equipping her army and navy to a degree of efficiency never before attempted.

This middle policy of a conditional neutrality, ‘armed and vigilant,' is supported by the large and heterogeneous body of citizens represented in Parliament by the so-called Liberal Party, which is actually the party in power. They require a new cause to arise before Italy commits herself to war. They are particularly jealous of Italy's honour. The Italians are a very selfconscious race, and they bitterly resent the charge so often made against them abroad-at one time perhaps not undeservingly-that they are an unscrupulous people. They are anxious to live down this evil reputation; and they consider that to declare war against their old allies on a mere pretext and without the presence of some new cause, such as the failure of Turkey to prevent the Pan-Islamite Campaign from spreading into Libya, would be a dishonest action. The government in the hands of Signor Salandra may be trusted to keep Italy's honour bright. Signor Salandra has gained the confidence of the mass of the people; and the country is congratulating itself that at last it has a Government on which all can implicitly rely. If the Government decides on war, it can in its turn rely on the people to make all the necessary sacrifices, gladly and willingly. For the present-and the majority of the Italian people note the fact with relief and satisfaction-everything points to an indefinite continuance of the policy of 'armed and vigilant neutrality.'

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I.-BY LAND.

In the article which appeared in the October number of this Review the chief events of the war were reviewed up to the end of September. At that period a great battle had raged without intermission for more than a fortnight on the heights north of the Aisne from its junction with the Oise to Berry au Bac, and thence eastwards along a line passing south of Rheims across the plain of Champagne and through the forest of the Argonne to the neighbourhood of Verdun. The line then curved southwards along the heights east of the Meuse to the vicinity of St Mihiel, where the French and Germans faced each other on opposite banks of the river, and, again turning eastwards, traversed the undulating district of the Woevre to the Moselle at Pont à Mousson. Intermittent fighting was also proceeding along the frontier of Lorraine and in the Vosges, which still continues, without, however, having exercised any direct influence on the main operations, the scene of which has lain throughout to the west of the Moselle. The enemy's forces in Belgium, which had previously been employed in containing the Belgian field army based on Antwerp, and in covering the lines of communication traversing that country, had been concentrated for the attack on Antwerp, in which a force of artillery, stated to comprise two hundred guns including numerous howitzers of large calibre, was also employed.

The retreat of the Germans from the Marne had been so hurried that it seemed likely at first that the heights north of the Aisne were being held merely as a rearguard position to cover the reorganisation of the main armies, and the preparation of a defensive position further north. It soon became evident, however, that the position was of great strength, and was occupied in force with a view to stubborn defence. Further to the east, the enemy's retreat, which had been conducted with more deliberation, ceased on reaching the line already indicated. The utmost efforts of the Allies failed to make any material progress on any part of the front. What at first appeared to be a rearguard action on a large

scale developed into a general engagement of great intensity along a front of 180 miles. It was not a hastily entrenched position that the Germans held. It had been prepared deliberately and with consummate skill during their advance to the Marne.

This preparation, during an offensive movement, of an entrenched position in rear on which the army may fall back in case of defeat, forms a distinctive feature of the German system, and constitutes a novelty in war. The method has been followed on every occasion. During the advance to the Niemen at the end of September, a position was prepared on the East Prussian frontier, armed with heavy artillery and occupied by Landsturm troops and detachments from the fortress garrisons, before which General Rennenkampf's army was detained for a month after winning the battle of Augustovo. Entrenchments were constructed along the frontier of Posen and Silesia before the end of September, in anticipation of an offensive movement to the Vistula; and the army which fought at Warsaw in October was provided with a position in the rear which it was prevented from occupying by the vigour of the Russian pursuit, and the movement of a large force of cavalry from Novo-Georgiewsk against its left flank. The invariable provision of rallying positions by the Germans might seem out of harmony with the doctrine of the offensive with which they are imbued, and which has been carefully inculcated by their whole system of training; but it is in accordance with the thoroughness which characterises all their methods, and the foresight with which they provide for every possible contingency.

The attack on the position between the Oise and the Moselle, the defence of which was materially aided by heavy siege artillery set free by the fall of Maubeuge, was persisted in by the Allies with great gallantry for many days. The character of the fighting has been said to resemble siege warfare. Ground gained by the Allied troops was promptly entrenched; and a step-by-step advance ultimately resulted in the opposing trenches being, in places, only separated by one or two hundred yards. At a few points the enemy's advanced trenches were carried, but the main position proved unassailable, owing to the skill which characterised

the defensive arrangements. Wire entanglements were lavishly used; guns commanded the approaches from concealed positions; and machine-guns hidden in short lengths of trench projecting from the general line brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground in front. The enemy, true to the principle of the offensive and the teaching of their drill-book, met attack with counterattack. It would, indeed, be incorrect to describe their attitude as defensive; it was a persistent and determined offensive. It may be concluded from the reports that they were normally the assailants. The entrenchments acted as a base from which assaults were suddenly delivered across the narrow intervening space. This kind of fighting has characterised the campaign throughout. It is novel, because the kind of situation from which it originated necessarily marks the close of tactical operations at manoeuvres. It was not, indeed, altogether unforeseen, though it has surpassed in its development and duration anything that was imagined. It may be regarded as the outcome of the use of entrenchments in the attack which our Field Service Regulations recognise; though, curiously enough, the German drillbook is silent on the subject.

Although a battle between entrenched armies bears some resemblance to siege warfare, it is quite dissimilar in several important respects. A besieged army is cut off from all outside sources of supply. It is entirely dependent on its own resources, which must ultimately become exhausted. If, for the moment, we regard the German army as being on the defensive at the beginning of October, it will be evident that it was by no means in a state of being besieged. Its communications with Germany were open for the supply of food, stores, and reinforcements. Its freedom of movement was restricted only by the Allied army in front. On the other hand, it had not the advantage conferred on a besieged army by the encircling defences of the fortress, which provide facilities for meeting attack from every quarter. Hence, when the Allies failed to make any impression on the enemy's position by frontal attack, they sought for a vulnerable point elsewhere. The northward movement west of the Oise was initiated with the object of enveloping the flank and threatening the lines of communication.

It is unnecessary to discuss the details of this operation, of which little is known. It failed because the Germans were able to bring up troops as fast as the Allies for the prolongation of their line. The struggle of each army to outflank the other ultimately resulted in the line of battle reaching the sea, which both prevented further extension and put a stop to the attempts of either side to outflank the other.

It would be hard to say whether the Allies or the Germans have derived more advantage from this extraordinary situation. As regards the tactical situation it may be said, broadly, to militate against the side acting offensively because it has prevented outflanking operations, which seem alone to promise decisive success under present-day conditions. In this respect it has been disadvantageous to the Germans, who have maintained the offensive throughout. On the other hand, it enabled the Allies to bring their naval power into play, by which the defence of their left flank was materially strengthened. From the strategical point of view the Germans benefited by the transfer of the bulk of their army to a position which directly covers their main line of communication through Belgium, both supply and retreat being thus facilitated. Should retreat become necessary, their right flank will derive security during the operation from the proximity of the Dutch frontier. From the Allies' point of view the change in the situation was unfavourable in two respects. It made any enterprise against the enemy's lines of communication impracticable, and it deprived them of the direct retreat into the interior of France which enabled them to wrest the offensive from the Germans early in September.

The extension of the line of battle towards the north was the cause of another important change in the situation. During the earlier stages of the campaign the Germans had contented themselves with masking Antwerp by a detachment of sufficient strength to keep the Belgian field-army shut up in the fortress, and to prevent it from attacking their line of communication passing through Brussels and Louvain. Later on, the necessity of reinforcing the army in France obliged them to withdraw their regular troops from Belgium, their place being taken by Landwehr and Landsturm.