he made in the House of Lords as First Lord of the Admiralty. The date is March 21, 1905: 'It never occurred to me that anybody would object to that note. It was not intended to introduce any new procedure into the Board of Admiralty, but to describe exactly what always has gone on at the Board of Admiralty. I go further and say that, unless that went on, the Board of Admiralty could not do its work. How is it possible for the First Sea Lord to advise on questions of policy unless his colleagues, with their responsibilities, are in constant friendly communication with him? It is the way the work is always done. How is the Fourth Sea Lord to provide for the proper coaling of the Fleet unless he knows what policy is in the mind of the First Sea Lord as to the distribution of the Fleet? How can the Civil Lord see that proper barracks, docks, and other buildings are provided unless he is kept constantly in touch with the First Sea Lord in respect of any possible changes of policy? All this note is meant to indicate is that what has always been done should be done, and that on all questions of great importance-and the word "great" is used very advisedly-there should be constant communication and conference between the Sea Lords. 'Then it is supposed that, when I say that the First Sea Lord will refer to the First Lord for further action considered necessary, that is as much as to say that the question cannot be brought forward before the Board by the First Lord unless with the concurrence of the First Sea Lord. Nothing could be further from the fact. It has always been possible for any member of the Board to bring any subject absolutely independently before the First Lord; and I go further and say that any member of the Board has a right to claim that any question he chooses shall, with the concurrence of the First Lord, be brought before the Board formally for settlement. Until I saw the public comments, it never occurred to anybody inside the Board of Admiralty that this described anything but the constant, immemorial, necessary usage. If there is a difference of opinion between the Sea Lords, it is the First Sea Lord naturally who will bring the matter to the First Lord. There never was a First Sea Lord more steeped in the traditions of the Admiralty as to the Navy than Lord Walter Kerr; there never was a First Sea Lord more conscious of his responsibility for maintaining the full rights of the Board; there never was a First Sea Lord less likely to try and impair the authority of his colleagues or to fail in respect for their separate and independent position. If there was a difference of opinion between the Sea Lords which could not be settled, they always went to Lord Walter Kerr, who came to me and said, "This point we are obliged to refer to you." Therefore this note does nothing more than indicate what has always been the custom.' It only remains to add that, after ten years have elapsed, after the whole policy of 1904 has passed under the review of four successive First Lords of the Admiralty, Lord Cawdor, Lord Tweedmouth, Mr McKenna, and Mr Winston Churchill, and after the office of First Sea Lord has been held by Sir Arthur Wilson, Sir Francis Bridgeman, and Prince Louis of Battenburg, in succession to the great administrator who held it in 1904 and now holds it once more, the Distribution of Business, modified from time to time in many of its details, still assigns to the First Sea Lord responsibility for the fighting and sea-going efficiency of the Fleet.' The Note appended to it now runs as follows: 'It is to be understood that in any matter of great importance the First Sea Lord is always to be consulted by the other Sea Lords, the Civil Lord, the Additional Civil Lord, and the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries; but each member of the Board and the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries will communicate direct with the First Lord.' I have now established two propositions. The first is that the First Lord, being responsible to the Crown and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty, is ipso facto supreme and may in virtue of that supremacy act on occasion on his own initiative, with or without the concurrence of the Board, the letter of the Patent notwithstanding. The second is that the First Sea Lord, being in a sense the alter ego of the First Lord-he was explicitly so designated by Barham in 1805—is and always has been so far invested with authority over his junior colleagues that no matter of great importance' can be brought to maturity, or perhaps even initiated, without his cognisance, nor, subject to the final decision of the First Lord, without his concurrence. These propositions, however, unimpeachable as I have shown them to be in themselves, are not to be taken as covering the whole situation. The supremacy of the First Lord is limited on the one hand by the superior authority of the Cabinet, and on the other by the fact that, if he acts arbitrarily on his own initiative or if he demands the concurrence of his colleagues in measures of which they strongly disapprove, he may be confronted with their resignation in a body-a situation which in the majority of cases, if not in all, would assuredly lead to his undoing. In like manner the more limited but still real authority of the First Sea Lord over his junior colleagues is checked and controlled by the supremacy of the First Lord. That is, perhaps, as far as we can take the matter from a strictly constitutional point of view. Subject to the limitations above defined, it is hardly possible to say that any act done by the First Lord or, within his more limited province, by the First Sea Lord is outside the constitutional prerogatives of either office, although its policy, its wisdom, its propriety, its conformity to the traditions of the Department and the sentiment of the Sea Service might be open to grave question. Individual action, although constitutionally quite legitimate, might easily be very ill-advised. In the first part of this article it was pointed out that the relations of the First Lord to his colleagues-and mutatis mutandis the same may be said of the First Sea Lord-'are just as much founded on usage and prescription as his own supremacy is; and it is manifest that the Board could not work at all unless those relations were marked by goodwill, good feeling, good sense, and a spirit of loyal co-operation.' Thus the Board works best when it works harmoniously, and its voice is most respected when it speaks collectively and therefore anonymously. This is a very important point in its relation to the Sea Service at large. The Sea Service has long learnt to look up to 'My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty' as the supreme authority it is proud to obey, not to any individual member of the Board. It is accustomed to take its orders from the Board, and, when by its obedience to them it has earned praise or reward, it is content that the Board should award them. Individual members of the Board may come and go, but the Board itself is an abiding and venerated authority throughout the Navy. That is the immemorial attitude of the Sea Service, and it is not expedient that it should be lightly disregarded. JAMES R. THURSFIELD. Art. 12.-THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM. 1. La Neutralité Belge et l'Invasion Allemande. Par Maxime Lecomte et Col. Camille Lévi. Bruxelles et Paris: Lavauzelle, 1914. 2. Sylvain van de Weyer. Par Théodore Juste. Bruxelles : Maquardt, 1871. 3. The Memoirs of Prince Talleyrand. By the Duke de Broglie. Vols. IV and v. Translated by Mrs Angus Hall. London: Griffith & Farran, 1892. 4. Le dernier Bienfait de la Monarchie. Par le Duc THE work of MM. Lecomte and Lévi is remarkable for the prophecy contained in its preface. 'Si un rapprochement franco-allemand était possible, on ne pourrait qu'encourager et féliciter les hommes de cœur, épris d'idées de paix et de sentiments d'humanité, qui croient à la possibilité de ce rapprochement et s'efforcent de travailler à sa réalisation. Mais on est obligé de penser que ces esprits distingués se laissent décevoir par une illusion et ne voient pas les indices multiples qui montrent que, loin de se rapprocher, les deux grands peuples entreront à nouveau en conflit armé dans un temps plus ou moins prochain. 6 Si ce conflit se produit, il parait certain qu'il ne sera pas provoqué par la république française, qui est pacifique, qui ne nourrit aucune pensée d'agression. La terrible crise éclatera le jour où le gouvernement allemand se verra dans la nécessité d'obeir à la pression du parti de la guerre, et de donner satisfaction aux besoins d'expansion de la nation, qui trouvent leur formule exacerbée dans les revendications des pangermanistes. . ... 'La France, en dehors de ses sentiments et de la foi due aux traités, a un intérêt évident au maintien de l'inviolabilité du territoire belge. L'Allemagne, au contraire, semble avoir la conviction, comme bien des faits tendent à le prouver, que son intérêt supérieure en cas de guerre avec la France lui commande l'invasion de la Belgique.' So convinced of this were MM. Lecomte and Lévi that they published this important volume, examining the history and resources of Belgium, and the methods by which Germany might carry out her imputed purpose. 'Rem acu tetigerunt.' They point out the enormous railway development in Germany on the frontiers of Belgian Luxemburg, and they demonstrate that the violation of Belgian neutrality was thus a certainty of the near future. The consequences of such action they examine with detailed care, and they accurately predict the course of events. In fact, the book might have been written last September, with scarcely the alteration of a comma. In 1911, according to our authors, there was some intimation conveyed to the Belgian Government that, if the defences of the country were not increased, it would certainly be invaded by one, if not both combatants, in the event of war. This warning should have made it certain that Germany would invade Belgium. It was her interest to do so; and, now that the moral barrier had broken down, by everyone's apparent admission, what was there to prevent her? We cannot help confessing that the complaisance of Europe before Austria in Bosnia and Italy in Tripoli had given some colour to the contention that there was no real force in scraps of paper.' Such a scrap of paper it was which proclaimed the neutrality of Belgium. What was its history? 6 It was an antiquarianism to style the troops drawn from the country between France and Holland, who fought at Waterloo, Belgians.' Throughout modern history the name Belgica' had disappeared from the Its place was, roughly speaking, taken by Flanders, Brabant, Hainault and other counties, and North-western France. Cæsar had placed his Belge between the Seine and the Rhine, but the word reappeared in the days of the Renaissance with a restricted meaning. 'Les provinces Belgiques' of Charles V were those parts of his northern dominions which, bordering on France, were comprised in the ancient hunting-grounds of the Belgæ. It is almost an accident that Belgium is not called Gallia or Francia; for Charles might as well have termed these lands his Gallic or his French provinces. Yet the name has always persisted. Boileau speaks of 'le lion belgique.' Grotius terms the country 'Belgica Hispanica,' and the people 'Belgæ.' Heylin in the early 17th century treats 'Belgium' as a synonym for Low Germany: Cockeram, about the same time, defines 'Belgeans' as 'People of the low countries, Somersetshire, Wiltshire and Hampshire. In 1790 were proclaimed the United States of Belgium'; but rather, one concludes, because it was |