Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session ...
United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976 - 416 pàgines
Què opinen els usuaris - Escriviu una ressenya
No hem trobat cap ressenya als llocs habituals.
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
action agree amendment American Answer appropriate approval argument arrangements Assistant authority believe bill Chairman clause Committee concerning conclude concurrent resolution conduct Congress congressional consent considered Constitution consultation cooperation countries decisions delegation Department disapproval discussion effect enacted enter established example executive agreements executive branch exercise fact force foreign affairs foreign policy Foreign Relations framers give hearings House important independent intent international agreements involved issue Justice kind language legislative legislative veto Leigh limited matter means ment military national commitment necessary negotiation Office particular passed practice present President Presidential problem procedure Professor proposed Public pursuant question reason referred regulation Representatives respect responsibility Scalia Senate separation of powers specific statement statute Subcommittee submitted suggested Supreme Court tion treaty United veto vote Zablocki
Pàgina 401 - The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Pàgina 4 - For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section — (1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die ; and (2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the 60-day period.
Pàgina 213 - In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the Nation.
Pàgina 306 - He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands.
Pàgina 31 - ... where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
Pàgina 108 - TITLE I Sec. 101. In order to carry out the policies and accomplish the objectives set forth in section 2 of this Act, the President is authorized to negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly countries to provide for the sale of agricultural commodities for dollars on credit terms or for foreign currencies.
Pàgina 244 - President by an exertion of legislative power; but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations...
Pàgina 398 - Congress is in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days...
Pàgina 34 - It was shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.