conclusion of peace, we shall presumably have on the Continent or even further afield, in Egypt and elsewhere. If these influences, however, do not apply, the Government will, in any case, have to spread out the process for industrial reasons.

We may now sum up the few broad conclusions which emerge from a mass of conjecture. In the first place, the dislocation and transference of the ordinary productive activity of the country has been on a scale entirely without precedent; but the privileged position of this country as an island power retaining command of the sea, together with the need of suddenly raising an army on a continental scale, has prevented this dislocation from being converted into terms of actual unemployment or distress among working people. Secondly, it appears that a balance has already been struck between recruiting and unemployment in most industries. If anything like another million men are to be raised, it will be necessary not only to employ as many women as possible in the place of men, but also to restrict production in the least vital of our industries. Finally, history affords no precedent as to the immediate industrial aftereffects of the war. But the destruction of wealth, the interruption of commercial relations, and the dislocation of markets have been so general and on so large a scale that it is rash to assume, on historical analogies which are really inapplicable to the present situation, that trade will quickly be able to resume its normal conditions, or that spending power, in the form of either coin or credit, will at once be available for those who will have urgent need of material goods. Hence the re-absorption of European armies, together with the re-transference of those workpeople who have been diverted from their ordinary occupation to produce guns and war equipment generally may be a slow process, and will present our own as well as European Governments with a problem in organisation that will tax their utmost capacity.

WALTER T. LAYTON.

Art. 16.-PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

I.-ON LAND.

THE course of the operations in the two principal theatres of war during the latter part of November made it apparent that the general situation had undergone an important change. After the supreme effort of Nov. 11, when the crack corps of Germany, including the Prussian Guard, were sacrificed in desperate attempts to break the Allies' line near Ypres, the enemy's offensive in France and Belgium began to abate. By the end of the month the infantry were almost everywhere on the defensive; and, though the artillery continued to display considerable activity, the Allies' guns were steadily establishing their superiority. In the Eastern theatre of war the Germans, after sustaining what seemed to be a decisive defeat between the Vistula and the Warta, had resumed the offensive with augmented forces and renewed determination. It was evident that, for the first time since the beginning of the war, they had relinquished the offensive in France, and transferred their principal activities to the Eastern theatre of war. As the significance of this change may not appear at first sight, it is proposed to consider the situation in some detail.

When Germany plunged into war, dragging with her half-reluctant Austria, she felt no misgivings as to the result. The problem she had to solve-that of defeating the numerically superior armies of France and Russia— had been studied by her General Staff during many years of peace. The plans for dealing with it had been thought out in the minutest detail, and every preparation had been made that careful forethought could suggest.

The Germanic powers enjoyed certain advantages which might be expected to go far to compensate for the numerical inferiority of their military forces. Being resolved on aggression, they could make certain of obtaining the initiative by secretly ordering mobilisation while France and Russia were still negotiating. The initiative confers the power of taking the offensive in any direction without regard to the adversary, who, being unprepared, is powerless to interfere. Being certain of possessing the initiative, the German General

The

Staff were therefore free to adopt the plan of operations best calculated to achieve the object of the war. conditions of the strategical situation defined the French army as the first objective, because it would be next in the field after the German army. Austria would follow, with Russia lagging far behind. Hence it was decided that Germany should attack France, while Austria should detach an adequate force to subdue Serbia, and invade Russia with the remainder of her army with the object of breaking up the Russian concentration before it could be completed. By these means it was hoped that France would be brought to her knees before Russia could become dangerous. The fundamental idea of the plan required that the Allies should be defeated in France while Russia was still held within her own frontiers.

This bold plan was thwarted by the defeat of the Germans on the Marne, and by the unexpected readiness of Russia, whose armies overran East Prussia and inflicted on Austria a series of defeats in Galicia which laid Silesia open to invasion. This situation was too menacing to be neglected. From that time till the middle of November the Germans continued to make strenuous but unavailing efforts to pursue the offensive simultaneously in both theatres of war. Being ultimately convinced of the inadequacy of their forces for such an ambitious project, they relinquished the offensive in the Western theatre of war and transferred several armycorps to the frontiers of Russia.

Thus, after nearly four months of war, the Germans have had to suspend the course of action on which they relied for ultimate success. What seemed imperatively necessary for Germany, on account of her central position between France and Russia, was a decision in one or other theatre of war, in order that one frontier might be secure from attack while she was engaged in offensive operations on the other. Against Russia such a decision is impracticable, because the vastness of her territory and resources would enable her to evade defeat, and to prolong the contest indefinitely. It is, therefore, against France that Germany must seek the decision.

Until recently it was probably the opinion of most students of war that the Germans could not afford to lose time in dealing the decisive blow in France. It

seemed that, if the Russian menace should become imminent while the French campaign was still undecided, the transfer of troops that would inevitably result must so weaken the German army in France as to place it at the mercy of the Allies. It was not supposed that the Russians could be dealt with, and troops be transported back to France, in time to restore the situation. The Germans themselves were probably of this opinion. The feverish activity they displayed during the earlier operations in Belgium and France indicates that they regarded the destruction of the Allied army as a necessary antecedent to offensive operations against Russia. This idea has been falsified by the unforeseen power of resistance provided by the skilfully-designed system of entrenchments evolved by German ingenuity. With one flank secured by the sea and the other by the Swiss frontier the German position in Belgium and France appears to be practically impregnable. The Allies have been unable to make any sensible impression on it, while the bulk of the German army has been operating against Russia. The situation resulting from the weakening of their army in France proves to be by no means so critical for the Germans as was expected.

The disadvantage of Germany's central position, referred to above, is accentuated by the character of her Eastern frontier and by certain political and economic conditions. By some mischance Nature has made her frontier strong in the west, where, owing to the concentration of large forces and the prosecution of an offensive campaign, strength is not needed; while her Eastern frontier, where defensive action is required, possesses no natural facilities for defence. In the west the Moselle and the Rhine, with their fortresses, form successive lines of resistance. In the east, marshes, lakes, and forests afford some slight protection to the frontiers of East Prussia and Posen, but Nature has left Silesia quite uncared for. When it is considered that Berlin is within 170 miles of Russian territory, and that Silesia is one of the richest provinces of the Empire and a great industrial centre, it is not surprising that the threat of a Russian invasion should have caused the Germans to hurry troops from the scene of prospective conquest to that of present danger.

Germany's central position is not, however, wholly disadvantageous. It enables her to transport troops from one theatre of war to the other in complete secrecy and perfect security, while the widely-separated Allies are unable to render each other any direct assistance. During the many years of preparation for war she has given special attention to the provision of railway facilities for expediting to the utmost such movements of troops. No fewer than twenty railway bridges span the Rhine between the Swiss and Dutch frontiers. Lines of railway follow both banks of the Rhine; others skirt the Polish frontier, connecting the lines that traverse Germany from east to west, and providing lateral communication for the movement of troops in rear of a field army. Special sidings and platforms for entraining and detraining troops are provided at every point where they are likely to be of service. In short, the entire railway system of Germany has been specially designed to facilitate and expedite the transport of troops in connexion with specific plans formulated by the General Staff for the conduct of the war which has been foreseen and provided for during many years of peace.

The withdrawal of troops from Belgium probably began shortly after the battle at Ypres on Nov. 11. It was effected with the utmost secrecy, the Allies being kept occupied by occasional infantry attacks at various points, and by a sustained and sometimes violent bombardment. At the same time a large number of troops, apparently drafts to replace casualties, were brought into Belgium with some ostentation, their arrival being sedulously advertised through the medium of Amsterdam newspapers. Rumours of a projected renewal of the offensive in the region of Ypres were also put abroad, which even gained credence in some London newspapers, eager for sensational news. These devices were obviously intended to keep the Allies in a state of uncertainty, and to conceal the transfer of troops to the east. How far the Allies were deceived is uncertain, but they did not assume the offensive in France and Belgium for some time, while the Russians were certainly surprised by the arrival of the German reinforcements in Poland.

The German offensive movement between the Vistula and the Warta, which began to develop about Nov. 12,