like this that summary inferences are most misleading, for its future can never be predicted. As time goes on its power is revealed by the fact that it begins to add to itself, right and left, the very virtues which appeared furthest from its reach, and to produce work which has gained in every respect, in freshness and vigour as in controlled flexibility, over its earlier experiments. This has been the history of the work of Mrs Wharton; and, because it has not only had a history but is constantly making one, always attacking new positions and never repeating either a failure or a success, it is work of the kind most of all interesting to criticism, work of which, in the middle of its course, nothing can be foretold but that its best is yet to come.

PERCY LUBBOCK.

Art. 11.-THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.

1. Naval Administration.

By Admiral Sir R. Vesey

Hamilton. London: Bell, 1896.

2. Naval Policy, A Plea for the Study of War. By 'Barfleur.' Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1907. 3. Letters of Lord Barham. Vols. II and III. London : Navy Records Society, 1911.

4. The Spencer Papers. Vol. I. London: Navy Records Society, 1913.

PART II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS.

IN the first part of this article it was shown from evidence tendered to a Select Committee of the House of Commons (1861), that there has always been inherent in the First Lord of the Admiralty an elastic power which enables him to undertake any duties which the public welfare may require. In other words, the First Lord may in any grave emergency act on his own initiative without waiting to consult the Board. Further, this inherent power of initiative extends so far that, if the First Lord comes to any decision which normally requires the assent of the Board, he can either call on the members of the Board to acquiesce in it or insist on their resigning their places if their assent is withheld. The exercise of this power is, of course, quite inconsistent with the letter of the Patent by which the Board is appointed. But the usage which sanctions it is probably quite as old as the Patent itself. It may be conjectured that it had its origin in the high personal prestige and commanding professional authority of the First Lord first appointed under the Patent of Queen Anne-an instrument, it will be remembered, which has come down without material alteration, save in one particular, to the present day. This was Admiral Edward Russell, Earl of Orford, the victor of La Hogue. The spirit of naval discipline is embedded in the very marrow of the British naval officer, and runs from top to bottom throughout the whole hierarchy of the sea service. A great seaman like Russell would easily establish his ascendancy over his professional colleagues, and would probably make short work of their opposition if ever they ventured to oppose him.

Be this as it may, it is easy to show that the usage recognised by the enquiry of 1861 was in full force nearly three-quarters of a century earlier. In 1795 the second Earl Spencer was First Lord of the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord being Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, the great strategist who afterwards, as Lord Barham and First Lord of the Admiralty himself, directed the final stages of the campaign of Trafalgar with such masterly sagacity. It was decided by Ministers, Spencer concurring, to recall Admiral Sir John Laforey, then commanding a fleet in the West Indies. On the Board being called upon to ratify this decision, Middleton declined to affix his signature to the order of recall. Spencer at once treated this refusal as an indication of Middleton's determination 'to withdraw from office' and defined the position thus: 'The idea I entertain of the constitution of this Board and of the manner in which the business of it should be carried on, is, that in every measure determined upon and officially proposed to the Board by the First Lord, every member of the Board is considered as ready to take an active part by his signature; and, though the responsibility unquestionably rests on the First Lord, the other Lords are always understood to concur in his measures. I must therefore desire in the present instance (one of too much importance to be passed over lightly), that you will declare your concurrence in the recall of Sir John Laforey by signing the order which has been prepared.'

Middleton forthwith replied by resigning his seat at the Board, and his resignation was accepted. In truth Spencer had virtually demanded it. There had been a good deal of friction between the two, and probably neither was reluctant to part company from the other. In any case Spencer's letter clearly shows how he regarded his position and its prerogatives. His responsibility was undiluted and his authority supreme. But, presumably in deference to the letter of the Patent, it would seem to have been the usage in his time for his decisions to be ratified by the signatures of at least two other members of the Board, and in all important cases by that of the First Sea Lord. Further, he held that no member of the Board could withhold his signature when called upon by the First Lord to affix it. That was

tantamount to a dissolution of the Board; and in Middleton's case such a refusal entailed his resignation.

By a strange irony of fate it was reserved for Middleton-now Lord Barham-to embody the usage as defined by Spencer in his own practice in a still more extreme form, and virtually to reduce the signature of other members to a mere formality. He became First Lord of the Admiralty in May 1805 on the resignation of Lord Melville. By this time it had become the usage for orders issued by the Board to be signed by at least three Lords. But Barham rarely signed such orders himself; and the required three signatures were commonly affixed by deputy, being generally countersigned by the Secretary and thus invested with the full authority of the Board. But on one memorable occasion Barham did sign an executive order and signed it alone. The story is well known how Bettesworth, sent home by Nelson in the Curieux' with news of Villeneuve's movements, reached the Admiralty late on the night of July 8, when Barham had gone to bed. It is said that, when called in the morning and Bettesworth's news was communicated to him, the old man-he was then in his 80th year-was furious at so many hours having been lost at such a crisis. But he sat down there and then and drafted a hasty minute, which he forthwith embodied in a letter to Cornwallis, then blockading Brest, instructing him to make the dispositions which resulted in Calder's action with Villeneuve. This letter is dated July 9, and it concludes, 'Official orders will follow as soon as possible.' But Barham added in a postscript, Time is everything,' as who should say, 'Don't wait for the official orders but take this letter as your authority.'

The official orders, to precisely the same effect though somewhat more formal and explicit, did follow as soon as possible, for they are dated the same day. But there is no evidence that they went by the same ship as that which carried Barham's letter; nor, so far as I can discover, is there any evidence that Cornwallis received them before the crisis was over. On the other hand, there is direct evidence that he received Barham's letter and acted upon it without an instant's delay. For in a letter dated Noon, 11th July, 1805,' he wrote

6

to Barham, 'I have this moment had the honour of receiving your lordship's letter, and I have sent the necessary instructions,' and so forth. It seems certain, then, that Cornwallis acted on Barham's letter alone and did not wait for the official instructions, which both men would appear to have regarded as a formality superfluous in the circumstances. Barham's colleagues, who signed the official order-for once, in their own autograph and without the intervention of the Secretary -were Admiral Gambier and Lord Garlies, the First and Third Sea Lords. Gambier was Barham's nephew, and Garlies was not a man of much weight. 'We know,' says Sir John Laughton, 'of nothing in the lives of either Gambier or Garlies which [should] lead us to suppose that they would venture, on such a point, to dispute their chief's opinion.'

Later in the same year Barham gave a still more striking, albeit less memorable, illustration of his readiness in emergency to act solely on his own initiative and responsibility, without consulting the Board at all and indeed with a definite intention of concealing from it what he had done. In November Lord Keith, commanding in the North Sea, reported that two French frigates had escaped from Flushing; and Barham apprehended that their purpose was 'an attack on our African settlements and trade.' Accordingly he wrote privately and with his own hand to Lord Gardner, then in command at Cork, giving him detailed instructions how to act in the circumstances by detaching a force to the African Coast. At the end of his letter he said, 'Whatever relates to this service to be directed to me as private, until your Lordship receives a confirmation of these orders from the Board. The vessels employed to be mentioned in your disposition of ships as "cruising to the westward." However, the French frigates were soon reported as having returned to Flushing, and there the matter ended. No official orders were ever issued; and Barham subsequently instructed Gardner to return the private letter containing his secret orders. Probably the Board never heard of the transaction.

I have cited these illustrations of the doctrine expounded in the first part of this article not merely on account of their great historical interest but because