which purpose she has available the facilities of her elaborate territorial system. It is agreed by those who have gone into the question so far as it can be examined with the information available, that she has already put all her trained men into the field, amounting to about 4 millions, including non-combatant services. Many of these have been killed, taken prisoner, or wounded. There remain between five and six million men of military age, who were untrained at the outbreak of war. Of these most, if not all, who are fit for service, are now being trained, and will be put into the field when the moment is considered opportune. The situation of Austria is similar, but her casualties have probably been relatively greater. She is believed to have put between two and three million men into the field, and to have an equal number in reserve who were untrained at the beginning of the war. The provision of officers, guns, and equipment is the chief difficulty that confronts all countries in raising new armies. This difficulty is probably greatest in the case of Russia, which has in other respects the greatest resources.

The prolongation of the war may lead to other difficulties than those to be encountered in the field. The insidious methods of German spies and agencies seem to be producing their intended effect on the opinion and attitude of neutral nations. Some attempts have been made to counteract their baleful influence; and it is no doubt easy to overdo this species of activity. Reports from various countries indicate that the results of the German press-campaign have been the reverse of successful. But it is equally clear that we cannot afford to dispense with energetic and wisely-directed efforts in this direction. What is especially needed is to provide the neutral public with true versions of incidents that are habitually perverted, and to inculcate just views regarding the world-wide issues at stake and the possible consequences of the war. Unhappily, in the case of the country which most nearly concerns us, where, with more candour, we might have received more sympathy, there is reason to fear that any measure of this kind is now belated. For among the public in question, our secretive methods have undoubtedly aroused suspicion with regard to information officially supplied. There are people who,

being neither lawyers nor logicians, find it difficult to differentiate between the suppression of fact and the suggestion of falsehood.

II.-AT SEA.

W. P. BLOOD.

FOUR intimately associated incidents in the war on the seas-the action off Coronel, the engagement near the Falkland Islands, the lightning bombardment of unfortified Yorkshire towns by German cruisers, and the aerial raid on Cuxhaven, one of Germany's naval bases— are likely to exercise a profound and permanent influence on the future of naval warfare and to lead to some modification of theories which met with considerable acceptance before hostilities occurred. Though no naval battle has been fought in the North Sea, light has been shed by these events on some problems of the first rank. Not a few popular misconceptions have been removed; and it is probable that naval officers will have to revise their standards of conduct and belief which have rested mainly upon tradition.

If we would extract their legitimate meaning from the two cruiser actions-the destruction of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock's squadron (to which reference has already been made in this Review) and the practical annihilation of Vice-Admiral Count von Spee's force-they must be examined as two scenes in a single act of a great drama. After defeating Admiral Cradock, Vice-Admiral von Spee appears to have come to the conclusion that powerful British and Japanese squadrons would search for him in the Pacific. He evidently thought himself justified in concluding that, after destroying the only two British ships in the Atlantic which he had reason to fear meeting, he could operate in that ocean in comparative safety for a time. It is possible, moreover, that he learnt that the old battleship 'Canopus' and the light cruiser 'Glasgow,' which had formed part of Admiral Cradock's force, had left Pacific waters with the apparent intention of rounding Cape Horn and coaling at the Falkland Islands, the most lonely and most undefended of all British possessions. He determined to follow them, assured of gaining further glory.

In the meantime the naval authorities in London had not been inactive. In all secrecy-and secrecy is the basis of the work of all competent strategists-they determined to trap and overwhelm the German force. It may be assumed that the orders given to the 'Canopus' and the 'Glasgow,' which constituted these ships decoys, formed part of the general scheme. Simultaneously instructions were issued to two battle cruisers in home waters, the Invincible' and the 'Inflexible,' to prepare to go south; and in one of these Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, who had been Chief of the Admiralty War Staff since the opening of hostilities, was instructed to hoist his flag. While the Admiralty, under the new First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, attached importance to secrecy, it was realised that time was also of the essence of a successful issue. The naval authorities insisted there was not an hour to be lost if the scheme was not to miscarry; hence the employment of two of the swiftest armoured ships under the White Ensign and the haste with which they left Europe, without, indeed, completing their stores.

There is a widespread impression that the enemy possesses agents at all the great naval ports, and that these persons have means of communicating swiftly with Germany. A movement such as the despatch of these two battle cruisers, under the orders of the Chief of the War Staff, could not be carried out without many persons sharing the secret; and yet for several weeks the secret remained inviolate. The first news which Admiral von Spee obtained of the Admiralty's decision was when he was confronted with these two powerful men-of-war off the Falkland Islands; and everything points to the conclusion that the German naval authorities were also in ignorance until they learnt that four of the five ships under Admiral von Spee had been sunk.

In accordance with the German admirals' decision the Pacific Division left the Chilian island of Juan Fernandez on Nov. 15, heading for Cape Horn, with the apparent intention of seizing the Falkland Islands and gaining possession of the wireless station, which would have put Admiral von Spee in a position of strategic advantage. The ships arrived off Port Stanley on the morning of Dec. 8, under the impression that no serious opposition

would be encountered. In the meantime, however, the two British battle cruisers, the 'Invincible' and the 'Inflexible,' under Admiral Sturdee, had steamed in all secrecy from the English Channel, a distance of nearly 7,000 miles, and had arrived at the Falkland Islands on the previous afternoon. They were engaged in coaling when the German ships arrived. The Admiralty had arranged, also unknown either to the German naval authorities or to Admiral von Spee, for several other British ships, besides the 'Canopus' and the 'Glasgow,' to concentrate on the Falkland Islands, thus giving to the strategic scheme a completeness rare in the history of naval warfare. Without revealing their actions to the enemy, the British authorities brought the right force to the right place at the right moment. If the 'Invincible' and the 'Inflexible' had left Europe a day later, or if slower ships had been employed, the scheme would have failed, and we should have suffered another reverse.

The captain of the light cruiser 'Dresden,' the only German ship which escaped, has communicated to the German Consul at Punta Arenas an illuminating account of the movements of the German force:

'The German Pacific Division left the Pacific to go to the Falkland Islands by way of Cape Horn. The voyage was made without incident. A little before arriving at our destination the commander of the division, Vice-Admiral von Spee, detached one of our cruisers to explore and to discover facts concerning the presence of English ships in the islands. The ship returned and reported that there were two English cruisers. The admiral prepared at once to give battle to the hostile ships, issuing the necessary orders.

'Advancing towards the islands, in a little while we were able to make out the strength of the hostile forces. There were not two cruisers, but six. Our commander kept to his resolution and continued the advance. A little later at the mouth of the bay we noted two Dreadnoughts of the 'Lion' type,* 26,000 tons, more or less, whose presence was unknown before. The conditions were magnificent. The weather was clear and calm. These conditions made impossible a combat with a chance of escape for the German fleet. Admiral von Spee persisted in his resolution to give battle, with the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" acting together, ordering at the same time the dispersal of the three other units, the minor cruisers, "Leipzig," "Dresden," and "Nürnberg."

'Meanwhile the two cruisers above mentioned courageously faced the English Fleet. The latter was attacked by our two cruisers, while the "Leipzig," "Nürnberg," and "Dresden " tried to place themselves outside the range of the enemy's cannon, the only device compatible with the circumstances in view of the number, quality, and size of the English ships. It suffices to remark that the English Dreadnoughts were armed with 34-centimetre cannon, while the German cruisers only had 21-centimetre cannon.' ('New York Times,' Dec. 18.)

It is now known that there was only a slight disparity in the number of ships under the British and German flags respectively when the engagement opened off Coronel, each admiral having two large cruisers; but, whereas Admiral Cradock had with him only one light cruiser, carrying two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns, Admiral von Spee possessed two vessels of this type, mounting, however, nothing bigger than 4.1-inch guns. All the accounts of the subsequent engagement indicate that the action was fought between the big ships and that the smaller vessels took little or no part in it. In other words, two British armoured cruisers engaged two German armoured cruisers. The former were sunk with all hands. Why? It has been suggested that the result was due at least in some measure to the fact that, whereas the German ships had been in commission for some time and had become expert in gunnery, the British ships had been only recently commissioned, and that the British officers and men used their guns less effectively. There is no evidence to support this contention. The only explanation of the decisive outcome of the action is to be found in the fact that the German ships were better armed and had the advantage of speed. One spectator has indeed stated that the British shells fell short of their targets by about three miles. This is probably an exaggeration, but the German ships appear to have come out of the action almost unscathed, while on the other hand the two British cruisers sank, with 1,625 officers and men.

In the subsequent action which was fought off the

*These two statements are erroneous. The two vessels are of an earlier and less powerful type, carrying 12 in. or 30.5 centimetre, and not 13.5 in. or 34 centimetre guns.