on the ministerial policy was expected; but Mr. Lowe, who led the attack, was considered to have failed in force and cogency of argument. He began by questioning the transaction between the Government and Messrs. Rothschild, insisting that the latter had received a great deal too much for advancing the purchase money. On this theme he enlarged at inordinate length, contrasting the transaction, rather ill-advisedly, with his own saving of 5,000l. out of the 3,000,000l. of the Alabama Claims, and complaining that Great Britain had been placed on a level with those States of questionable solvency which find a great difficulty in borrowing money. He then proceeded to give his explanation of the favourable reception accorded to the act of the Government, attributing it to the influence of the Press, particularly of the Metropolitan Press, which was moved by considerations of its own advantage. "It was believed that the era of spirited policy was at hand, which, however expensive it might be to others, was sure to be dear to the newspapers."

Into the financial part of the business Mr. Lowe entered circumstantially, contending that a proprietor who had only ten votes, represented by the 250 shares of the British Government (i.e. two-fifths of the whole number of votes) could not be held to have become chief proprietor of the Canal. Mr. Gladstone, who soon afterwards took the singular course of publishing a "syllabus" of his speech, declared that the House was practically left no choice in the matter that the purchase, so far as the Khedive was concerned, was complete, and that the best proof of it was to be found in the circumstance that the seven zinc boxes containing the shares were at this moment in the custody of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and not of the Messrs. Rothschild. He did not hold the Chancellor of the Exchequer personally responsible except in his character of a Cabinet Minister, nor did he attach any blame to the Messrs. Rothschild; but he held that the Government ought not to have placed itself in the hands of a private financial firm, and by that means have given facilities for the enormous speculations in Egyptian bonds which undoubtedly did take place pending the negotiations for the advance. He objected to the improvident character of the arrangement, which, he said, was tantamount to a payment of 15 per cent. interest per annum for the money without the risk of losing a single farthing. Referring next to the political aspect of the question, Mr. Gladstone invited Ministers to explain what were the new evils which the Government apprehended would follow the purchase of the shares by France or any other foreign country, and what was the additional security we had acquired for keeping open the passage to India. He also asked whether we had a preferential charge over the other creditors of Egypt, and whether any one could safely predict that the Khedive would be able to pay the interest he had promised. He had great apprehensions as to the receipt of the 5 per cent., but much greater apprehensions as to the position in which the necessity of demanding it might draw on us.

Next came on a debate on the Fugitive Slave Circular. It is seldom that two questions of the importance of that respecting the Suez Canal shares purchase and that concerning the Fugitive Slave Circular, come before Parliament on two successive evenings. On Tuesday, 20th, the day following the close of the Suez Canal Debate, Mr. Whitbread brought forward his motion against Government on the second question, in the form of a resolution to cancel every instruction which might stand in the way of entire protection to fugitive slaves afforded by the British flag. There was an exciting debate for two nights on the subject. Mr. Whitbread, in a cautious speech, which admitted the existing difficulties, urged first, that, once admitted to the protection of the British flag, a slave should be treated as a free man while on board one of Her Majesty's ships, and should not be removed or ordered to leave because he is a slave. In the second place, he demanded the withdrawal of all Circulars, Instructions, and Orders opposed to such a principle, or limiting the discretion of Her Majesty's officers to receive fugitive slaves on board her ships. He was careful to avoid heated declamation, and to keep the subject above the reach of Party strife. Mr. Hanbury, on the side of Government, moved an amendment to refer the matter to a Royal Commission. His attack, however, on the conduct of past Liberal Ministries did not suit the temper of the House. It is quite true, as he says, that in 1871 a Circular was sent to the East India Station, directing the return of slaves who should come on board Her Majesty's ships within three miles. of the shore. But the present instructions were as formal as any act of a Government could be. Speaking for the Government the Attorney-General referred to the first Circular, and frankly assumed his share of responsibility attaching to that document. Sir John Karslake, Sir R. Baggalay, and Dr. Deane, had also a hand in it. The Attorney-General did not deny that it was open to objection in so far as it directed the surrender of slaves who had been admitted on board ship on the high seas; but he virtually denied the truth of the popular doctrine that when a ship of war is anchored in a foreign port she is subject only to the laws of her own country. Were such the case, he said, "she would be bound to give an asylum to murderers as well as slaves."

Mr. Hardy, in reply to Sir H. James, maintained that the exterritoriality of a ship in a foreign port was not perfect, and he made an effective point by quoting" Historicus," in illustration of the nuisance a ship acting on the contrary assumption must become.

On the second night of the debate, Mr. Herschell defended the late Government in an able speech. He admitted that both sides were living in glass-houses, but the Conservatives had begun throwing stones. He denied that there was anything in international law which limited the reception to those slaves whose lives were in danger, and he thought the wisest course would be to leave each case to the discretion of the commanding officer. Sir W. Harcourt, who spoke later in the evening, strongly censured

the recklessness of the Government, in giving up the principle that the Queen's vessels were extra-territorial. No doubt, he said, foreign nations might prescribe the conditions on which they would admit our ships into their ports, but then England might declare on what terms she would accept their hospitality, and if after the passing of this resolution, they still admitted our ships into their harbours, it would be tantamount to accepting the principle of it. Sir William was immediately followed by the Solicitor-General for Ireland (Mr. Plunket), who denied that the immunity of our ships-of-war had been in any way sacrificed, and he pointed out that the policy of England had been to bring about a better state of feeling among the slaveholding powers, which would in time lead to the eradication of slavery; but the extreme measures proposed by the Opposition would retard, instead of hastening the desired effect. Lord Hartington defended Lord Clarendon from the charge of having issued his instructions without the knowledge of the Cabinet, and Mr. Disraeli taking advantage of this admission, which destroyed the force of Mr. Forster's argument, earlier in the debate, taunted the Liberals with their readiness to throw over their old colleague, for the sake of obtaining a majority. In the division which followed Mr. Whitbread's resolution was rejected by 293-248, a majority of 45; and immediately afterwards, an amendment moved by Mr. Fawcett, that Lord Clarendon's East Indian Order, and the second Slave Circular should be suspended, met a similar fate, by 290-245, these being two of the largest divisions during the session. A discussion on the Fugitive Slave Circular in the House of Lords was brought about by Lord Cardwell, who presented a petition from the Dissenting Ministers of London, praying for the unconditional withdrawal of the obnoxious instructions. The same arguments which had already done duty in the House of Commons were again made use of. Lord Cairns, while regretting that we had not arrived at the stage when we could give our protection to every slave who claimed it, said that the best results must follow from the deliberations of the Royal Commission.

In the subsequent discussions which arose out of the Suez Canal purchase, the Ministers lost ground in public estimation. It became evident that there had been mismanagement in some of the subsidiary arrangements, and in meeting the criticism on the acts of the Government, Mr. Disraeli betrayed a want of the tact and temper which usually characterised him. Mr. Cave's Report was received by the Cabinet before the end of March; but in answer to a question from Mr. Cartwright in the House of Commons, the Premier declined to make it public, alleging that on perusing the document he and his colleagues had unanimously concluded that it was necessary to communicate with the Khedive for his consent or refusal, that the communication had been accordingly made, and that the Khedive had "expressed a strong objection to this Report being made public in the present unsettled state of Egyptian

Finance." Immediately the most unfavourable inferences were drawn by the world of investors and stock jobbers, and something like a panic in Egyptian securities set in. A day or two later the Chancellor of the Exchequer tried to undo the effects of his leader's injudicious course; and in reply to Mr. Samuelson observed that the perusal of Mr. Cave's Report had not altered the opinions he had expressed six weeks before on the financial condition of Egypt though he admitted that the lapse of six weeks might, perhaps must, have had some influence on the situation, that in his opinion the publication of the Report would not be injurious to the Khedive, but as the Khedive appears to persist in its refusal the Report could not be published. Soon, however, the Khedive saw the impolicy of any longer withholding his consent, and the Report was published at the beginning of April.

The Report was considered to be satisfactory, inasmuch as it furnished the hitherto vaguely informed English public with some trustworthy information on the subject of Egyptian finance. That Egypt owed 75 millions sterling, and had a reasonable prospect of being able to pay seven per cent. interest on the amount, was the general result. With the exception of the comparatively small sum raised by the Khedive's predecessor, and by the present Khedive to pay his predecessor's debts, the money borrowed had gone to help the Suez Canal. The reigning Khedive had, indeed, spent no less than 30 millions sterling on other public works, 13 or 14 millions on railways alone, having 1210 miles of railway actually at work. But for this outlay the excess of income over expenditure had sufficed. It was mainly the Suez Canal that made him a borrower, though some of his premature schemes of improvement elsewhere may have helped to swell the amount of debt. Mr. Cave having begun by giving the causes which had produced the present state of Egyptian finance, proceeded to show what that state really was, and lastly, to prescribe the remedy which he thought possible. He took pains to ascertain the agricultural resources of the country, the extent of the land under cultivation, the extent that could be added by an efficient system. of public works, the supply of labour, and the suggestions which had been made for increasing it. He recapitulated with accuracy of detail the increase of the exports and imports, the rise of the revenue, the general improvement of the population, the excess of births over deaths, the foundation of schools, and the general advance of education, and did justice to those qualities in Ismail Pasha's Administration which had recommended him to the goodwill of Europeans as a ruler who, more than any other of his family, had been disposed to attract to his country the ideas and energy of the West. But when Mr. Cave applied himself to the special subject to which his mission related, his language was almost uniformly severe, in spite of his sympathies with the Khedive and his desire to help the State. He spoke of Egypt as suffering "from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste, and extravagance

of the East, such as have brought her Suzerain to the verge of ruin, and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilisation of the West." The Khedive had attempted, with a limited revenue, in the course of a few years, works which ought to be spread over a far longer period, and which would tax the resources of much richer exchequers. The precarious tenure of office caused dishonesty to go wholly or partially unpunished; the peculation and neglect which pervaded every department gave rise to intrigues, which sooner or later brought about the downfall of honest officials. The poorer

Fellaheen are subject to much ill-treatment and extortion; contractors for work are allowed to bring gangs together, starving and defrauding the labourers, the more miserable class of whom are paid nothing, but work from sunrise to sunset for their bare food, and run away at every opportunity. His conclusions on all the information he obtained are expressed in the following sentence: "As, therefore, every security of real value is pledged, and as without the means for meeting the floating debt a very serious crisis in the financial affairs of Egypt must take place, which would be fatal to the bondholders of the various loans, it would seem that the most feasible mode of averting the danger would be to buy up, for the purpose of consolidation, the loans of 1860 and 1873 and the bonds of the floating debt.' The essential condition of success in this would be "that the Khedive should place a person who would command general confidence, such, for instance, as the Financial Agent sent out by Her Majesty's Government to take employment under His Highness at the head of a Control Department which should have a general supervision of the incidence and the levying of the taxes."

Another incident connected with this business of the Suez Canal, in which the Premier did not gain in parliamentary reputation, was his treatment of the dismissal of Sir Daniel Lange by M. Charles Lesseps, from the post of representative of the Company in this country.

The case was this: In 1871 proposals for a change in the ownership of the Suez Canal had been suggested in several quarters. The Khedive had expressed to Colonel Stanton, the Consul-General in Egypt, an opinion in favour of the transfer of the property, either to an English company, or to the English Government. The Italian Government about the same time suggested the joint acquisition of the Canal by the Maritime States. The FrancoGerman war was then just over, the Germans still occupied the soil of France, the Commune was ruling in Paris. On April 3rd Sir Daniel Lange ventured to write to Lord Granville suggesting the purchase of the Canal: "Taking into account," he said, "the altered feeling in France produced by recent events, the question may arise whether a well-defined financial proposal emanating from England would not be opportune, and even acceptable to the shareholders provided it be done with discretion and caution."