But, on the contrary, if a man's views centre only in the applause of others, whether it be deserved or not; if he pants after popularity and fame, not regarding how he comes by it; if his passion for praise urge him to stretch himself beyond the line of his capacity, and to attempt things to which he is unequal; to condescend to mean arts and low dissimulation, for the sake of a name; and, in a sinister, indirect way, sue hard for a little incense, not caring from whom he receives it; it then degenerates into what is properly called vanity. And if it excites a man to wicked attempts, and makes him willing to sacrifice the esteem of all wise and good men, to the shouts of the giddy multitude; if his ambition overleaps the bounds of decency and truth, and breaks through obligations of honour and virtue; it is then not only vanity, but vice; a vice the most destructive to the peace and happiness of human society, and which, of all others, hath made the greatest havoc and devastation among men.

What an instance have we here of the wide difference between common opinion and truth! that a vice, so big with mischief and misery, should be mistaken for a virtue! and that they, who have been most infamous for it, should be crowned with laurels, even by those who have been ruined by it, and have those laurels perpetuated by the common consent of men through after ages! Seneca's judgment of Alexander is certainly more agreeable to truth than the common opinion; who called him 6 a public cut-throat, rather than a hero; and who, in seeking only to be a terror to mankind, arose to no greater an excellence, than what belonged to the most hurtful and hateful animals on earth.'

Certain it is, that these false heroes are, of all men, most ignorant of themselves, who seek their

gain and glory from the destruction of their own species; and, by this wicked ambition, entail infamy and curses upon their name and family, instead of that immortal glory they pursued, and imagined they had attained. According to the prophet's words, "Woe to him who coveteth an evil covetousness to his house, that he may set his nest on high; that he may be delivered from the power of evil! Thou hast consulted shame to thine house, by cutting off many people; and hast sinned against thy soul;' Hab. ii. 9, 10.

Now no man can truly know himself till he be acquainted with this, which is so often the secret and unperceived spring of his actions, and observes how far it governs and influences him in his conversation and conduct.

And, to correct the irregularity and extravagance of this passion, let us but reflect how airy and unsubstantial a pleasure the highest gratifications of it afford; how many cruel mortifications it exposes us to, by awakening the envy of others; to what meanness it often makes us submit; how frequently it loseth its end, by pursuing it with too much ardour (for virtue and real excellence will rise to the view of the world, though it be not mounted on the wings of ambition, which, by soaring too high, procures but a more fatal fall); and how much more solid pleasure the approbation of conscience will yield, than the acclamations of ignorant and mistaken men, who, judging by externals only, cannot know our true character, and whose commendations a wise man would rather despise than court. Examine but the size of people's sense, and the condition of their understanding, and you will never be fond of popularity, nor afraid of censure; nor solicitous what judgment they may form of you,

who know not how to judge rightly of themselves. -Marc. Anton. lib. ix. § 18.

CHAP. XIII.

What kind of Knowledge we are already furnished with, and what degree of esteem we set upon it.

XII. A MAN can never rightly know, himself, unless he examines into his knowledge of other things.'

We must consider, then, the knowledge we have; and whether we do not set too high a price upon it, and too great a value upon ourselves on the account of it; of what real use it is to us, and what effect it hath upon us; whether it does not make us too stiff, unsociable, and assuming; testy and supercilious, and ready to despise others for their supposed ignorance. If so, our knowledge, be it what it will, does us more harm than good. We were better without it; ignorance itself would not render us so ridiculous. Such a temper, with all our knowledge, shews that we know not ourselves.

A man is certainly proud of that knowledge he despises others for the want of.'

How common it is for some men to be fond of appearing to know more than they do, and of seeming to be thought men of knowledge! To which end, they exhaust their fund almost in all companies to outshine the rest; so that in two or three conversations they are drawn dry, and you see to the bottom of them much sooner than you could at first imagine. And even that torrent of learning which they pour upon you at first so unmercifully, rather confounds than satisfies you. Their visible aim is not to inform your judgment, but display

their own. You have many things to query and except against, but their loquacity gives you no room; and their good sense, set off to so much advantage, strikes a modest man dumb. If you insist upon your right to examine, they retreat, either in confusion or equivocation; and, like the scuttle-fish, throw a large quantity of ink behind them, that you may not know where to pursue. Whence this foible flows is obvious enough. Selfknowledge would soon correct it.

But, as some ignorantly affect to be more knowing than they are, so others vainly affect to be more ignorant than they are; who, to shew they have greater insight and penetration than other men, insist upon the absolute uncertainty of science; will dispute even first principles; grant nothing as certain, and so run into downright pyrrhonism; the too common effect of abstracted debates excessively refined.

Every one is apt to set the greatest value upon that kind of knowledge in which he imagines he himself most excels, and to undervalue all other kinds of knowledge in comparison of it. There wants some certain rule, then, by which every man's knowledge is to be tried, and the value of it estimated. And let it be this: "That is the best and most valuable kind of knowledge, that is most subservient to the best ends, i. e. which tends to make a man wiser and better, or more agreeable and useful, both to himself and others.' For knowledge is but a means that relates to some end. And as all means are to be judged by the excellency of their ends, and their expediency to produce them; so, that must be the best knowledge that hath the directest tendency to promote the best ends, viz. a man's own true happiness, and that of

others; in which the glory of God, the ultimate end, is ever necessarily comprised.

Now, we were to judge of the several kinds of science by this rule, we should find,—(1.) Some of them to be hurtful and pernicious, as tending to pervert the true end of knowledge; to ruin a man's own happiness, and make him more injurious to society. Such is the knowledge of vice, the various temptations to it, and the secret ways of practising it; especially the arts of dissimulation, fraud, and dishonesty. (2.) Others will be found unprofitable and useless; as those parts of knowledge, which, though they may take up much time and pains to acquire, yet answer no valuable purpose; and serve only for amusement, and the entertainment of the imagination: for instance, an acquaintance with plays, novels, games, and modes, in which a man may be very critical and expert, and yet not a whit the wiser or more useful man. (3.) Other kinds of knowledge are good only relatively, or conditionally, and may be more useful to one than another; viz. a skill in a man's particular occupation or calling, on which his credit, livelihood, or usefulness in the world depends. And, as this kind of knowledge is valuable in proportion to its end, so it ought to be cultivated with a diligence and esteem answerable to that. (Lastly,) Other kinds of knowledge are good, absolutely and universally; viz. the knowledge of God and ourselves, the nature of our final happiness, and the way to it. This is equally necessary to all. And how thankful should we be, that we, who live under the light of the Gospel, and enjoy that light in its perfection and purity, have so many happy means and opportunities of attaining this most useful and necessary kind of knowledge!