in watching her. A joint British and Japanese protest to the local authorities has proved futile, and joint representations will now be made at Washington.

'November 6.-Washington, Nov. 4.-The authorities here have fixed a date by which the German cruiser "Geier," which has been under repair for some weeks at Honolulu, must either leave port or be interned. In order to give the "Geier" a chance of avoiding the Japanese cruisers, the date is being kept secret.

'November 10.-Washington, Nov. 9.-The German cruiser "Geier" has been interned at Honolulu until the end of the war. She failed to leave the port within the time-limit set by the United States.'

Another admirable instance of United States sensitiveness to the claims of neutral duty is affordedaccording to a message from Washington printed in the 'Morning Post' for March 16-in connexion with the flight of the German cruiser 'Prinz Eitel Friedrich' into American waters. The message says:

'Unofficially a report has reached Washington that Capt. Thierichsen declares his boilers are in such a bad condition from the continued use of sea-water that he must have new boilers to put the vessel in a seaworthy condition, but there is a very grave doubt as to whether the Government will permit new boilers to be installed. Lawyers hold that under the strict construction of international law repairs may be made to a belligerent vessel in a neutral port, but that the terms of the repairs must not be made so elastic as to include rebuilding. To replace damaged boiler-tubes would be proper, but to replace worn-out boilers with new ones would violate the well-established practice of nations.'

If a belligerent war-vessel were repeatedly to come into a given neutral port and fill up its fuel-bunkers, it would undoubtedly be abusing the hospitality of the neutral, and the neutral who knowingly allowed this would commit a breach of neutral duty. But suppose the war-vessel never enters territorial waters of the neutral but arranges for a number of merchantmen to bring fuel out from the neutral port and deliver it on the high seas; is the neutral bound to put a stop to this if he can? It might be argued that the belligerent in such a case is not making the neutral port a base of operations, for it never enters that port, but is simply

drawing supplies from a neutral country by sea, an operation which renders the goods liable to capture as contraband but does not involve the neutral in any breach of duty. On the other hand, it may be urged that the merchantman is practically turning itself into a tender to the belligerent fleet and, as such, is itself become a belligerent war-vessel. The United States adopts the latter view. This is clear from the Rules issued on Sept. 19, 1914, for the guidance of its port-officials in dealing with cases like these; the Rules speak of the supply of fuel, etc., to a belligerent war-vessel either 'directly or by means of . . . merchant vessels of belligerent or neutral nationality acting as tenders.'

The State of Chile has carried the same view into practice. It has been ascertained that German cruisers in the Pacific have been systematically supplied with provisions and fuel by German merchantmen which have loaded in American, especially South American, ports. These merchantmen would declare that they were bound for Hamburg or Bremen and would load enough coal to take them to those ports and also large amounts of foodstuffs. A letter from Santiago (Chile) dated Nov. 9 and printed in the 'Times' of Dec. 16, 1914, cites an instance in which wireless communications between one of these steamers and German cruisers were intercepted by Chilean wireless stations. In the same letter it is pointed out how difficult it was for the port authorities, suspicious as they might be, to refuse the request of German steamers to be allowed to load the coal, seeing that British steamers sailing for Liverpool were regularly obtaining the large amount of coal required to take them to their destination. The German merchantmen, after delivering the coal, etc., to their cruisers, made as a rule for some other neutral state than that from which they had sailed.* It was not until the Karnak' broke that

* The Rules of Sept. 19, 1914, mentioned in the text, show that on this point the United States authorities were 'ware and waking.' In describing matters which would amount to circumstantial evidence that a merchant vessel laden with fuel or other naval supplies intended to deliver its cargo to a belligerent war-ship, Rule 3 includes the following: Where a merchant vessel has on a previous voyage between ports of the United States and ports of other neutral states failed to have on board at the port of arrival a cargo consisting of naval supplies shipped at the port of departure,

rule that the Chilean authorities were able to act. The 'Karnak' left Iquique on Oct. 2 with 6000 tons of coal, declaring her destination to be San Francisco viâ Callao. On Oct. 26 she arrived empty at another Chilean port, Antofagasta, with indications in her appearance that she had transferred her cargo at sea. She declared to the authorities that she had been chased by a British cruiser and had jettisoned her coal' ('Times,' Nov. 9, 1914). This excuse was transparently false; and the Chilean Government, on the British minister protesting, ordered an enquiry, and laid it down that, if steamers are proved or strongly suspected in these circumstances to have made false declarations, such steamers will be treated as ships forming part of a belligerent navy' ('Times,' Dec. 16) and will be detained until the end of the war. Subsequently two other German steamers, the 'Luxor' and the 'Memphis,' left a Chilean port without clearance-papers in order to take supplies to German cruisers. The Chilean Government not, only ordered the capture of both vessels but, in consequence of this and other breaches of neutrality by ships of the Kosmos' line, forbade any of the vessels of this line to take on coal or provisions in any Chilean port pending investigations ('Times,' Nov. 23).

JOHN PAWLEY BATE.

Further remarks on the Law of Neutrality as illustrated by the present war will be made in a subsequent article.

Art. 16.-THE WAR.

I.-BY LAND.

DURING the past three months of war the principal scenes of the great drama have continued to be enacted on the Russian front. While the Allied armies, undeterred by conditions of weather that have in some localities made movement almost impossible, have, by ceaseless activity, compelled the Germans to keep very large forces in France, the latter, with their Austrian allies, have continued their offensive against Russia with a perseverance which in a better cause could not fail to command admiration. But, despite continuous fighting in both theatres of war, neither the Allies nor the enemy have achieved more than local and partial successes.

In order to apprehend the significance of military operations and the degree of success attending them it is first necessary to understand the object they are designed to attain. In this lies one great difficulty of reviewing a current campaign-that the object of the operations on either side is not definitely known. It can only be conjectured; and an erroneous conjecture not only vitiates all deductions based upon it, but may lead to distorted views on general questions. Thus, at the beginning of the war, it was generally supposed by nonmilitary critics that the object of the German invasion of France was to attack or invest Paris; and because Paris escaped its supposed fate and the Germans turned aside to attack the Allied armies south of the Marne, the enemy's whole plan was assumed to have failed. On this occasion the reputation of the German General Staff became so discredited that many of the critics have never since been able to discern anything but flurry and ineptitude in many skilful and dashing strokes designed by a body of officers among whose failings lack of coolness and ability certainly finds no place. It is quite true that the Germans laid their march on Paris; and, partly to inspire their troops to great exertions, partly, perhaps, with the idea of intimidating the Allies, announced their intention of being in the capital by a certain date. But this presupposed the defeat of the Allied armies, after which the investment of Paris would

probably have been effected principally by second-line troops, the field army being released to operate against Russia. The Germans, in fact, acted in accordance with the principle which has governed the opening of nearly every offensive campaign since field armies became mobile, namely, to strike straight at the enemy's capital, or at some great centre of the nation's life and population which the hostile army cannot afford to abandon to its fate. The first object of war being the destruction of the enemy's army, the surest step towards that end at the beginning of a campaign is to strike along a line on which the enemy is certain to be found. A general engagement is thus ensured at the earliest possible moment, while the defending army is yet, perhaps, not fully prepared. The Germans turned aside from Paris at the beginning of September because the Allied army, though severely handled, was still unbeaten; and while it remained unbeaten any attempt to attack the Capital would have been unsafe and useless. For it is not to be imagined that the Allied army would have played the part of spectator at the sack of Paris; and the Germans were not strong enough to combine an attack on the great fortress with an offensive campaign in the field.

While the Germans at the outset of the French campaign were animated by the single purpose of defeating the Allied army as the first step towards the subjugation of the French nation, and as a preliminary to throwing their field army against Russia, the conditions of the campaign on the eastern front are more complex, making it impossible to determine precisely what object the enemy has in view. In every case the object can be conjectured only by determining from military considerations what would be the best course of action, and assuming that this course will be adopted. But without full knowledge of all the conditions the best course cannot be determined with any confidence; and, even when the military conditions are sufficiently known, political considerations may exercise an unforeseen influence which upsets the calculation. In the case of the Russian campaign, among many uncertain quantities there is one fact which dominates the German aims. For reasons dealt with in our article last January, Germany must bring the French campaign to a conclusion