the northeast. They all, therefore, as well as the few which reach the Gulf of Mexico, cross the track of the Panama and Nicaragua steamers and vessels.

It will be observed that of the 50 hurricanes, the ranges of which are given by Professor Johnston, but two crossed the route which is proposed to be followed by the Honduras line, namely, by land to Florida, and thence by steamers to Puerto Caballos.

Again: it is precisely in the line of all communication with Nicaragua and Panama that we find the region of rotatory or Caribbean hurricanes, as laid down by the same authority. These would be wholly avoided by taking the direction of Honduras.

Hence it appears that the proposed route of interoceanic communication by way of Honduras would be almost entirely free from the dangers resulting from hurricanes. When we consider that not far from 75,000 persons now pass annually, by way of the Isthmus, from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts of the continent, security from dangers of this kind becomes an

important consideration. The destruction of a merchant vessel, at the worst, involves but the loss of ten or twelve lives and a few thousand dollars of property; and, however deplorable the catastrophe may be regarded, it sinks into insignificance when compared with the loss of a California packet, with its five or six hundred passengers and millions of treasure. An important result, therefore, is gained if danger from this source be obviated or diminished; for any diminution of the contingencies of travel must be regarded as a public good.*

There is still another point in the chart of Professor Johnston which deserves notice in this connection. It is the course of the "northers," or dreaded north winds of the Gulf of Mexico, which have been so often productive of the greatest disasters to shipping. These winds sweep down the valley of the Mississippi, and across the Gulf of Mexico into the bight of the gulf lying between the peninsula of Yucatan and the lower states of Mexico. They blow with more or less constancy, and often with terrible force, for six months of the year, from September to March, on nearly a direct line from the mouth of the Mississippi to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. As they advance across the Gulf, their force is augmented, and the contraction of the land contributes to give them a power, at times, almost equaling the hurricanes of the Antilles. This fact, in conjunction with the circumstance that Tehuantepec has absolutely no port at its northern or gulf terminus in which steamers or sailing vessels could

* Since the above paragraphs were first printed, they have received a fearful illustration in the loss of the steamer "Central America" off the coast of Carolina in September, 1857. This disaster involved a loss of not less than 460 lives, and nearly $2,000,000 of treasure, apart from other valuable property.

find refuge, demonstrates its utter inadequacy for the great purpose of inter-oceanic communication. The impossibility of any vessel entering the River Coatzacoalcos, which opens due north, over a bar on which the maximum of water never exceeds thirteen feet, during the prevalence of the northers, when the waves run to half that depth, and leave scarcely more than a fathom of water on the bar, is obvious to the dullest apprehension and the most prejudiced mind.

XVI. TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE.

Let us consider, for a single moment, the relations in respect of transmission of intelligence which the proposed work would open up. I take it for granted that the Atlantic telegraph will be laid down within the present year, and thus put London in, I may say, instantaneous communication with every part of the United States-with the far-off prairies and the southernmost capes of Florida. From the point last named to Havana, in the island of Cuba, is but 130 miles. To continue the connection thence to the Bay of Fonseca, it will only be necessary to construct 180 miles of land telegraph to Cape San Antonio, 270 miles of submarine telegraph thence to the British establishment at Belize, 120 miles of submarine telegraph,thence to Puerto Caballos, and 200 miles of land telegraph to the Bay of Fonseca. That is to say, assuming the telegraph connection with Havana complete, a supplement of 340 miles of land and 430 miles of submarine telegraph would complete the communication between London, New York, Havana, and the Bay of Fonseca! In other words, it would put London within eight days of San Francisco, six days of Callao, ten days of Valparaiso, and 35 days of Australia.

At present, the naval stations, both of the United States and Great Britain, in the Pacific, are established at Valparaiso. Orders from London to the British Pacific squadron have, therefore, not only to traverse the Atlantic, but nearly the whole western coast of South America to reach their destination. Now, as

nearly all the points on the Pacific where the services of national vessels would be required lie not only to the northward of Valparaiso, but to the north of the equator itself, it follows that vessels assigned to any specific duty would be required to sail back over the line which their orders had traversed, and, in case of sailing vessels, be subject to weeks of detention in passing the latitude of calms and variable winds. Thus, if a steamer were selected for duty, say at Acapulco, on the coast of Mexico, her orders would have to go 2880 miles out of the way to reach her in Valparaiso, and the vessel afterward would be obliged to sail 3480 miles to arrive at her destination! The time between the issue of the order and its execution, under no circumstances could be less than 45 days.

Let us imagine the Bay of Fonseca, which has every facility for the purpose, to be fixed upon as a naval station in the Pacific, and the telegraphic communication complete. In such event, orders issued from Washington or London would be able to reach the Pacific squadron within a single day, and, in the supposed case of a vessel destined to Acapulco, be executed within four days from their issue. And what is true of Acapulco would be true, in equal proportion, in the discharge of whatever service might be required of a squadron in the Pacific, whether on the western coast of America, the eastern shores of Asia, or at the isl ands of the Pacific. Hence may be deduced, and fair

Z z

ly, the importance of the proposed work in a governmental and executive point of view.

XVII. COMMERCE OF THE PACIFIC.

In the chapter on the proposed Nicaraguan Interoceanic Canal I have enumerated certain countries on the Pacific with which commerce would be facilitated by the construction of railways or canals across Central America. The actual trade with those countries, passing round Cape Horn or across the Isthmus, carefully calculated for the year 1854, presents the following aggregates, which have since been largely increased:

In other words, the commercial values which took this direction in the year 1854 amounted to a grand aggregate of $154,880,000. This is exclusive of the Australian trade, of which but a little more than $2,000,000 in value passed by the routes in question.

I shall not here discuss the probabilities of the trade of the British Australian colonies taking a direction across Central America, but content myself by saying that, exclusive of gold, the imports and exports of these colonies, collectively, for 1855, amounted to the following totals:

The commerce of California now, of course, constitutes the largest item in the aggregate of trade with