the contrary, it gave them power to act in certain cases, but to prevent doubts as to the extent of the power so given, provided that they should not act in the determination of appeals against orders affecting parishes in which they were rateable. Besides, here the magistrate, whose vote is disputed, did act in the determination of the appeal; for the case granted by the Court became a part of the order of sessions made on hearing the appeal. ABBOTT C. J. We think it the safer course to hold that magistrates should not interfere in cases where they are interested, and that the rule for quashing the writ of certiorari must be made absolute., Rule absolute. 1826. The KING against GUDRIDGE. The KING against The Inhabitants of LLANTIL UPON an appeal against an order of two justices, whereby W. Edwards, his wife, and children, were removed from the parish of Saint Peter, in the county of Hereford, to the parish of Lllantillio Grossenny, in the county of Monmouth, the court of quarter sessions confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of this Court on the following case: 4. made a parol agreement with B. for the purchase of a cottage and garden for 401. A. took possession, and paid 301. on account, and resided upon the premises. No conveyance was executed. After A. had been in possession twelve months, he sold the property for 40l. to C., to whom he gave up possession. A. afterwards paid the remainder of the purchase-money to B. Held, that A. did not gain any settlement by the purchase of any estate or interest within the statute 9 G. 1. c. 7. s. 5. : (a) Three of the Judges of this court sat, as our former occasions, from Tuesday the 9th to Saturday the 13th of May inclusive. During that period this and the following cases were argued and determined. W. Ed 1826. The KING against The Inhabitants of LLANTILLIO W. Edwards was born in the parish of Llantillio Grossenny, and he also gained a settlement in that parish by hiring and service. The parish of Llantillio Grossenny relied on shewing a subsequent settlement in a third GROSSENNY. parish, namely Skenfreth, in the county of Monmouth. In 1816 the pauper made a parol agreement with one Ann Carter for the purchase of a cottage and garden in the parish of Skenfreth, for the sum of 401. Under this contract he took possession and paid Ann Carter, 30l. on account; no conveyance was ever executed. After the pauper had been in possession twelve months, living and sleeping in it with his wife and children, he sold the property for 40l. to S. Watkins, to whom he gave up possession, and afterwards paid the remaining 10l. to A. Carter. The pauper was never in possession of the premises after he had paid the whole of the purchasemoney. S. Watkins is now in the possession of the cottage and garden. The question for the opinion of this Court was, whether the pauper gained a settlement in Skenfreth. Nolan, in support of the order of sessions, relied upon Rex v. Long Bennington (a) and Rex v. Geddington (b), as decisive authorities to shew that the pauper did not gain any settlement by the purchase of any estate or interest within the statute 9 G. 1. c.7. He was then stopped by the Court. Maule and Watson, contrà. This case is distinguishIn Rex v. Geddington (c), by (a) Cited by Bayley J. in Rex v. Geddington, 2 B. & C. 132. (b) 2 B. & C. 129. (c) 2 B. & C. 129. the به the terms of the contract, the purchase-money was to be paid, and the conveyance was to be executed on a particular day. In this case no time was fixed for payment of the purchase-money, or for making the conveyance. In Rex v. Geddington the pauper could not call for any conveyance before the day appointed. Here the pauper was let into possession, and might immedi ately, on paying the 107., have demanded a conveyance. There the residue of the purchase-money was never paid, but the contract was rescinded. Here, the residue of the purchase-money was paid, and the contract was ultimately performed. During the whole time the pauper resided on the premises he had an equitable estate upon condition, the condition being the payment of the resis due of the purchase-money. When that condition was performed, he acquired an equitable estate by relation, from the time when his occupation commenced. BAYLEY J. It is very desirable to adhere to the language of the act of parliament, and to the construction put upon that language in decided cases. The statute 9 G. 1. c. 7. s. 5. enacts, "that no person shall be deemed to acquire or gain any settlement in any parish, for or by virtue of any purchase of any estate or interest in such parish, whereof the consideration for such purchase doth not amount to the sum of 30%. bona fide paid." There must, therefore, be a purchase of an estate or interest, and by the latter word must be understood some specific definite interest, and the party contracting must become the purchaser. Rex v. Long Bennington (a) and Rex v. Geddington (b) establish, that although (a) 2 B. & C. 132. (b) 2 B. & C. 129. an 1826. The KING against The Inhabitants of LLANTILLIO GROSSENNY. 1826. The KING against The Inhabitants of LLANTILLIO GROSSENNY. an equitable estate is sufficient to give a settlement, still the purchase must be completed; and that if it be not an estate, but an equitable right only, no settlement is gained. The principle deducible from those cases is, that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust must be created, in order to give a settlement by the purchase. In Rex v. Geddington the agreement was to purchase an estate for 310l., of which 160l. was to be paid on the 30th November, and 150l. on the 24th June then next. The latter sum was never paid; the pauper resided a year and a half, and afterwards the contract was rescinded. There, by paying 150l., a perfect equitable estate would have been acquired, but it was never paid, and therefore the pauper was held never to have had a perfect equitable estate. Here the pauper had paid 30%., and by paying 10%. more he would have performed all he was bound to do, and would have acquired a perfect equitable estate. During the whole time the pauper was in possession in this case he might have been removed. He never was the purchaser of an estate or definite interest. It has been ingeniously argued, that the payment of the 10l. would have given the purchaser a right to demand a conveyance; and that as it might have been made at any time, the payment, when made, related back to the time when the occupation began; and, therefore, that the estate by relation was the estate of the purchaser, from the time when his occupation commenced. I think, however, that for the purpose of gaining a settlement, such a payment did not give him the estate ab initio, but only from the time when the payment was actually made. The expression of my Brother Holroyd, in Rex v. Geddington (a), as to the vendee having acquired a settlement by having paid or offered to pay the remainder of the purchase-money, must be understood in that sense. HOLROYD J. I think there is no distinction between the cases of Rex v. Bennington and Rex v. Geddington (a), and the present case. The pauper in this case never was in possession of the estate after he had paid the 107. He therefore never came to settle upon his own estate. A tender of the purchase-money perhaps might have been equivalent to payment on the principle that an offer to perform is equivalent to actual performance; but then in that case, in order to give a settlement, the purchaser at the time of the tender must have had a right to continue to hold the premises. Here, at the time when the payment of the residue was made, the purchaser had no right to hold the possession of the premises. LITTLEDALE J. concurred. Order of sessions confirmed. (a) 2 B. & C. 129. 1826. The KING against The Inhabitants of LLANTILLIO GROSSENNY. |