author produced to prove that souls were consubstantial with God, (according to that writer,) as much as the Son was supposed to be by the Nicene Council; it was so mean, and so unworthy a suggestion, that I thought it proper to vindicate P Tertullian, as falsely charged in that matter. It was of some moment that Tertullian had utterly denied it of angels; or even archangels, and of the highest order. This the objector takes no notice of. Tertullian denies that the soul comes up usque ad vim divinitatis, and explains himself inoffensively on that head; as I observed. Nay, he argues through the whole chapter against Marcion's tenet, of the soul being substantia Creatoris, the substance of (or consubstantial with) its Creator. Yet this writer here goes on with the same ridiculous charge, founding it upon words that express nothing of it. What the words mean, I intimated at large in the place referred to9: and this gentleman makes no reply to it. Why he did not, is best known to himself.

VI. We come next to Origen, whom, it seems, I have greatly injured in rendering, μετέδωκε γὰς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς μεγαXIÓNTOS, hath imparted even his greatness, instead of has imparted even of his greatnesss. But I am sure he has injured Origen a great deal more by suppressing the remaining part of the sentence, which shows what Origen meant, viz. that the Son is commensurate with the Father in greatness. This was not imparting some small pittance of his greatness, but equal greatness, or his whole greatness and this gentleman might have considered that μeradiowμs commonly governs a genitive case; which is sufficient to take off the force of his criticism: though I must own I see but little difference in the two ways of

See Reply, p. 55, 225, 328. Preface, p. 6.

P Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 97. Compare Pamelii Paradox. Tertullian.

n. 3.

4 Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 115. Vid. Tertull. contr. Marc. lib. ii. c. 9. r Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 47.

• Observations, p. 25, 126.

speaking, nor that either of them may not be admitted; provided only that the whole sense of Origen in that passage be taken along with it.

t

As to another place of Origen, this writer desires that my Defence and his Reply" may be compared; which I desire also.

The same I say as to a third place of Origen.

As to a fourth place in Origen, this writer is pleased to stand corrected in respect of his translation of it, which I found fault withy. As to his further endeavours to defeat the meaning of that place, I am willing to trust them with the reader, after he has seen the passage itself, and what I have said upon it.

Another passage of Origen I shall likewise trust with the reader, if he pleases but to look into my Second Defence. This writer here (p. 127.) talks of my construction being "contrary to the nature of all language;" as if the nature of language never admitted any adjective to stand alone, the substantive being sufficiently intimated from the context. But this is his forward way of talking: and he seems to think he has a right to be believed upon his word.

VII. This article concerns Novatian. I have fully expressed myself, as to this author, in many places of my Defences, which the reader that thinks it of importance may please to consult. I forbear any farther dispute about the reading of a certain passage, till the learned Mr. Welchman's new edition of that author appears, which may probably give us some farther light into it.

VIII. The eighth article, instead of proving any misrepresentation upon me, only revives the memory of a great one of his owna; which discovered his small ac

* Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 69, 106. Reply to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 227.

* Compare Reply, p. 295. and Observations, p. 63. with my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 258, 371.

y Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 367, 368.

(z Ibid. p. 69.

Ibid. p. 200.

quaintance with the ancients. As to this writer's excep tions to Hippolytus, I have sufficiently obviated them elsewhere and one would think that Tertullian's use of the word Persona, in the same sense with Hippolytus's πgównov, might have screened the latter from this author's censure in that particular. But supposing I had less to plead for my saying that the Sabellian singularity consisted in making the Godhead μovoпрóσwлоs, and that I had expressed it in a phrase that came not into use till the fourth century; can there be a greater mark of pedantry, than for a man to take me up, and cavil at the bare expression, and to charge me with an untruth upon it? How would it look to charge Basil, and Chrysostom, and Theodoret, as reporting a thing notoriously untrue, when they represent Sabellius as making the Godhead Evπgóownov, just as I do? Would not the man be taken for a jester, or a very ignorant man, in doing it, as cavilling only at a mode of expression? But I proceed.

IX. The author here censures me for rendering ovagxías by unity, rather than monarchy, in a passage of Pope Dionysius. My reasons for so doing, I conceive, were such as these: 1. That the same Dionysius had expressed the same thing a little higher by the word μováda, which signifies unity and he seems to have chosen povagxias after, only to vary the phrase. 2. Because in the words immediately preceding, he is speaking of the union of Father and Son; by which he solves the difficulty objected, and not by throwing the oneness of Godhead upon the Father alone, exclusive of the other Persons. 3. Because rpias, Trinity, is the word opposed to μovagxías in the same sentence; Dionysius showing that there must be a Trinity, and withal an Unity (say I) preserved. These reasons made me prefer the word unity. When this author has better for the word monarchy, and in his sensed, I shall be ready to accept it, instead of the other.

b Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 102, 228.

• Ibid. p. 110.

It is to be noted, that povagxía, in this subject, sometimes signifies, not

X. Here I am charged with mistranslating a word in Eusebius, grnuévn, which I render compactede, that is, constituted; which, it seems, is wonderfully done. But the wonder may cease, if it be considered, 1. That in the same place the equality is mentioned as belonging to the ternary number, here considered as a figure of the Trinity. 2. That the rpias is there also made the one apx, Source of all things. 3. That the whole rpias is said to be iptnμévn, compacted, as I render it. For had the meaning been that two Persons were dependent on one, the epithet would not have been applied to the whole Trinity. 4. There is a plain opposition between the τριὰς and the τῶν γενητῶν. Whether these reasons may convince our writer or no, I know not if he pleases, he may go on wondering at very plain things, to show his want of reflection. He will have it that prun there signifies a connection of things, one depending on or derived from another. He has not thought fit to give us any translation of the place, according to his own sense of it: but all he says in favour of it is only misreport of the use of the word avapxos, as I shall show hereafter.

The second passage f of Eusebius I leave to the reader; this gentleman having no way of eluding my sense of it, but by misrepresenting it, after his manner.

XI. The next relates to Gregory Nysseng, where this writer has nothing to show but chicane. I translate some words that may be seen in the place referred to, thus: "Neither let us dissolve the immediate connection, by

considering the will in the generation." Upon which my acute censor thus remarks: as if the author meant to say, that "considering the will of the Father in the ge"neration of the Son, would be a dissolving of the im

monarchy, but unity of headship, or principle, source, or fountain, as in Athanasius.

Δεχθείη δὲ ἂν καὶ οὕτως μία ἀρχὴ θεότητος, καὶ ἐ δύο ἀρχαί· ὅθεν κυρίως καὶ povagxía sotív. Athan. Orat. 4. init.

• Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 118.

Ibid. p. 283, 284.

f Ibid. p. 146.

"mediate connection." No, neither the author nor I meant to say it: the words immediately foregoing show that we did not; nor does my translation imply any such thing. But the meaning is, that the notion of will was not to be carried so far, as to destroy that necessary conneclion.

XII. As to the passage of Cyril, and my inference, as he calls it, from it, (which is not my inference, but an inference which is mentioned as having some colour, and at the same time confuted by the late learned Benedictine editor, as I observed b,) this writer might as well have let it alone, unless he had known more of it. Had not that learned editor given us much better arguments against that inference than the Observator has, it would be more considerable than he imagines. The reader that desires to know more of this matter may consult the learned Toutée's Dissertation, before referred to; and which this writer has fraudulently concealed from the reader, in order to make way for his charge upon me.

My words are these: "If there is any thing to be "suspected of Cyril, it is rather his excluding the Father "from being Creator, than the Son from being efficient: "but the late learned Benedictine editor has sufficiently "cleared up Cyril's orthodoxy on that head." Now after I had so plainly declared against the inference, is it not very unaccountable in this gentleman to charge me with it, and in the manner he does?"The Doctor's inference," says he, "from the words of Cyril, is as remarkable an "instance of the strength of prejudice, as (I think) I ever "met with," p. 131. I may much more reasonably say, that this representation is as remarkable an instance of the strength of malice, as I ever met with. See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 311, 313, 385. where I take notice of the Father being represented as issuing out orders for creating, and the Son as creating: which is

h Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 312.

i Dissert. iii. de Doctrin. Cyrilli, p. 139, &c.