uneven number-i.e., from fourteen to thirteen, the effect of which was that, at all events, however near and close might be the division of judicial opinion, the Judges could not be equally divided, so as to render the arguments entirely abortive. What happened, however, was as near as possible to that abortive result, for the decision was only by a majority of one-six Judges being in favour of the Crown, and seven for the accused; so that by a majority of one he went free. Lord Coleridge, Sir Baliol Brett, Mr. Justice Grove, Mr. Justice Denman, Sir R. Amphlett, and Mr. Justice Lindley were of opinion that the Court had jurisdiction, and that the conviction was right; the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chief Baron, Sir G. Bramwell, Sir R. Phillimore, Mr. Justice Lush, Baron Pollock, and Mr. Justice Field were of opinion that the Court had not jurisdiction, and that the conviction was wrong. Lord Coleridge was clearly and strongly of opinion that the accused was liable on both the grounds relied on by the Crown—that is, first, on the ground that three miles are subject to our sovereignty, and are part of our territory and dominion (although subject to the right of free navigation), in support of which he strongly relied on the Act of Parliament 20 and 21 Vict., chap. 109, and also on the ground that the injury was on board a British vessel. The first point, he said, had been more than once affirmed by the House of Lords in its judicial character, and had been formally affirmed by Parliament in an Act passed a few years ago (20 and 21 Vict., chap. 109), and the consequences of an opposite decision would, he said, be so monstrous and so mischievous as to afford a cogent argument to show that it could not possibly be right. Sir Baliol Brett, in a very long and erudite judgment, came to the same conclusion on the first point, as to the three miles being part of our territory, and Sir R. Amphlett and Mr. Justice Grove concurred in that view; while Mr. Justice Denman gave his decision on the other point, and in his judgment entered very fully and minutely into the criminal case on the point, in order to show that in effect the offence was committed on board the British vessel-in which view it was admitted that the accused would be liable in a British court. Sir R. Phillimore delivered an elaborate judgment in support of the contrary view, denying that the act was committed on board a British vessel, and maintaining that though undoubtedly all jurists admitted the jurisdiction of a State -for some purposes-over the sea within three miles of its shores, yet it was only for civil and fiscal or defensive purposes. The Lord Chief Baron concurred in this judgment, as also in that of the Lord Chief Justice to the like effect; and Mr. Justice Lush, Baron Pollock, and Mr. Justice Field also declared their concurrence in the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Baron delivered a brief judgment of his own to the effect that there was no authority for the existence of a criminal jurisdiction under such circumstances and no instance of its exercise, and Sir G. Bramwell gave a brief judgment to the like effect, mainly on that ground. It will be seen that the burden of the maintenance of the conclusion arrived at by the majority-though a bare majority-of the Judges fell mainly on Sir R. Phillimore and the Lord Chief Justice; and, as that of the Lord Chief Justice would, as he was the Chief of the Court, be delivered last, and was of great length, its delivery was postponed to the Monday following.

On Monday, November 13, therefore the Lord Chief Justice delivered judgment as follows:-He said there could be no doubt that the offence of which the defendant was found guilty amounted to manslaughter according to English

law, but the question raised for the consideration of that Court was whether the defendant was amenable to that law, and whether there was jurisdiction to try him for that offence. The conviction of the defendant was disputed on the ground that he was a foreigner, and the ship which he commanded a German vessel, sailing from one foreign port to another on a peaceful voyage, when the collision took place by which the deceased lost her life, and that offence was committed upon the high seas and without the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty, whose jurisdiction had been transferred by statute to the Central Criminal Court. The facts on which the defence was based were indisputable, but the prosecution relied on two points—first, that although the occurrence on which the charge was founded took place on the high seas in the sense that the place in which it happened was not within the body of the country, it occurred within three miles of the English coast, and that by the law of nations the sea for a space of three miles around the coast was part of the territory of the country whose shores it washed, and that consequently, as the "Franconia" at the time the offence was committed was in English waters, all on board the "Franconia" at the time of the accident were subject to the English law; and secondly, that although the negligence complained of happened on board a foreign vessel, the death occasioned by such negligence took place on board a British vessel, and that as a British vessel was in point of law considered British territory, the offence having been completed by the death of the deceased in a British ship, it must be considered as having been committed on British territory. It was an incontestable proposition of law, and universally admitted, that according to the law of nations a foreigner could not be held criminally can extend its responsible to the laws of a nation not his own for acts committed beyond "No sovereignty," says Story, the limits of its territory. process beyond its own territorial limits to subject either person or property to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons and property in any other tribunals." Dr. Lushington said the power of this country is to legislate for its own subjects all the world over, and as to foreigners within its jurisdiction, but no further, subject to this qualification, that if the Legislature of a particular country should think fit, by express enactment, to render foreigners subject to its law in respect of offences committed beyond the limits of its territory, it would be incumbent on the courts of the country to give effect to such enactments, leaving it to the State to settle the question of international law with the Governments of other nations; but he was then dealing with the question in reference to the common law alone. His lordship then at considerable length reviewed the jurisdiction formerly held by the Admiralty, which had now been transferred to the Central Criminal Court, and said it might be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that the zone of sea now contended for by the Crown was a doctrine unknown to the ancient law of England, and had never yet received the sanction of an English Criminal Court of Justice. From the commissions issued in the 14th century, the Kings of England asserted the right of sovereignty over the narrow seas, and at a later period still more extravagant pretensions were advanced. Selden asserted the sovereignty of the Kings of England over the sea as far as Norway, in which he was upheld by Hale. His lordship having reviewed the dicta of the English text written upon the subject, said in like manner, Venice claimed the Adriatic, Genoa the

Ligurian Sea, Denmark a portion of the North Sea, Portugal claimed to bar the ocean route to India and the Indian seas to the rest of the world, and Spain made a like claim with respect to the west. All these vain and extravagant pretensions had long since given way under the influence of reason and common sense, and had long since been abandoned. The great contests of the jurists as to the freedom of the seas commenced in 1609 with the celebrated work of Grotius, the controversy ending, as controversies often did, in a species of compromise. After referring to other learned writings on the subject, his lordship said that Bynkershoek, in his treatise, "De Domino Maris," published in 1702, suggested for the first time a territorial dominion over the sea extending as far as cannon shot would reach, which subsequent writers had fixed at a marine league, or three miles, and that had since been treated and accepted, with very few exceptions, as belonging to the State owning the coast by publicists who had followed him, but great uncertainty and differences of opinion had prevailed with regard to the character and degree of sovereignty exercised, and still continued to exist. In the absence of all precedent and of any judicial decision or authority applicable to the present purpose, they would not be justified in holding an offence committed under such circumstances to be punishable by the law of England, especially as in so holding they must declare the whole body of our penal law to be applicable to the foreigners passing our shores in a foreign vessel on its way to a foreign port. It was no doubt desirable, looking to the frequent collisions which took place in the neighbourhood of our coasts, that the commanders of foreign vessels who by unskilful navigation or gross carelessness caused disaster or death should be as much amenable to English law as those navigating our own vessels, instead of having to seek for redress in the distant country to which the offender might belong. The remedy for such deficiency should be applied by the Legislature, and not by the usurpation on their part of a jurisdiction which the Courts did not judicially possess. With regard to the contention of the Crown that the offence was really committed on board the "Strathclyde," which brought him within the jurisdiction of this country, his lordship said he could not be said to have been in any sense constructively on board the "Strathclyde," and if he was on the high seas at that time he could not be punished for an infraction of English laws, yet it could not be said that he would escape altogether. He would be amenable to the laws of his own country, and it could not be presumed that the law of any civilised people would be so administered as to allow such an offence to pass without adequate punishment. In the conflict of opinion which unfortunately existed it was to him a great satisfaction to know that the late Mr. Justice Archibald-whose loss they all deplored-had read his judgment, and had expressed his entire satisfaction both in the conclusion and the grounds of that conclusion. That lamented judge's opinion could not of course be of any avail, but as the majority of the Court were of opinion that the conviction should be quashed, it would accordingly be quashed.

Mr. Justice Lush remarked that the remedy, if any was needed, rested with Parliament. Parliament was fully competent to legislate with regard to the three-mile zone.

There being six judges in favour of the conviction, and seven against it, the conviction was therefore quashed.

III.

VANE V. VANE.

This case, which may be, perhaps, considered the cause célèbre of the year, came on for hearing before Vice-Chancellor Malins on November 13.

Mr. Glasse, Q.C., Mr. Serjeant Ballantine and Mr. R. Newton Smart were for the plaintiff; the Attorney-General (Sir John Holker, Q.C.), Mr. J. Pearson, Q.C., Mr. Davey, Q.C., and Mr. North were for the principal defendants; Mr. Mounsey Hysham was for the trustees.

The plaintiff instituted this suit as Sir Frederick Henry Vane, heretofore commonly called Frederick Henry Vane, against Henry Ralph Vane, heretofore commonly called Sir Henry Ralph Vane, and others, to obtain a declaration that the plaintiff, as the eldest legitimate son of Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane, deceased, is, under the will of Sir Lionel Wright Fletcher, deceased, entitled to the estates devised by that will, and still remaining unsold, as tenant in tail male in possession; that the defendants may be ordered to deliver up to the plaintiff the possession of the estates, and for an account of the rents and profits of them. The plaintiff's case was to this effect:Sir Lionel Wright Fletcher died on July 19, 1786, having devised the estates in question, which are in Cumberland and Westmoreland, to trustees, for his son Frederick Fletcher Vane, for his life, with remainder to his first and other sons, lawfully begotten, in tail male. On March 9, 1797, Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane married Miss Hannah Bowerbank, by whom he had previously had, as the plaintiff alleged, three illegitimate children. The first of those children was a girl, born on August 22, 1794, and afterwards called Hannah Vane. The second was born on July 9, 1795, and afterwards called Walter Vane. After the birth of Walter Vane the intimacy between his parents still continued, and they lived together at various places in Cumberland, and among others at Broughton Hall, in the parish of Bride Kirk, in that county. Miss Bowerbank again became pregnant. Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane then took lodgings for her at Bushey, in Hertfordshire, whither she went in January 1797. He was deeply attached to her, and had repeatedly promised to marry her. Soon after her going to Bushey, and before the birth of her third child, she threatened him that if he did not marry her he should never see her or her children again. He then told her he had got the licence for their marriage, and that she was to get ready and go with him the next morning. The evidence showed that he produced the licence, and held it up before her. The suddenness of the whole proceeding on his part had such an effect upon her that she was prematurely delivered in the course of that day-March 9, 1797-of a third child, afterwards called Francis Fletcher Vane. As soon, however, as Miss Bowerbank had sufficiently recovered-viz., on the same 9th of March, 1797-she was taken by Sir Frederick to London, and then and there married to him, at the church of St. George the Martyr, Queen Square, Bloomsbury. On April 16, 1797, Francis Fletcher Vane was baptised at that church, and the entry of his

baptism in the register now stands thus:-" 16, Francis Fletcher, born March 29th, 1797, son of Sir Frederick Fletcher and Hannah Vane, Great Ormond Street." The plaintiff insisted that it was evident from the colour of the ink and other circumstances, and that it was the fact, that the entry had been tampered with; and that the words and figures, "born March 29th, 1797," were added some time after the original entry was made. The plaintiff further alleged that both Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane and Lady Vane were informed by their doctor, and believed, that after the birth of Francis Fletcher Vane they would never have another child born alive, and that Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane accordingly determined to, and did, bring up Francis Fletcher Vane as his legitimate son, born after the marriage. With that view, Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane procured the words, "born March 29th, 1797," to be added to the entry of the baptism. In 1801 Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane and Lady Vane removed from London to the family mansion in Cumberland, which was at Hutton-in-the-Forest, whence they went to Armathwaite Hall, in the same county. All the three children were there called by the name of Vane, and Francis Fletcher Vane was introduced to society by his father as his legitimate son and heir apparent. After the removal, however, to Armathwaite Hall, Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane and Lady Vane had two other children-viz., Sophia Mercy Vane, who was born March 18, 1802, and the plaintiff, who was born May 10, 1807. Francis Fletcher Vane attained the age of twenty-one years in March 1818. On the day on which he was supposed to have done so, he had an exciting interview with his father at Armathwaite Hall. The plaintiff met him coming from the room, crying and evidently much agitated, and the plaintiff believed that his father then told Francis Fletcher Vane that he was illegitimate, and that the plaintiff was, in fact, his father's rightful heir apparent. However that might have been, the plaintiff alleged that Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane concurred with Francis Fletcher Vane, as his eldest legitimate son, in a re-settlement of the estates, the particulars of which the plaintiff did not know. The evidence showed that Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane was for some reason averse from his son Francis Fletcher Vane's marrying, and on one occasion forbade his fulfilment of an engagement with a young lady of good fortune, family, and great personal attractions. In April 1823, however, Francis Fletcher Vane married Miss Diana Olivia Beauclerk, when a settlement was executed, with respect to which the plaintiff insisted that Mr. Beauclerk and his daughter were aware of the true circumstances of Francis Fletcher's birth, and that Mr. Beauclerk took advantage of the power that knowledge gave him over Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane, and obtained from him a much more favourable settlement than otherwise would have been made. After that marriage Francis Fletcher Vane went to reside at Hutton Hall, and received the rents of the estates settled on him and his wife. Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane died in 1832, and Francis Fletcher Vane then assumed the title of Sir Francis Fletcher Vane. He had three children by his marriage with Miss Beauclerk-viz., the defendant, Henry Ralph Vane, his eldest son, born in the year 1830; Frederick Fletcher Vane, the younger, who was born in 1832, and died in 1865; and Gertrude Elizabeth, afterwards Mrs. Wing. Sir Francis Fletcher Vane died in 1842; and thereupon his eldest son, the defendant, Sir Henry Ralph Vane, entered into the possession of the estates. He had since married and re-settled the property, but there had been no issue of that marriage. Lady Vane, formerly Miss Bowerbank,