1838. Nov. 7. A lady being entitled, subject to a prior life estate, to certain free hold and funded property, she settled the same, on her first marriage, for her separate use, independent of her intended, or any other husband. Her first husband died, and she married a second time: Held, that the property still belonged to her as her se parate estate. THIS DIXON v. DIXON. HIS bill was filed by Ann Maria Dixon, the wife of the Defendant, John Dixon, by her next friend, against her husband and a trustee, claiming to be entitled to certain property, as being her separate estate, under the following circumstances: At the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff, Ann Maria Dixon, then Ann Maria Shields, with her first husband, Samuel Simpson, she was entitled, in remainder, to a certain portion of two freehold houses, her mother having a previous life estate therein: she was also entitled, in remainder, to a share in two sums of money invested in the funds, in which also her mother had a previous life estate. In August 1821, the Plaintiff (her mother being then living), married Samuel Simpson, on which occasion a settlement was executed, whereby her interest in these freeholds was conveyed to trustees, in trust, for sale, and she assigned to trustees all her interest in the stocks and funds; and it was declared, that the trustees should stand possessed of the produce of the real estate and of the funds, upon the trusts following: Upon trust and to the intent that, during the natural life of the Plaintiff, the interest, dividends, or annual proceeds of the said trust monies, stocks, funds, and securities, might be for the sole and separate use and disposal of the Plaintiff, exclusive of the said Samuel Simpson, or any other husband with whom she might intermarry, and free from his debts, engagements, dominion and control; and to that end, upon trust, to pay such interests, dividends, or annual proceeds from time to to time as the same should be due, and be received either into the proper hands of the Plaintiff, and for which her receipt, notwithstanding her coverture, should be a good discharge, or to such person or persons, and for such use and purpose as she, by writing under her hand, should, notwithstanding her coverture, from time to time, as the interest, dividends, or annual proceeds should arise, but not in any way by anticipation, direct. And it was by the said indenture further declared and agreed by and between the parties thereto, subject, and without prejudice, to such powers of appointment and provision, for advancement for the children of the marriage, as were therein mentioned; that in case there should not be any child or children of the intended marriage, or if there should not be any child who should become entitled to a vested interest in the trust monies, stocks, funds, or securities, the trustees and the survivor of them, and the executors or administrators of such survivor, should stand possessed and interested of and in the same, in trust, for the Plaintiff, her executors, administrators and assigns, in case she should happen to survive the said S. Simpson. Samuel Simpson died in October 1827, without having had any children by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff afterwards married the Defendant, John Dixon, on which occasion no settlement was executed; and, in February 1838, the Plaintiff's mother died, whereby the Plaintiff became entitled, in possession, to her proportion of the freeholds and of the funds in question: she filed this bill in February 1838, stating these circumstances, and that she had not, for some time past, been supported by John Dixon, and that she was therefore wholly without the means of subsistence: the bill also stated that, on the second marriage, her husband had notice of the settlement. The Defendant, the husband, by his an swer, 1838. DIXON v. DIXON. 1838. DIXON บ. DIXON. swer, admitted that, prior to his marriage with the Plaintiff, he had heard that a settlement had been executed on the occasion of the Plaintiff's previous marriage with Samuel Simpson; but the Defendant said he was never made acquainted with, or informed of the contents of that settlement, and that he never saw the same; he submitted, whether the settlement made on the first marriage of the Plaintiff was binding on him, and he claimed to be absolutely entitled, for his own use, to the whole of the property: he also stated that he had separated from his wife in consequence of her misconduct. Mr. Pemberton and Mr. Thompson, for the Plaintiff. Mr. Kindersley and Mr. Stuart, contrà, for John Dixon. The MASTER of the ROLLS held, that the Plaintiff was entitled, for her separate use, to the income of the trust funds. Nov. 16. Dec. 7, 8. One of several TH FEARY v. STEPHENSON. HE original bill in this case was filed by Samuel Feary, A. Manning, and W. C. Bromley, and Elizabeth his wife, against Joseph Stephenson, and William Read (trustees under the will of John Stephenson), Elizabeth Stephenson the executrix, and other parties interested in the residue of the testator's estate, for an account was filed by the other coPlaintiffs against the mortgagee and the provisional assignees alone: Held, that the Defendants in the original suit, who were accounting parties, ought also to have been made parties to the supplemental suit. account of the real and personal estate of the testator, and for payment of one eighth part thereof, to which Elizabeth Bromley, as one of the children of the testator, was entitled. W. C. Bromley and Elizabeth Bromley, it appeared, had assigned their share to Feary, in consideration of a sum of 600l.; but Feary, by a memorandum indorsed on the assignment, admitted this sum to be the money of Manning, and that he was a mere trustee for him. Feary afterwards purchased of Manning, and became entitled to one half of the said share. These facts appeared on the original bill. Feary subsequently assigned his interest to Reeves, by way of mortgage, and afterwards took the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors' Act. A supplemental bill stating these circumstances, was then filed by Manning and Bromley and his wife, against Reeves and the provisional assignee alone. The original and supplemental suits now came on for hearing. Mr. Kindersley and Mr. O. Anderdon, for the Plaintiffs. Mr. Pemberton and Mr. Jeremy, for the Defendants, the trustees, objected to the case proceeding, on the ground, that Stephenson and Read had not been made parties to the supplemental bill. Mr. Cooper, for one of the Defendants, referred to a case of Lloyd v. Meredith. (a) (a) At the Rolls, 15th March 1838, unreported. The 1838. FEARY ย. STEPHENSON. 1838. FEARY v. STEPHENSON. Nov. 7. The MASTER of the ROLLS. The original bill was filed by three persons, alleged to have an interest in the testator's estate, and it was answered by the accounting party; Feary and Manning and Bromley and wife were the parties to whom the Defendants were called on to account. The bill is brought to a hearing, and then it is admitted that Feary has no interest; therefore, as it now stands, the suit is prosecuted by a party who has no interest; and it is then alleged, that there is another suit to which the assignees of Feary are made parties. I must have some authority produced before I can allow this case to go on. The cases in which the interest of a Defendant has devolved upon another person, raised a very different question. The case stood over to produce authorities. Mr. Kindersley and Mr. O. Anderdon. It is not necessary to make the original Defendants parties to a supplemental bill, unless they have an interest in the supplemental matter. This was decided by Sir John Leach in Bignall v. Atkins. (a) The same objection, as in the present case, was raised in Greenwood v. Atkinson (b), but it was overruled by the Vice-Chancellor. What possible interest can the trustees have in the matters stated in this supplemental bill? their liability is neither increased nor diminished. Where, in the progress of a suit, a child comes into esse, and who, being one of a class, becomes interested in the subject matter of the suit, it is the practice to file a supplemental bill against that child alone, and not to make all the other original Defendants parties thereto. Again, where in the progress of a suit it becomes necessary to revive, the bill of (a) 6 Mad. 569. (b) 5 Sim. 419. |