the problem of the Plural Voting Bill is not prejudiced by anything that has happened; and the Prime Minister in his remarks on Feb. 3 was most guarded in his references to it. What is the fairest course to take? For such a purpose it is necessary to estimate the chances of the Bill at the time when the war broke out. That date was Aug. 4, 1914. The earliest day on which the Bill could pass is June 3, 1915. There was thus, as has been said, an interval of ten months; and this interval was evidently all-important. It is probable that any impartial observer would come to the conclusion, that the chances of the Plural Voting Bill becoming law in this Parliament were infinitesimal. It may be true, as one irreverent supporter of the Prime Minister remarked concerning his political good fortune, 'the greater the hole he is in, the greater the convulsion of nature that gets him out.' But, on the principle of 'no prejudice,' unless some expedient is found of subjecting the Bill to as precarious a chance of existence as it enjoyed last July, the only fair course seems either to drop it or to pass it with a proviso that it should not come into force until after the next contested general election. Whether such a decision would be unpalatable to Liberals, only inside knowledge can tell; but to the outsider any manipulation of the franchise, the fairness of which was at all open to question, would of all measures appear the most provocative, especially after the series of preceding events.

Somewhat similar considerations govern the problem of an Election. Questionings and rumours appear rife. As the end of 1915 completes the five years of existence prescribed by the Parliament Act, much no doubt depends on the course of the war. An election during hostilities is inconceivable. But uncertainty in itself is harmful in view of the prevailing condition of mistrust; and it would be to the general good if some statement could be made. Probably a postponement following the French model would be best, with a proviso that an election should take place, say, six months after the conclusion of peace or armistice for negotiations. This could be effected by an amendment of the Parliament Act, or, if this was considered objectionable by Liberals, by an election, uncontested on both sides, with security

for a contested election six months after the date of peace or of the armistice.*

The preceding suppositions are, of course, all based on the hypothesis that, when the war is ended, British politics will run again on much the same lines as before it began. On the other hand, a coalition, such as has taken place in France, is always a possible eventuality. It would at least be an evidence of national determination, stronger than any speeches or proclamations, welcome at once to our Allies and convincing to friendly neutrals. But the likelihood of such a development is not great, as affairs appear at present. In truth, it would not much matter, provided that there can be conservation of energy, and that efficiency is coupled with determination. Unhappily, in the eyes of a critic, it is just this conservation of force and this efficiency which in their full measure are prejudiced by the present internal distrust and antagonism. Even from the merely party point of view it is likely that that party which could fully rise to the occasion, and which would give its life, would find it. From the national point of view, however, the issue is one of much greater significance. What is a nation worth which cannot attain a real unity in such a crisis as the present? What will be the future of Britain, if even now she knows not the hour of her visitation?

The foregoing pages were written before the Commons debate of March 15. What then happened confirms what has been said above. An agreement as foreshadowed on p. 562 has been reached. Once definitely decided, Mr Lloyd George defended it with characteristic courage, but it is clear that it was only reached after considerable searchings of heart. Again, as pointed out on p. 561, the debate showed how easily the turmoil of party warfare may openly break out; and it is possible that the passage of the Amending Bill in April may show similar expressions of feeling.

*It seems doubtful whether such a dummy' election would prove practicable on closer consideration. The idea, however, has secured the influential support of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others.

Art. 15.-THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY AND THE PRESENT WAR.

INTERNATIONAL 'law' is the label by which, not having a word corresponding to Droit and Recht, we describe a heterogeneous mass of alleged rules of inter-state conduct. Until, roughly, the last half-century these rules were derived from the practice of States, supplemented by deductions drawn by text-writers from the reason of the case. They constituted a fairly certain nucleus, fringed with uncertainties, and they inevitably lacked precision.

The only really satisfactory way of making international law is that which began with the Declaration of Paris, 1856, namely, by express Convention. The series was continued in the Declaration of St Petersburg, 1868 (forbidding the use of explosive bullets); the (unratified) Declaration of Brussels, 1874 (on the laws of land-war); the Geneva (Red Cross') Conventions of 1864 and 1906; the Conventions drawn up at the two Peace Conferences of The Hague, 1899 and 1907; and the (unratified) Declaration of London, 1909 (about naval warfare). These law-making' treaties are the nearest approach in the international area to enacted municipal law. Inasmuch, however, as none of them has been agreed to by all States, they form what has been called a general, as contrasted with a universal, international law. And as regards the Conventions entered into at The Hague in 1907 it is to be noted that each of those which relate to conduct during war (i.e. Nos IV to XIII) contains a proviso that it is only to apply if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.' Now, Montenegro and Servia and Turkey have ratified none of them and, therefore, they are all technically inoperative as Conventions during the present war. Still, even the unratified Conventions, and those to which this or that State is not a party, or which are inoperative pro hac vice, possess a value only less than that of a generally operative Convention. They represent the reasoned convictions of specially-appointed state-agents as to what, having regard to the moral standards of the day, is right state-behaviour, or, in the case of a compromise,

as to what is reasonable in the circumstances. Hence we find that the Declaration of Paris was observed by two non-signatory Powers, Spain and the United States, when at war with each other in 1898; the unratified Declaration of London was appealed to in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912, as also by the Dutch in the recent case of the 'Medea' ('Times,' March 29); and several States, e.g. Argentina and Greece, in their Proclamations of Neutrality during the present war, have taken the technically inoperative Hague Conventions as their standard of conduct.

We propose to review here some of the happenings of the present war which affirm or tend to modify the rules operating between belligerents and neutrals.

Passage of belligerent troops over neutral territory.— This is one of the cases in which there was, until recently, no rule except that which arose from the nature of the case. The jurists were not quite agreed. The opinion of some of the older writers, that a neutral must on demand allow this passage, had, indeed, been rejected in the light of stricter doctrines as to territorial sovereignty; but there were some (e.g. Sir T. Twiss, writing about half a century ago) who thought that a neutral did not compromise his neutrality by granting passage to one belligerent provided he was ready to grant it to the other. Against this it was pointed out (e.g. by Heffter) that this was quite inconsistent with the requisite impartiality, because this passage would always be more advantageous to one belligerent than to the other-a criticism admirably illustrated on the Belgian frontiers at the beginning of the present war. The overwhelming majority of writers was of the same opinion as Heffter. In 1907 the pronouncement agreed to at The Hague resolved all doubts. Convention V (Neutral Powers and Persons in Land Warfare') said:

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'Art. 1. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. 'Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or of supplies.

Art. 5. A neutral Power ought not to allow ("tolérer") on its territory any of the acts referred to in Arts. 2 to 4.'

Accordingly, the demands made on these States by Germany in the early days of last August were an invitation to them to violate the duty owed by them to France.

Passage of the Dutch portion of the Scheldt by naval forces of the Powers now belligerent is governed by the same general principles, for whatever rights of navigating the lower waters were granted by the Treaty of Vienna, 1814, were granted 'sous le rapport du commerce only. The Scheldt being here a territorial river and not a part of the sea, an attack on Antwerp from the sea would come under the rubric 'Land Warfare'; and the articles cited above from Convention V (1907) would forbid its use for that purpose. This being so, it follows that the converse use of the waters by the Power in possession of Antwerp in order to carry on war in the open sea could not be allowed without a violation of the duty of impartiality. If, then, it be true that Germany is building at Antwerp submarines too large to pass to the sea except through the lower Scheldt, an improper use of these waters is contemplated which the Dutch ought to check by all available means.* That the Dutch would take a strict view of their duty is confirmed, if any confirmation be needed, by their refusal, after the fall of Antwerp, to allow the exit of merchantmen which had been taken by the Belgians as prize of war.

It is in China that the most conspicuous instances of the violation of neutral soil have occurred during the present war. These fall under two heads. First, those troops of the belligerent Powers which were guarding their national embassies at Pekin when the war began could not join their main bodies without passing over Chinese soil. The President of China forbade this by a provision in his Neutrality Mandate.

'Troops of any of the belligerents,' it ran, their munitions of war or supplies, are not allowed to cross the territory of China. . . . The guards attached to the Legations of the various Powers in Pekin are not allowed to interfere with the

* When the erection of forts at Flushing and Terneuzen was in contemplation only, the late Mr Westlake pointed out that it would increase for the Dutch the effectiveness of the obligation contained in the words 'not to tolerate' in Art. 5 above mentioned. See 'Revue de Droit International,' 2nd ser., vol. xiii, p. 105.