Art. 5.-A REVOLT OF ISLAM?

Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey. [Cd. 7628.] London: Wyman,

1914.

TURKEY'S dramatic-or melodramatic-entry upon the stage of the European conflict has, as was natural, given rise to some apprehension and many speculations. In the following pages I shall attempt, not a forecast which events might falsify, but an estimate of Turkey's qualifications for the rôle she has undertaken to play; trusting that such an estimate, based upon the past and the present, affords a reasonable index to the probabilities of the future.

The Ottoman Empire has been assigned, by those who control its destinies at this hour, two tasks, which, though closely connected, can best be understood if treated separately. The first is to create a diversion in favour of Germany by a direct attack on two of Germany's enemies, Russia and Great Britain. The Caucasus and Egypt are the fields upon which the Sultan's forces are expected to prove their capacity for making themselves disagreeable to our allies and ourselves. The task is of a purely military nature, and must be judged by a purely military standard. No one who has had the opportunity of studying the Turkish soldier on active service will deny his many valuable qualities-his gallant disdain of death in battle, his dogged tenacity of purpose, his stoical patience under hardships and privations. In all these respects he is a match for any troops he may have to meet. But war, especially war under modern conditions, is not so much a matter of martial virtue, as of organisation; and organisation implies the possession of mental abilities and material resources, in which the Ottoman leaders are conspicuously poor. This poverty has been demonstrated twice within the last few years; first in Tripoli, and then in the Balkan Peninsula. On both occasions lack of brains and money on the part of the commanders nullified all the efforts of their troops. It would be unreasonable to suppose that an Empire which failed so ignominiously in a struggle with States like Bulgaria,

Servia, and Greece, can achieve any very brilliant success when pitted against Russia and Great Britain. It is true that, in the present emergency, the Kaiser is endeavouring to make good his ally's intellectual and financial deficiencies; Prussian officers have been sent to direct the operations of the Ottoman army and navy, and Prussian gold to diminish the emptiness of the Ottoman Treasury. But the supply of both commodities, limited as it is by the Kaiser's nearer necessities, is bound to fall far short of the demand. The opportune addition of two valuable units to the Turkish fleet by the 'sale' of the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' is also an important factor which it would be unwise to ignore. But the importance of this asset, if it cannot be overlooked, can be overrated. The fighting capacity of those vessels, however great it may be, is inexorably limited to the range of their guns, and is further circumscribed by the coal-supply. Naval guns can do little more than bombard coasts, and without an adequate supply of steam-power the best ships cannot keep up their speed. What the Ottoman fleet has already done in the Black Sea marks the extent of its value.

If we turn to the Turkish army, there also we have in its actual performance a measure of its promise. On the Russian frontier the Tsar's troops have already established an ascendancy which, when his strategists consider the moment suitable, will develop into an advance. Temporary checks there may be, and the Turks may well be able to boast of local 'victories'; but repeated disaster in the past has taught them that ultimately a conflict with their mighty neighbour can end in one way only. Enver Pasha may think otherwise; but the cumulative effect of the Turco-Russian wars from the early 18th century to the latter years of the 19th has been to instil into the ordinary Turk's heart a fatalistic faith in Muscovite invincibility. The same moral may be drawn from the operations already witnessed on the Egyptian frontier. Bands of Bedouin free-lances, richer in valour than in discipline or equipment, may raid, and even score some successes; but these sporadic performances by guerrilla hordes cannot have any decisive influence over the war. As to the regular Turkish forces, which alone might endanger our

hold on Egypt, it must be borne in mind that, besides the deficiencies enumerated, they labour under geographical difficulties which would prove formidable even to a much better organised army. Before they reach Egypt those forces will have to traverse a waterless desert. I have seen Bedouins accomplishing this feat with wonderful ease. After several weeks' march on bare feet across the burning sands of the Sahara, they would stride into camp, with a handful of dates for food, and a branch of scrub for fuel-no provision was made for water, the few wells along the route and the goodwill of God being trusted to slake their thirst. But the Ottoman soldier is not a Bedouin. The stationary life of centuries has robbed him of the nomad's marvellous endurance and frugality. His needs may be fewer than those of a European soldier, but they are numerous enough to require an efficient commissariat. It is precisely in the matter of commissariat that the Sultan's armies show at their worst; and it may be doubted whether the Kaiser can do much to cure this evil.

The second task allotted to Turkey, though indirect, deserves much more serious consideration. The Sultan's participation in the war against Russia, France and Great Britain is expected to stir up the Mohammedan subjects of the three Powers into rebellion. Nothing less is anticipated than a Pan-Islamic upheaval, stretching from the shores of the Atlantic to the slopes of the Himalayas-a general Revolt of Islam. The Mohammedan inhabitants of Turkestan, Afghanistan, Hindustan, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco will rise in their millions, at the call of the Caliph, and hurl themselves upon the Christian invaders of Asia and North Africa; and the Commander of the Faithful, from his palace in Stambul, will behold the vast ocean of the Moslem world swell at his bidding and overwhelm the Unbelievers under its waves. To what extent the Kaiser pins his faith to such a cataclysm, we have no means of knowing. But many of his Turkish allies are firmly convinced that this will be one of the results of their move. Many Turks, both Young and Old, have for years past been amusing themselves with the vision of a Pan-Islamic Empire under their suzerainty; and secret missionaries have

periodically been sent forth from Stambul to all the cardinal points of the Moslem world to preach this gospel and to prepare the soil for a general Jehad. Under Abdul Hamid these efforts partook of the spasmodic and desultory character that pervaded all his activities, and were tempered by the timidity, or the appreciation of realities, that always paralysed his policy. But the more enterprising and less experienced spirits which have since the Revolution steered, or failed to steer, the ship of the Ottoman Empire have displayed in this direction also their characteristic energy, ambition, and utter inability to distinguish between solid facts and the iridescent fancies of a feverish dream.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the stuff this dream is made of is wholly imaginary. The idea of a Revolt of Islam is not an offspring of the uncreative Turkish mind. The Turk has only tried to nourish a plant which originally sprang from the fertile soil of Arab idealism and still derives its sustenance from Arab faith. I have had occasion to test the vitality of the Pan-Islamic tree, to see its flowers and to speculate upon its possible fruits, during the Tripolitan war. The Arab tribesmen who came out of the Sahara to fight the Italians came full of a fine religious fervour. In fighting the invaders of Tripoli they believed they were fighting the enemies of Allah. To them the campaign was not a merely local and isolated enterprise, but an incident in a general crusade of the Faithful-one act in a great drama destined to find its climax in a liberation of the whole of North Africa from the hands of the Infidel. They gave expression to this conviction by calling the expedition a 'Holy War' and themselves 'Holy Warriors'; and they proved its sincerity by their wonderful readiness to die in witness thereof. Nor was there any dearth of apostles eager to fan their zeal and keep the hope of ultimate triumph burning.

I had the good fortune to gain the friendship of one of these enthusiastic preachers-a very remarkable personality of the Peter-the-Hermit type. He had devoted his life to going to and fro in the earth and walking up and down in it, scattering the promise of redemption in all Moslem hearts wherever they might be found. He had already been twice across the Sahara

from Morocco to Egypt. He had been in the Caucasus, in Afghanistan, in India. When I met him in the TurcoArab camp outside Tripoli he had just arrived on foot from Alexandria, having covered the distance in ninetyfour days, which included stoppages at all the TurcoArab camps on the way. At each place he halted for a few days, not to rest, but to preach and fight. He carried across his back an Italian rifle, at his side an Arab scimitar, and on his shoulder a flag with a significant device—a green globe representing Africa, and some red patches over it representing the Moslem provinces under Infidel occupation. Alongside this blazon was embroidered the text, Nasrun min Allah wa fethun karib' ('Victory (is) from God, and the conquest near ').

I could not have found a more competent exponent of the Pan-Islamic dream, or a more clear-sighted critic of its strength and its weakness. All his statements were enlightening, and one of his most emphatic prophecies (he laid claim to prevision of the future) has already found a startlingly accurate fulfilment. He described the nations of Europe as so many brigands who said, Islam is asleep; let us go in and take all we can.'

'But,' he added, 'wait and see. The day of retribution is at hand. In a few years, very few years-I will give it to you in writing, if you like-there will be a great European war, Italy fighting Austria, Germany fighting France, England fighting Germany. Then is our time for a general sweep.'

He claimed to be the spokesman of millions of Mohammedans who thought as he thought, and felt as he felt. That the claim was well founded I ascertained from numerous conversations I had with Arabs of all sorts and conditions. But, on the other hand, I also ascertained both in Egypt and in Tunis that the distance which separates aspiration from action is as wide in Islam as it is in Christendom. Every Moslem country evinced a profound sympathy with the Tripolitan struggle for freedom; and that sentiment found practical

* These were his exact words, uttered at the beginning of 1912. See "The Holy War in Tripoli,' by G. F. Abbott, p. 263.