected, because among other reasons it would be impossible secretly to assemble the requisite transport. For the purposes of a raid by aircraft the Channel coast would afford no special facilities to compensate for the enormous sacrifice of life which the enemy's efforts have entailed. Such an enterprise could be attempted with almost equal ease from Belgium, the difference in distance from the probable points of attack being inappreciable. Nor does it seem that the coast would be a suitable situation for an aerial base, owing to its exposure to a surprise attack by hostile aircraft, which might approach undetected over the sea.

The enemy's violent and persistent offensive between La Bassée and the sea has doubtless been partly inspired by the desire to drive the Allied forces out of Belgium with the view of completing the occupation of the