IN very varied fashions has philosophy endeavored at various stages of its career to solve the problem of the face as the mind's mirror, and to gain some clue thereby to the ways and workings of the brain. Often when philosophy was at its worst and vainest, has the problem appeared most certain of solution. From classic ages, onward to the days of Lavater, Gall, and Spurzheim, the wise and occult have regarded their systems of mind-localization as adapted to answer perfectly all the conditions whereby an inquiring race could test their deductions. But as time passed and knowledge advanced, system after system of mind-philosophy has gone by the board, and has been consigned to the limbo of the extinct and non-existent. Now and then the shreds and patches of former years are sought out by the curious to illustrate by comparison the higher and better knowledge of to-day; and occasionally one may trace in the by-paths of latter-day philosophies, details which figured prominently as the sum and substance of forgotten systems and theories of matter and of mind. So that the student of the rise and decline of philosophies learns to recognize the transient in science as that which is rapidly lost and embodied in succeeding knowledge, and the permanent as that which through all succeeding time remains stamped by its own and original individuality. Especially do such remarks apply to the arts which have been employed to find " the mind's construction" in face or head. If Lavater's name and his long list of " temperaments" are things of the far-back past in science, no less dim are the outlines of the extinct science of brain-pans, over which Gall and Spurzheim labored so long and lovingly, but for the name of which the modern student looks in vain in the index of physiological works dealing with the subjects" phrenology" once called its own. Pursued together in out-ofthe-way holes and corners, the systems of Lavater and Gall are represented among us to-day chiefly by devotees whose acquaintance with the anatomy

and physiology of the brain is not that of the scientific lecture-room, but that of the philosophers who deal in busts, and to whom a cranium represents an object only to be measured and mapped out into square inches of this quality and half-inches of that. and half-inches of that. Neglected because of their resting on no scientific basis, the doctrines of phrenology and physiognomy have died as peacefully as the "lunar hoax" or the opposition to the theory of gravitation.. And the occasionally prominent revival of their tenets in some quarters, but represents the feeble scintillations which attend the decay and announce the transient survivals of movements whose days numbered as parts of philosophical sys

tems.

are

Whatever reasonable deductions and solid advances regarding the functions of brain and mind either "science" tended to evolve, have been long ago incorporated with the swelling tide of knowledge. Phrenology has vanished in the general advance of research regarding the functions of the brain; a region which, apparently without cloud in the eyes of the confident phrenologist, is even yet unpenetrated in many of its parts by the light of recent experiment and past discoveries. Similarly the science of physiognomy has its modern outcome in the cant phrases and common knowledge with

a

which we mark the face as the index to the emotions, and through which we learn to read the broader phases of the mind's construction. But the knowledge of the face

as a book

Where men may read strange matters. has been more fortunate than the science of brain-pans, in respect of its recent revival under new aspects and great authority. From Eusthenes, who judged men by their features," to Lavater himself, the face was viewed as the mask which hid the mind, but which, as a general rule, corresponded also to the varying moods of that mind, and related itself, as Lavater held, to the general conformation and temperament of the

and mean.

By some authors, the emotion" is interpreted as the mental state which gives rise to the bodily disturbance. But such a mode of treating the term is simply equivalent to an attempt to define the shadow and ignore the substance. Says Dr. Tuke, whose authority in all matters relative to the relation betwixt mind and body we must gratefully acknowledge, "Everyone is conscious of a difference between a purely intellectual operation of the mind and that state of feeling or sentiment which, also internal and mental, is equally removed from (though generally involving) a bodily sensation, whether of pleasure or pain; and which, from its occasioning suffering, is often termed Passion; which likewise, because it moves our very depths, now with delight, now with anguish, is expressively called Emotion-a true commotion of the mind, and not of the mind only, but of the body." And in a footnote, Dr. Tuke is careful to remind us that "it is very certain, however, that our notion of what constitutes an emotion is largely derived from its physical accompaniments, both subjective and objective." That is to say, the nature of the mental act-which is by some authors exclusively named the emotion-may be, and generally is, imperfectly understood by us; and the name is given rather to the obvious effects of the mind's action on the face and body, than to the mental action which is the cause of these visible effects. Such a result is but to be looked for so long as the mental acts are contained and performed within a veritable arcanum of modern science. The emotion renders us conscious "subjectively," or within ourselves, of the mental states which cause the outward postures of body or phases of face. "The modern student," says Mr. Fiske, in a recent volume,* "has learned that consciousness has a background as well as a foreground, that a number of mental processes go on within us of which we cannot always render a full and satisfactory account." And while the source of the common emotions of everyday life is no doubt to be found in the ordinary sensations which originate from our contact with the outer world, * Darwinism and other Essays: Macmillan, 1879.

there are other emotions which arise from the "background of consciousness," and which are manifested in us as actively and typically as are the common feelings of the hour which we can plainly enough account for.

To descend from theory to example in this case is an easy task. The blush which has been called into the cheek by a remark made in our hearing, is as fair and simple an illustration of the objective source of emotions as could well be found. The production of the emotion in such a case depends upon the ordinary laws of sensation, through the operation of which we gain our knowledge of the world-nay, of ourselves also. Waves of sound set in vibration by the voice of the speaker, have impinged upon the drum of the ear. Thence converted into a nervous impression or impulse, these sound-waves have travelled along the auditory nerve to the brain. There received as a "sensation'-there appreciated and transformed into consciousness" — the brain has shown its appreciation of the knowledge conveyed to it by the ear, in the production through the nerve-mechanism of the blood vessels, of the suffused tint which soon overspreads the face. But this direct production of an emotion by mental action, and from the foreground of consciousness, is opposed in a manner by a second method which may be termed "subjective," by way of distinction from the objective sensation derived from the voice of the speaker, and giving rise to the blush. From the background of consciousness," wherein Memory may be said to dwell, there may come the remembrance of the occasion which gives rise directly to the blush. Projected into the foreground of consciousness, the subjective sensation may be as vividly present with us in the spirit as when it was felt in the flesh. True to its wonted action, the brain may automatically influence the heart's action, and suffuse the countenance as thoroughly as if the original remark had that moment been made. Ringing in the ears of memory, the subjective sensation may be as powerful as when it was first received from the objective side of life. As has well been remarked, the import and effects of subjective sensations may not be lightly es

connection of the emotions with sensation, and for the part which the feelings may play in inducing aberration of mind. In the concluding words of the paragraph just quoted lies the explanation of the production of mind-derangements through a hereditary bias, namely, the perpetuated effects of ill-regulated mental acts. In the same idea, that of continued and transmitted habit, exists the key to the understanding of the origin of emotions. Above all other causes, habit has acted with extreme power and effect in inducing the association not merely of groups of actions expressive of emotions, but also in forming and stereotyping trains of thought and ideas in harmony therewith. On some such plain consideration, the real understanding of many problems of mind may be said to rest; and certainly in the subject before us it is one we cannot afford to lose sight of throughout the brief study in which we are engaged.

timated in the production of various phases of the mental life. "When an exceedingly painful event produces great sorrow, or a critical event great agitation, or an uncertain event great apprehension and anxiety, the mind is undergoing a passion or suffering; there is not an equilibrium between the internal state and the external circumstances; and until the mind is able to reach adequately, either in consequence of a fortunate lessening of the outward pressure, or by a recruiting of its own internal forces, the passion must continue; in other words, the wear and tear of nervous element must go on. Painful emotion is in truth psychical pain: and pain here, as elsewhere, is the outcry of suffering organic element-a prayer for deliverance and rest. And again, this author-Dr. Maudsley-speaking of the rationale of emotion, which in its graver exhibition may produce derangement of mind, says: "When any great passion causes all the physical and moral troubles which it will cause, what I conceive to happen is, that a physical impression made upon the sense of sight or of hearing is propagated along a physical path (namely, a nerve) to the brain, and arouses a physical commotion in its molecules; that from this centre of commotion the liberated energy is propagated by physical paths to other parts of the brain, and that it is finally discharged outwardly through proper physical paths, either in movements or in modifications of secretion or nutrition (e.g. the influencing of heart and bloodvessels as in blushing). The passion that is felt is the subjective side of the cerebral commotion-its motion out from the physical basis, as it were (e-motion), into consciousness-and it is only felt as it is felt by virtue of the constitution of the cerebral centres, into which have been wrought the social sympathies of successive ages of men; inheriting the accumulated results of the experiences of countless generations, the centres manifest the kind of function which is embodied in their structure. The molecular commotion of the structure is the liberation of the function; if forefathers have habitually felt, and thought, and done unwisely, the structure will be unstable and its function irregular." So much for the nature of emotion, for the

Any such study, however limited its range, must devote a few details to the question concerning the seat of the emotions in the chief centre of the nervous system. Of old, the peculiar system of nerves lying along the front of the spine, and called the " sympathetic system,' was believed to possess the function of bringing one part of the body into relation with another part. To this system in modern physiology is assigned the chief command of those processes which constitute the "organic life" of higher animals, and which, including such functions as digestion, circulation, etc., proceed under normal circumstances independently of the direct operation of will and mind. Liable to be influenced and modified in many ways by the will and by the nervous acts which compose the waking existence of man, the sympathetic nerves may nevertheless be regarded as the chief and unconscious regulators of those processes on the due performance of which the continuity and safety of life depends. But in the physiology of past days these nerves were credited with the possession of a much more intimate relation to the play of emotions. By some authorities in a past decade of science, the seat of the emotions was referred exclusively to the nerves in question and to the processes which

they regulate.

Under the influence of these nerves and of the emotions, argued these theorists, we see the functions of the body gravely affected; and in some epigastric centre," as the chief nervemass of this system was termed, the emotions were declared to reside. But in such a theory of the emotions, results were simply mistaken for causes. On the ground that disturbance of the heart's action, or of digestion, occurred as a sign and symptom of emotion, the play of feelings was assigned to the bodily organs, whither in classic ages had been set the "passions" and "humors' residing in spleen, liver, and elsewhere. But in modern science nous avons changé tout cela. If we are not thoroughly agreed as to the exact location of the emotions in the brain itself, we at least by common consent regard the central organ of the nervous system as the seat of the feelings which play in divers ways upon the bodily mechanism. Most readers are conversant with the fact that all brains, from those of fishes to those of quadrupeds and man, are built up on one and the same broad type; exhibiting here and there, as we ascend in the scale, greater developments of parts which in lower life were either but feebly developed or otherwise unrepresented at all. To this plain fact, we may add two others which lead toward the understanding of the seat and locale of the emotions. In man and his nearest allies, two of the five or six parts of which a typical brain may be said to consist have become immensely developed as compared with the other regions. And it is on this latter account that we familiarly speak of man's brain as consisting of two chief portions-the big brain, or cerebrum, filling well-nigh the whole brain-case; and the little brain, or cerebellum, which lies toward the hinder part of the head. To these chief parts of the brain we may add-by way of comprehending the emotional localities the sensory ganglia," or, as they are collectively termed, the sensorium." In these latter nerve-masses or ganglia the nerves of special sense-those of sight, hearing, smell, etc.-terminate. Impressions of sight, for instance, received by the eyes, are transferred to the appropriate ganglia in which the act of mind we term see

ing" is excited. ing" is excited.

And so also with hearing and the other senses; the organ of sense being merely the "gateway of knowledge," and the true consciousness in which knowledge resides being thus excited within the brain. Add to these primary details one fact more, namely, that the spinal cord, protected within the safe encasement formed by the backbone, possesses at its upper or brain end a large nervous mass known as the "medulla oblongata," and our anatomical details respecting the nerve-centres may be safely concluded. From the "medulla oblongata" the nerves which in large measure regulate or affect breathing, swallowing, and the heart's action, spring; so that whatever be the importance of the "medulla oblongata'

as

an independent centre of mind or brain, there can be no question of its high office as a controller of processes on which the very continuance of life itself depends.

In what part of the nerve-centres are the emotions situated-in big brain, little brain, sensorium, or medulla?—is a query which may now be relevantly asked. The ingenuous reader, imbued with a blind faith in the unity of scientific opinion on matters of importance, will be surprised to find that in the archives of physiology very varied replies may be afforded to this question. Opinions backed by the weight of great authority will tell us that big brain" is the seat of the emotions, intelligence, the will, and of all those higher nerve functions which contribute to form the characteristic mental existence of man. Such a view, say its upholders, is supported more generally and fully by the facts of physiology and zoology, and by those of sanity and insanity, than any other theory of the exact situation of the "Inental light." Authority of equally eminent character, however, is opposed to the foregoing view regarding the superiority of the big brain over all other parts of the nervous centres; and in this latter instance our attention is directed to the claims of the "sensorium" as already defined, and as distinguished from the big brain itself, to represent the seat of the emotions. The emotions of the lower animals, we are reminded, bear a relation to the development of these sensory ganglia, rather